2021
Madison Paper Industries v. Madison (July 6, 2021) 2021 ME 35. The taxpayer sought an abatement of property tax for property that included a paper mill and two hydroelectric dams. The paper mill was located in the Town of Madison and the dams were partially located in Madison and partially located in the neighboring Town of Anson.
The taxpayer, Madison Paper Industries, argued that Madison incorrectly applied a value to the taxpayer’s property based on current use rather than highest and best use and, therefore, overvalued the taxpayer’s property. The taxpayer claimed that the highest and best use for the property was liquidation value, based on their intent to liquidate the property later in the year, even though the property was fully functional on April 1. The court ruled that current use is not excluded from highest and best use and that, in this case, since the mill was fully functional on April 1, the current use value was the highest and best value. The court dismissed the taxpayer’s argument and ruled in favor of the town.
Old Town v. Expera Old Town, LLC (April 20, 2021) 2021 ME 23. The City of Old Town contested an abatement ordered by Superior Court and calculated by the State Board of Property Tax Review (“SBPTR”), based on a bankruptcy sale and a liquidation sale of Expera’s paper mill. Expera argued that the bankruptcy and liquidation sales were arm’s-length transactions and that, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Terfloth v. Scarborough (90 A.3d 1131), must be considered indicative of market value. Expera further argued that, since the SBPTR did not make a statement on the arm’s-length transaction issue, that implied that SBPTR accepted the bankruptcy and liquidation sales as acceptable and indicative of market value. The court said that the Terfloth decision focused more on the determination and consideration of arm’s-length transactions and did not say that arm’s-length transactions were proof of market value in all cases. The court further found that the SBPTR’s silence on the issue was not proof that the bankruptcy and liquidation sales showed market value or that they were arm’s-length transactions. The court ruled in favor of Old Town, stating that Expera had “failed to meet its initial burden of showing that the assessments were manifestly wrong.”
Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corporation v. Jonesport (April 8, 2021) 2021 ME 21. The Maine Supreme Court, in this case, combined two separate issues. For the 2017 assessment year, the plaintiff taxpayer argued that the town’s adjustment of the amount of land excluded from farmland classification due to that land containing structures was wrong. For tax years 2015, 2016, and 2018, the taxpayer argued that their property was overvalued.
Building lot size
The defendant municipality applied a one-acre base lot to each of ten structures on the island, excluding a total of ten acres from farmland classification. The municipality adjusted the excluded land on the taxpayer’s farmland classification application from 5.7 acres to ten acres. The municipality argued that this one-acre base lot application was consistent with the valuation of all parcels in the municipality. The taxpayer argued that the additional land excluded by the municipality was actually being used as farmland and should be included in the program. The court ruled in favor of the taxpayer, stating that the law does not allow for a base lot methodology for the farmland program if it conflicts with the actual use of the land. The court instructed the municipality to grant the abatement requested for this issue.
Overvaluation
The plaintiff taxpayer argued that the property was substantially overvalued. The defendant municipality argued that the 200% factor applied to valuation of improvements on the island was appropriate because of the additional cost of construction on an island. The municipality further argued that the issue of overvaluation was previously decided in a 2017 Maine Supreme Court case involving valuation of the same property for tax year 2014 (Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corporation v. Jonesport (2017) 167 A.3d 564). The court ruled that the previous case settled the issue that the town did not discriminate by applying a higher valuation on island improvements than improvements on the mainland. The issue in this case was the taxpayer’s argument that the 200% factor exaggerated the value of island property. The court ruled that the taxpayer, which had the burden of proof, showed adequate evidence that the property was overvalued. The court remanded this case back to the Board of Appeals to determine the proper values.
2019
Bolton v. Scarborough (December 23, 2019) 2019 ME 172. The defendant town abated the plaintiffs' property value by 8%, which amounted to a total tax reduction equal to the total dollar value of the reduction in taxes received by the property owners in the abutting lot discount program previously ruled on in Angell v. Scarborough (149 A.2d, 2016) and Petrin v. Scarborough (147 A.2d, 2016). The plaintiff property owners appealed the town's abatement, requesting instead a 31.48% abatement. During the appeal process, the Scarborough Board of Assessment Review presented an alternative calculation that would result in a 14.74% abatement. The taxpayers appealed to Superior Court and then to the Supreme court. The town cross-appealed to reinstate the original 8% abatement. The court ruled in favor of the town, saying that the original 8% abatement calculation satisfied the equal protection, due process, and constitutional requirements, making the taxpayers whole.
