Case No. 06-13
                                      Issued:  May 11, 2006

WILLIAM D. NEILY,               )
               Complainant,     )
          v.                    )       DECISION ON APPEAL OF    
                                )       EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S  
1989, SEIU,                     )
               Respondents.     )

     Complainant William D. Neily filed a prohibited practice
complaint with the Maine Labor Relations Board (Board) on 
October 17, 2005, naming both the State of Maine (State) and the
Maine State Employees Association (MSEA or Union) as Respondents. 
Mr. Neily amended the complaint on November 29, 2005.  The first
count of the complaint alleges that the State failed to bargain
in good faith over wages as required by 26 M.R.S.A. 979-D(1)
(E)(1), thereby violating 979-C(1)(E) of the State Employees
Labor Relations Act (SELRA), by refusing to perform a market pay
analysis or bargain for a wage change for Mr. Neily's position. 
The Union is alleged to have violated 979-C(2)(B) as well. 
Specifically, the first count alleges that the State and MSEA
failed to bargain as required by the statute by failing to comply
with the requirements the Complainant asserts are contained in
Public Law 2001, chapter 438.  The second count alleges that by
refusing to perform a market pay analysis for Mr. Neily's
position and a small number of other classifications, the State
and MSEA have created two systems for evaluating jobs in
violation of 979-D(1)(E)(4)(a), thereby violating 979-C(1)(E)
which prohibits "refusing to bargain collectively with the
bargaining agent of its employees as required by section 979-D."  


The Complainant alleges this conduct interfered with his rights
in violation of 979-C(1)(A) and 979-C(2)(A).  The third and
final count alleges that the Union breached its duty of fair
representation and thereby violated 979-C(2) by refusing to
bargain with the employer to obtain market pay adjustments for
Mr. Neily's job.
     In response to the initial filing of the complaint, the
State and the MSEA each filed a Motion to Dismiss in early
November.  The primary arguments for dismissal were that the
complaint was time barred and the Mr. Neily lacked standing to
allege a violation of the duty to bargain.  Mr. Neily filed an
amended complaint on November 29, 2005, which included a response
to the Motions of both the State and the MSEA.  On December 15,
2005, the Board's Executive Director conducted a telephone
conference call to discuss the procedure for hearing arguments on
the sufficiency of the complaint, as required by MLRB Rule 
Chapter 12, 8.  The State decided not to file anything further,
MSEA submitted additional written argument in support of its
Motion to Dismiss on December 28, 2005, and the Complainant filed
his response on January 4, 2006.  
     On February 14, 2006, the Executive Director dismissed all
three Counts on the basis that they were time barred.  The
Executive Director noted that, even if the complaint were not
time barred, Counts I and II charge the State with failure to
bargain in violation of 979-C(1)(E) and that the Complainant
does not have standing to enforce an alleged violation of the
duty to bargain.  The Executive Director dismissed Count III
because it was time barred and because there were no factual 
allegations supporting a violation of the duty of fair
     On February 27, 2006, Complainant Neily appealed the
Executive Director's dismissal of Counts I and II of his
complaint to this Board as permitted by MLRB Rule Chapter 12, 


8(3).  In his 14-page appeal, Mr. Neily reargued his case and
added a substantial amount of factual detail describing why he
could not reasonably have learned about the conduct underlying
the alleged violation until three or four months before filing
his complaint.  He included a letter to the Board from a coworker
who essentially corroborated some of Mr. Neily's new factual
allegations on this point.  

     Complainant Neily began his employment with the State of
Maine on November 2, 2002, as a Boiler Inspector.  The Boiler
Inspector position was established on July 10, 2002, and assigned
to the Administrative Services bargaining unit.  In the spring of
2001, the State and MSEA, with the assistance of a consultant,
conducted a market pay analysis which compared the wages and
benefits of State classifications in various bargaining units
represented by MSEA with similar jobs in the private sector.  
The parties had agreed to provide pay adjustments to any
classification that was below 90 percent of the prevailing wage
identified by the market analysis.  The Complainant was not
employed by the State at the time of the market pay analysis. 
The classification of Boiler Inspector did not exist at the time
the market pay study was conducted so it was not evaluated. 
     As a result of the market pay analysis, the State and MSEA
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on June 21, 2001, in which
the parties identified those classifications that would receive
an adjustment, how much the adjustment would be, and how those
adjustments would be administered.[fn]1  Individual employees in
adjusted classes received the adjustment in addition to their
assigned salary range and step.  The Memorandum of Agreement
covers all of the bargaining units represented by MSEA.  It 