Almeder v. Kennebunkport (October 3, 2019) 2019 ME 151. The plaintiff property owner, representing several property owners on Goose Rocks Beach, appealed a lower court decision that the defendant town owned the beach from the seawall to the low tide mark. The appeal offered several arguments.
The plaintiff argued that the defense's expert surveyor misinterpreted the location of the seawall and the intent of the original deeds. The court ruled that the surveyor was qualified, and the lower court correctly relied on his testimony.
The plaintiff argued that, despite the lower court's ruling, title to the beach was established and that the old deeds that originally transferred the land to private owners intended to include the beach with the transfer. The court ruled that the lower court interpreted the deeds correctly in that the seaward boundary of the properties was the seawall.
The plaintiff argued that the court misinterpreted the term "seawall." The court ruled that the lower court correctly interpreted the term. The law court then officially defined the term as a "physical feature on the face of the earth that acts as a barrier or wall – either man-made or naturally occurring – that acts to impede the flow of the sea." The court also noted that seawalls are located above the high water mark.
The plaintiff argued that the seawall is not the boundary of the owners' properties and that the property line extends to the low water mark. The court ruled that the old deeds clearly stated that the seawall is the seaward boundary of the properties.
Finally, the plaintiff argued that the land from the seawall to the low water mark had never officially been transferred to the town and, therefore, ownership should revert to the property owners. The court ruled that, while there were ambiguities, the town (except in one property owner's case) is the rightful owner of the beach from the low water mark to the seawall. Back to case list.
Blue Sky West v. Maine Revenue Services (August 20, 2019) 2019 ME 137. To assist with valuation of property in the unorganized territory, Maine Revenue Services (MRS) requested financial information from the plaintiff, through a request for information pursuant to 36 M.R.S. § 706. The plaintiff submitted the information requested, then subsequently (several months later) sent a notice declaring that information as confidential. Between receipt of the documents and the declaration of confidentiality, MRS received a Freedom of Access Act (FOAA) request for the plaintiff's documents. The plaintiff argued that documents it provided to MRS were confidential and are not subject to a FOAA request. MRS claimed that, since the documents were not clearly marked as confidential, as required by § 706, they were not confidential and could be released through a FOAA request. The court agreed, stating that the documents, when submitted, must be labelled as confidential to be treated as such. Back to case list.
Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, LLC (March 28, 2019) 206 A.3d 283. The issue in this case involved the defendant harvesting rockweed (a type of seaweed) from the intertidal zone of land owned by the plaintiff. The defendant argued that this harvesting constituted fishing and navigation, which are two of the three activities allowed by the public in the intertidal zone (fishing, fowling, navigation). The court ruled that harvesting rockweed, a marine plant attached to rocks in the intertidal area, does not meet the definition of navigation or fishing, even using a broad interpretation of those terms. In the future, anyone harvesting seaweed from the intertidal zone must first have permission from the landowner. Back to case list.
2017
Eddington v. Emera Maine (December 7, 2017) 174 A.3d 321. The case is based on whether a mistake by the defendant regarding property ownership constitutes an error in valuation or an illegality, error or irregularity in assessment. The defendant taxpayer had mistakenly reported ownership of a transmission line that was in fact owned by another company. The property was assessed to and taxes were collected from both companies for that transmission line. The defendant subsequently realized its mistake and applied for an abatement to the municipal officers. The plaintiff municipality argued that the error was one of valuation, which required the taxpayer to apply for abatement within 185 days. Since the taxpayer missed that deadline, the municipality denied the abatement. The court ruled in favor of the taxpayer, that the error in this case was one of illegality, error or irregularity of assessment, which allowed request for abatement to the municipal officers between one and three years after commitment. The court specifically mentioned that double taxation is illegal. Back to case list.
State v. Biddeford Internet Corp. (October 10, 2017) 171 A.3d 603. The defendant taxpayer argued that the fees assessed by the plaintiff were not fees, but unconstitutional property taxes. The court applied the four-part test established in Lewiston v. Gladu, 2012 ME 42 to determine whether the charge represented a fee or a tax. The test requires that a fee must be: 1) imposed with the primary purpose of furthering regulations rather than raising revenue; 2) paid for benefits not received by the general public; 3) voluntary; and 4) a fair approximation of the cost to government and the benefit to party. The court ruled that the broadband sustainability fee charged in this case met all four criteria and was, therefore, a fee. Back to case list.
Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corporation v. Jonesport (July 11, 2017) 167 A.3d 564. The plaintiff taxpayer argued that the defendant municipality had engaged in unjust discrimination by valuing island property at a higher rate than similar property on the mainland. The municipality applied a 200% economic obsolescence multiplier to improvements on the island, due to the increased costs associated with island construction. The court ruled that the municipality did not discriminate because the same multiplier was applied to all municipal island structures. Further, sales ratio studies and contractor charges for island construction supported the multiplier. Back to case list.
2016
Angell Family 2012 Prouts Neck Trust v. Scarborough (October 13, 2016) 149 A.3d 271. This case was almost identical to Petrin v. Scarborough, but applied to a different area of the Town of Scarborough. In fact, both cases were heard by the court at the same time. As with Petrin, the court found that the partial town revaluation, affecting waterfront property only, was not discriminatory. The court also found that the method by which the town valued separate, adjacent lots with the same owners did violate the requirement to treat similar property equally. Back to case list.
Petrin v. Scarborough (August 16, 2016) 147 A.3d 842. The plaintiff taxpayers argued that the defendant town had unequally assessed certain waterfront property that resulted in higher property tax bills for the plaintiffs. The challenged assessment practice, the 'abutting property program,' involved separate, adjoining lots with the same owner. The town valued two adjoining lots as a single parcel, valuing the second lot as excess acreage, sometimes at a deep discount. The town, however, retained the lots as separate assessments and sent separate tax bills to the owners of the lots. The court ruled that separate lots cannot be considered a single parcel simply because they are adjacent. The plaintiffs are entitled to an abatement of taxes due to the additional burden imposed from the adjacent lot discount practice for the 2014 tax year. Going forward, the town will have to value the separate lots individually, presumably unless a taxpayer takes action to combine them into a single lot. The plaintiffs also argued that the town’s partial revaluation improperly targeted waterfront property. The court rejected that argument. Back to case list.
Cedar Beach/Cedar Island Supporters v. Gables Real Estate (July 19, 2016) 145 A.3d 1024. The plaintiffs argued that the public had an easement over a private way as access to a public beach. The defendant disputes the finding in Superior Court that the implied easement exists due to the public’s continuous use of the private way. The court ruled that the act of members of the public walking on the private way to get to the beach was not enough to overcome the property owner’s desire to restrict that use. Public foot traffic along the way to gain access to the beach is considered recreational use. To meet the test of establishing an implied easement over the objections of the property owner, public use must be more than recreational. Back to case list.
Pinkham v. Department of Transportation (May 19, 2016) 139 A.3d 904. The plaintiff disputed the value of land taken by the defendant through eminent domain. MDOT has a statute that says appraisal and valuation information is confidential. The plaintiff in this case requested (in Superior Court, where he disputed the amount MDOT gave him for part of his land) sales and appraisal data for other affected properties in the area where MDOT was taking land for an expansion. MDOT denied the request for reason of confidentiality. The court stated that there is a difference between confidentiality for a FOAA request and privileged information for purposes of discovery in a court case. The plaintiff was making a discovery request, rather than a FOAA request. The court ruled that, while the information the plaintiff sought was, by statue, confidential, it was not specifically stated as privileged and, therefore, subject to discovery in this case. Back to case list.
Chadwick BaRoss v. Westbrook (April 21, 2016) 137 A.3d 1020. The plaintiff argued that equipment it leased should be exempt from property tax under 36 M.R.S. § 655(1)(B), for personal property stock-in-trade (inventory). The plaintiff’s claim was based on a section of the company’s standard lease agreement that allows the plaintiff to replace a piece of leased equipment in possession of one customer to sell that equipment to another customer, therefore making all equipment inventory for sale. The court ruled that leased equipment is not inventory, since inventory must be “earning no profits while awaiting sale. ” The court also said that, since the leased equipment was not available for sale to the public without permission of the lessee, that further disqualified the property from exemption. Inventory must be in stock or on hand. Back to case list.