     1 The Memorandum of Agreement was amended on November 30, 2001,
to include various supervisory positions.


refers only to market pay adjustments and does not mention the
market pay evaluation or market pay analysis that led to the
identification of which positions were to be adjusted.  Neither
the Memorandum of Agreement of June 21, 2001, the amendment to it
dated November 30, 2001, nor the 2001-2003 collective bargaining
agreement signed on June 21, 2001, makes any reference to the
market pay analysis that was conducted or that any further
evaluations would be done as part of that analysis.  The Public
Law effective June 20, 2001, (chapter 438) that provided funding
for the economic terms of the collective bargaining agreements
referred to market pay adjustments, but did not mention any
market pay analysis or any further market pay evaluations.
     The Complainant alleges that since the 2001 study, the State
has created or reestablished five classifications in the
Administrative Services unit, including his classification of
Boiler Inspector, and none of them have been evaluated for a
market pay adjustment.  The Complainant did not learn of the
existence of the 2001 study until July of 2005, and did not see
the Memorandum of Agreement until August 31, 2005.  Prior to July
of 2005, neither the State nor MSEA told him that market pay
adjustments had been made to some of the other classifications in
the unit.
     The Complainant further alleges that in 2002 the State and
MSEA began a study of classes in the Administrative Services
bargaining unit to update the job classifications and allocate or
reallocate those positions to the appropriate pay range.  That
study was completed in April of 2005.  The Complainant first saw
this study in July of 2005.  The cover page of this study states:

        As a stop-gap measure, to alleviate deepening
     recruitment and retention problems, the consulting firm
     of Baker, Newman, and Noyes was engaged by the State of
     Maine and the MSEA/SEIU in March of 2001 to perform a
     comparison of private sector pay and determine which
     classifications of employees were paid more than 10%
     below the market average.  Those paid less than 90% of 


     the market were provided with a 'market salary
     adjustment' in amounts ranging from 1% to 30%, bringing
     the pay of those classifications up to 90% of market

The Complainant also alleges that bargaining to implement the
recommendations of the April 2005 study began in November of


     The Complainant is a state employee within the meaning of 
26 M.R.S.A. 979-A(6).  MSEA is the bargaining agent within the
meaning of 26 M.R.S.A. 979-A(1) for the Administrative Services 
bargaining unit of state employees.  The State is the public
employer as defined in 26 M.R.S.A. 979-A(5).  The jurisdiction
of the Maine Labor Relations Board to hear this case and render a
decision lies in 26 M.R.S.A. 979-H, as set forth in MLRB Rules
Chapter 12, 8(3).       


     The Executive Director dismissed Mr. Neily's complaint
because it did not allege a prohibited practice occurring within
six months of the date the complaint was filed.  In dismissing
the complaint, the Executive Director considered all of the
materials submitted by the Complainant, including many facts that
were included in the Complainant's response to the Motions to
Dismiss which had not been, but could have been, included in the
amended complaint.  The standard used in ruling on the
sufficiency of a complaint is the same as ruling on a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.[fn]2  In both cases, the Executive Director and the Board 

     2 See 26 M.R.S.A. 979-H(2) (If the executive director determines
that the facts as alleged "do not, as a matter of law, constitute a
violation, the charge shall be dismissed by the executive director,
subject to review by the board.")


must treat the material allegations of the complaint as true and
must consider the complaint in the light most favorable to the
Complainant to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to
state a claim for relief.[fn]3  See, e.g., Buzzell, Wasson and MSEA 
v. State of Maine, No. 96-14, at 2 (Sept. 22, 1997), citing Brown 
v. MSEA, 1997 ME 24, 5, 690 A.2d 956.  When a complaint contains 
allegations that "are more than simply factual allegations but 
are legal conclusions, however, we are not bound to accept those 
legal conclusions as true."  MSAD #46 Educ. Assoc. v. MSAD #46, 
No. 02-13, at 2 (Nov. 27, 2002), citing Bowen v. Eastman, 645 
A.2d 5, 6 (Me. 1994).
     The State Employees Labor Relations Act, like all of the
collective bargaining statutes enforced by the Board, precludes
the Board from hearing a complaint filed more than six months
from the date of the alleged prohibited practice.  26 M.R.S.A.
979-H(2) ("[N]o hearing shall be held based upon any alleged
prohibited practice occurring more than 6 months prior to the
filing of the complaint . . . .")  We have held that the six-

     3 MLRB Rule chapter 12, 8(1) requires the executive director to
review the complaint for sufficiency and to take appropriate action,
which may include summary dismissal.  That subsection also authorizes,
but does not require, the executive director to issue a notice of
errors and insufficiencies and allow amendment to the complaint. 
Section 8(3) permits the complainant to appeal the executive
director's dismissal to the Board by filing a motion for review.   
The rule states:

     The motion must clearly and concisely set forth the points
     of fact and law claimed to be sufficient to establish a
     prima facie violation of the applicable prohibited act
     provision(s).  Upon the filing of a timely motion for
     review, the Board shall examine the complaint as it existed
     when summarily dismissed in light of the assertions
     contained in the motion.