Wardwell v. Duggins (April 12, 2016) 136 A.3d. The plaintiff owned land on which the defendant had an easement. The plaintiff claimed that hunting and recreation were not part of the original easement and asked the court to remove that language from a lower court decision. The defendant argued that hunting and recreation had been traditional activities on the easement. The court looked first to the language of the deed, which was ambiguous. The court then looked to extrinsic evidence and recent use of the land to determine acceptable activity. The court determined that the public had traditionally used that land for hunting and fishing and that it was reasonable to expect that the owner of the dominant estate (defendant) would also enjoy those activities. The court ruled in favor of the defendant, allowing the hunting and recreation language and activity. Back to case list.
Carthage v. Friends of Maine’s Mountains (March 8, 2016) 134 A.3d 876. The plaintiff and defendant both claimed ownership of the same two parcels of land. The plaintiff town argued that it took possession of the property for nonpayment of taxes in 1905. The defendant argued that, since there was no deed showing ownership by the town, that the transfer was never made. The court ruled that the collector’s return, produced by the town, constituted prima facie evidence that the town had purchased the two lots. Back to case list.
Penkul v. Lebanon (January 21, 2016) 2016 ME 16. To generate a review of an appeal of the county commissioners’ decision, a taxpayer must provide a complete record of testimony and documents received by the commissioners. The burden of proof is on the taxpayer. In this case, the taxpayer provided insufficient records. Back to case list.
2015
Edwards v. Blackman (December 31, 2015) 129 A.3d 971. Two separate easements existed on the plaintiff’s property, one for the town to access (and, therefore, snowplow) the private road on the property and the other for a neighbor (the defendant) to access the plaintiff’s beach. The plaintiff questioned the validity of both easements. The plaintiff argued that a 1986 easement granted to the town contained an inadequate description of the road. The court ruled that the description was sufficient enough to identify the road. Regarding the defendant’s beach access, the plaintiff argued that the original 1924 easement did not pass through to the current owner of the dominant estate (the property benefitting from the easement). The court, in a previous ruling, declared that “Whenever possible an easement should be fairly construed to be appurtenant to the land of the person for whose use the easement is created. ” Because the original easement in this case was clear, the court determined that is was an appurtenant easement (attached to the land, rather than to the owner) and continued to the current owner. Back to case list.
French v. Gutzan (November 24, 2015) 128 A.3d 657. The plaintiff claimed that his property included an easement on the defendant’s property, allowing access to a road. The easement was created in the 1800s by parties unrelated to the current litigants. The court ruled that as long as the plaintiff proved he is the owner of the property in question and that the owner of the property on which the easement is located was given notice of its existence, the easement remains. Historically, Maine courts have interpreted easements as being appurtenant (attached to the land) rather than in gross (attached to an individual and terminated when that individual dies). Back to case list.
Wiscasset v. Mason Station (May 12, 2015) 116 A.3d 458. The defendant taxpayer failed to appeal a lien in a timely manner. Since the defendant neglected to follow appropriate procedures, the motion to set aside is denied. A motion to set aside a default is not a substitute for filing an appeal. Back to case list.
2014
Almeder v. Kennebunkport (December 9, 2014) 106 A.3d 1099. The plaintiff, representing taxpayers owning property on Goose Rocks Beach, argued that because their property ownership extended to the ocean, they had the right to deny beach access to the public. The defendant town argued that the public had a prescriptive easement allowing beach access, since that access had been available and used for at least 20 years. The court ruled that not all of the criteria for a prescriptive easement had been met. This type of easement requires 1) continuous use for at least 20 years, 2) with the owners knowledge and acquiescence, 3) under a claim of right adverse to the owner. While the public access had been continuous for more than 20 years and the property owners were aware of the access, the defendant did not meet the burden of proof that the access was adverse to the owner. To meet the test of adversity, the defendant was required to show proof that the access occurred without the plaintiffs express or implied permission. The court assumes the presence of permission. The court ruled that the defendant did not show sufficient evidence of the plaintiffs lack of permission and, therefore, the prescriptive easement was denied. Back to case list.
Francis Small Heritage Trust v. Limington (August 7, 2014) 98 A.3d 1012. The primary question in this case is whether an land trust qualifies as a benevolent and charitable institution for exemption purposes under 36 M.R.S. § 652(1)(A). The court found that: 1) conservation of natural resources is a declared goal of the state; 2) charitable activity is that which allows access to an indefinite number of people and relieves government of part of its burden; and 3) the benevolent and charitable exemption and the open space program are not mutually exclusive and the fact that a land trust qualifies for the open space program does not mean that the trust is unqualified for the benevolent and charitable exemption. Because conservation of natural resources is a burden embraced by the state, the plaintiff land trust qualifies for exemption under 36 M.R.S. § 652(1)(A). Back to case list.
Terfloth v. Scarborough (April 8, 2014) 90 A.3d 1131. The plaintiff taxpayer argued that the defendant town substantially overvalued his property. The taxpayer argued that the purchase price, which was significantly lower than the assessed value, was the fair market value. The town responded that, since the property had been on the market for over three years, the sale price did not represent an arms-length transaction. The court found insufficient evidence to show that the sale was not an arms-length transaction. The court ruled that, while a sale price is not proof of fair market value, the town did not give the property sale price enough weight in determining assessed value. The court remanded the case through Superior Court to the Scarborough Board of Assessment Review for value adjustment. Back to case list.
2013
Hebron Academy v. Hebron (February 5, 2013) 60 A.3d 774. The plaintiff applied for exemption as a literary and scientific institution under 36 M.R.S. § 652(1)(B). The defendant municipality denied the application because the plaintiff – a private high school – is not a college and because the plaintiff generated unrelated income from rental to nonexempt entities. The court reviewed legislative history and ruled that academies are intended to be included as literary institutions. The court also ruled that the rental activity, which generated approximately 1% of the plaintiff’s operating budget, did not interfere with the plaintiff’s purpose and was de minimis and incidental. The court ruled in favor of allowing an exemption. Back to case list.
Stoops v. Nelson (March 5, 2013) 61 A.3d 705. The plaintiff taxpayer had not paid 2004 property tax to the Town of Madawaska. The municipality sent, by certified mail, a lien notice pursuant to 36 M.R.S. § 942 and then a foreclosure notice pursuant to 36 M.R.S. § 943. The plaintiff signed for the lien notice, but the foreclosure notice was returned unclaimed. The municipality foreclosed on the property and subsequently sold the property. The plaintiff argued that the municipality did not meet its obligation to provide notice under §§ 942 and 943. The plaintiff also claimed that the municipality violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The court ruled that §§ 942 and 943 require only that the municipality send notices and that delivery was not required. The court further ruled that the Due Process Clause requires only that the municipality provide notice of pending action reasonably calculated to inform the taxpayer. The court determined that the notices the municipality sent to the taxpayer met the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Back to case list.
2012
Lewiston v. Gladu (March 27, 2012) 40 A.3d 964. The plaintiff, City of Lewiston, brought action against the defendant taxpayer for unpaid stormwater runoff fees. The defendant argued that the fee was actually a tax and that the Stormwater Management Utility was not authorized to impose taxes. The court applied a four-part test to determine whether the charge was a fee. To be considered a fee, a charge must:
1) Be regulatory in nature and not designed to raise revenue;
2) Have a direct relationship between the charge and the benefit bestowed;
3) Be voluntary; and
4) Be a fair approximation of the costs incurred.
The court found that the stormwater fee met all four requirements to be considered a fee and ruled in favor of the plaintiff city. Back to case list.
2011
McGarvey v. Whittredge (August 25, 2011) 28 A.3d 620. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant used intertidal land owned by the plaintiff for purposes not permitted by law. The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s use of the intertidal land to access the ocean for scuba diving violated the allowable uses for that land, namely fishing, fowling, and navigation. The court, in a split but concurring opinion, ruled that access to the ocean for scuba diving falls under the accepted public uses of intertidal lands. Back to case list.
Blue Hill v. Leighton (October 25, 2011) 30 A.3d 848. The plaintiff, Town of Blue Hill, followed the lien procedures under 36 M.R.S. §§ 942 and 943 when the defendant taxpayer did not pay taxes for the 1991 tax year. The defendant continued to miss tax payments and the municipality continued to send tax bills and lien notices for years after 1991. The taxpayer argued that the municipality, by continuing to send property tax bills and lien notices after the first lien notice, waived its right to foreclose on the property. The taxpayer also argued that the municipality did not sufficiently prove that it held title to the property. The court ruled that following the §§ 942 and 943 procedures was sufficient to prove ownership and that the subsequent tax bills and lien notices was not a waiver of foreclosure rights. Back to case list.
Humboldt v. Steuben (December 20, 2011) 36 A.3d 873. The defendant municipality revoked an existing exemption under 36 M.R.S. § 652(1) granted to the plaintiff taxpayer. The taxpayer argued that the municipality was required to continue the exemption barring any organizational change with the taxpayer. The court ruled that “the burden of establishing entitlement to a tax exemption always remains with the taxpayer. ” This burden of proof holds, even if a taxpayer has received the exemption in prior years. The court ruled in favor of the municipality, stating that the taxpayer’s arguments in favor of exemption were unpersuasive. Back to case list.
2008
Bristol Taxpayers’ Assn. v. Bristol (October 21, 2008) 957 A.2d 977. The plaintiff taxpayers claimed that a municipal revaluation resulted in unjust discrimination for waterfront properties, which were valued at a higher rate than nonwaterfront property. The court ruled that separate areas, such as waterfront and nonwaterfront, can be valued differently because of location. Comparing waterfront property to nonwaterfront property does not by itself prove unjust discrimination. Back to case list.
Peaker v Biddeford (June 12, 2008) 950 A.2d 764. The defendant municipality appealed a superior court ruling regarding value of certain property. The court ruled that the superior court had not yet finalized its decision, so the Law Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case. Back to case list.
2007
Peaker v. Biddeford (August 9, 2007) 927 A.2d 1169. The defendant municipality appealed a superior court ruling regarding value of certain property. The superior court remanded the taxpayer’s appeal of a denied abatement request back to the Biddeford board of assessment review to calculate an appropriate abatement. The municipality appealed that court order. The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal did not constitute final resolution, since the city board of assessment review had not calculated an abatement as demanded by the superior court. Back to case list.
Stevenson v. Kennebunk (April 26, 2007) 930 A.2d 1046. The plaintiff taxpayer appealed the denial of an abatement request to the municipal board of assessment review. Sometime before the hearing, one of the three board members resigned. The town charter did not allow for alternates, so the two remaining members heard the appeal and their decision was a tie, one in favor of the municipality, one in favor of the taxpayer. The result was that the appeal was denied. The taxpayer appealed to superior court and then to the Supreme Court when the decision was upheld. The court ruled that state law requires at least a three-member board of assessment review. Since the municipal board had only two members at the time of the appeal hearing, the decision was invalid. A concurring opinion from the court stated that even if the two-member board was valid, a tied decision is void and has no legal effect. The taxpayer filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. Back to case list.
UAH Hydro Kennebec v. Winslow (March 1, 2007) 921 A.2d 146. The plaintiff taxpayer claimed that the municipal assessment of its property was discriminatory and illegal. The municipal value of the property included the effect of a contract the plaintiff held to sell power at a set price, which was above the current market rate. The taxpayer claimed that the value was discriminatory because the property was valued higher than a similar property without a contract would have been valued. Further, the taxpayer claimed that the inclusion of the contract in valuation of the property was illegal because the contract is intangible property and not subject to taxation.
The court ruled that the property assessment was not discriminatory because the contract effect represented the current use of the property, which is a statutorily legal factor in determining just value under 36 M.R.S. § 701-A. The court also determined that inclusion of the contract in valuation of the property was not illegal because the contract was “inextricably intertwined” with the property, which the court had previously determined was a valid inclusion in valuation of property. Back to case list.
2006
Waltham v. PPL Maine (July 21, 2006) 901 A.2d 816. The plaintiff town argued that submerged land upstream from a dam owned by the defendant was taxable to the defendant. The defendant argued that it did not own the submerged land, but merely had flowage rights to the water. The court ruled that flowage rights amounted to an easement appurtenant. An easement appurtenant is a non-possessory interest in the use of land owned by another person. Because the defendant did not possess the submerged land, they were not subject to property tax on that land. Back to case list.
Christian Fellowship and Renewal Center v. Limington (April 28, 2006) 896 A.2d 287. Plaintiff taxpayer requested exemption as a benevolent and charitable institution. The defendant municipality denied the exemption based on the plaintiff's religious purposes. Since the plaintiff offered use of the property to groups of certain religious affiliation, the municipality determined that the function of the plaintiff did not offset a government function. The court ruled that, while performing a service normally provided by the government is a qualifying criterion, it is not exclusive. Since the plaintiff provided a service to certain members of the public and was organized for charitable purposes, it qualified for an exemption. Back to case list.
2005
Norton v. Long Island (October 11, 2005) 883 A.2d 889. The plaintiff waterfront landowner sought quiet title to his property, including the submerged land adjacent to shore. The defendant municipality argued that the State retained the submerged land in public trust. The U.S. government seized the land, including the submerged land, through eminent domain during WWII. In 1964, the government transferred the land to the plaintiff through a deed that included the rights to adjacent submerged land. The court ruled that, while the U.S. government did obtain the rights to the submerged land and did subsequently transfer those rights to the plaintiff, the State continued to retain the public trust easement that allows public access to the area. Back to case list.
2004
Roberts v. Southwest Harbor (November 1, 2004) 861 A.2d 617. The plaintiff taxpayer claimed the defendant municipality discriminated against him by valuing one portion of his land higher than other, similar portions of land. The court ruled that the plaintiff must prove that his entire property was unfairly assessed and, because of that, he did not meet his burden of proof. Back to case list.
Hustus v. Medway (March 26, 2004) 845 A.2d 563. The plaintiff taxpayer applied for a hardship or poverty abatement of taxes under 36 M.R.S. § 841(2). The defendant municipality granted a partial abatement for taxes on the plaintiff’s personal residence, but denied the portion of abatement applicable to an attached structure that the plaintiff used as a business. The municipality claimed that the hardship or poverty abatement was intended to apply only to an individual’s residence. The court ruled that the statute did not distinguish between businesses and residences and, therefore, any abatement may be applied to the plaintiff’s business as well as the attached residence. Note: 36 M.R.S. § 841(2) was amended in 2005 to specify that the hardship or poverty abatement applies only to property tax on a primary residence. Back to case list.
Sager v. Bowdoinham (March 25, 2004) 845 A.2d 567. The plaintiff taxpayer requested a hardship or poverty abatement under 36 M.R.S. § 841(2). The defendant municipality granted an abatement equal to the total property tax for the defendant’s residence less the amount of money the defendant received under the Maine Residents Property Tax Program. The plaintiff appealed to the county commissioners and the commissioners determined that the municipality had acted appropriately in determining the abatement. The taxpayer then appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming the county commissioners had erroneously determined that the law required a reduction of abatement equal to amounts received from the Maine Residents Property Tax Program. The court noted that that the county commissioners had appropriately considered the law, which allows, but doesn’t require, a municipality to consider such amounts received when determining an abatement. The court ruled in favor of the municipality and that the county commissioners did not exceed “the bounds of the reasonable choices available to them. Back to case list.
Delogu v. Portland (February 20, 2004) 843 A.2d 33. The plaintiff taxpayer challenged the Portland Property Tax Relief program, claiming it violated the Maine Constitution, article IX, sections 8 and 9. The Portland Property Tax Relief program provided rebates to owners of homes valued at less than $400,000. The rebate was calculated by multiplying the mill rate by $15,000 or assessed value. Article IX, section 8 of the Maine Constitution requires all property to be assessed “according to just value.” Article IX, section 9 states that the Legislature cannot give up its “power of taxation.” The court ruled that the Portland Property Tax Relief program was effectively a partial exemption in violation of both article IX, section 8 and article IX, section 9. Back to case list.