Complainant's appeal contained a number of new factual allegations
supporting his argument that the six-month limitation should be
tolled.  This rule does not allow us to consider facts alleged for the
first time in the motion for review.  We would have reached the same
conclusion, however, if these factual allegations had been included in
the original or amended complaint.


month statute of limitations "begins to run when the complainant
knew, or reasonably should have known, of the occurrence of the
event which allegedly violated the Act."  Coulombe v. City of
South Portland, No. 86-11, at 8 (Dec. 29, 1986), citing MSAD No.
45 v. MSAD No. 45 Teachers Assoc., No. 82-10, at 12 (Sept. 17,
1982).  The Executive Director dismissed the complaint because it
was based on the market pay study conducted in the spring of 2001
and implemented in the Memorandum of Agreement signed on June 21,
2001, and amended on November 30, 2001.  The Complainant was not
hired until November of 2002, a year and a half after the market
pay study was completed.  Nearly three years after his date of
hire, Mr. Neily filed his complaint.  The Executive Director
found no basis for tolling the six-month limitation period until
the point Mr. Neily discovered the history of the market pay
adjustments, because he could have learned of the existence of
the adjustments and "there was no effort to conceal the existence
of either the market pay adjustments or the recruitment and
retention stipends" by either the State or MSEA.[fn]4    
     In responding to the Executive Director's conclusion that
his complaint was untimely, Mr. Neily asserts that he could not
reasonably have learned of the occurrences that allegedly
violated the Act prior to August 31, 2005, the date when he first
saw the Memorandum of Agreement on the implementation of the
results of the market pay study.  He contends that the six-month
limitation should be tolled because neither the State nor MSEA
informed him of the existence of the market pay study or the
adjustments at any time during his first two-and-a-half years   

     4 The employer's refusal to supply the Complainant with a copy of
the market pay study and related material (as opposed to the memoran-
dum of agreement) seems to be a reasonable interpretation of Title 1,
section 402(3)(D), which excludes from the definition of public
records under the Freedom of Access law those materials "used
specifically and exclusively in preparation for negotiations" by a
public employer.


of employment.[fn]5  The Complainant argues that because the re-
establishment of his classification and his date of hire both
occurred "during the time period covered by the 2001 market pay
agreements, the 2001-2003 Administrative Services contract, and
PL 2001, ch. 438," he is entitled to have a market pay evaluation
done for his classification.  None of those documents, either
alone or together, grant him the right to have a market pay
evaluation or adjustment.               
     The market pay study was a discrete event.  In 2001, the
State and MSEA agreed to hire a consultant to perform the market
analysis for all of the positions existing at the time.       
Mr. Neily's classification did not exist at that time.  The State
and MSEA implemented the results of that study in June, 2001, by
executing the Memorandum of Understanding detailing which
classifications were to receive adjustments and how much.     
The Memorandum of Agreement identified the classifications that
the evaluation revealed were in need of an adjustment, but it
contained no agreement to conduct further evaluations nor was the
evaluation process even discussed.  Similarly, the collective
bargaining agreement did not create an on-going market pay study
nor did it create an obligation to perform a market pay analysis
for new classifications or classifications that were reinstated.  
When Mr. Neily was hired, his classification was not one of those
that in 2001 had been determined to warrant a market pay adjust-
ment, so he was told nothing about an adjustment or stipend.  
The market pay analysis had been fully completed well over a year
before Mr. Neily was hired.  It had no effect on his classifi-
cation, and it did not create a right to a future pay evaluation. 

     5 In his appeal to this Board, Mr. Neily also provided extensive
factual detail on the isolated nature of his job to rebut the
Executive Director's observation that he could have learned of the
existence of the adjustments.  Even if we were to consider these
additional factual allegations, they would not change our ultimate
decision that his complaint is time barred.


Thus, there was no need and no obligation on the part of the
State or MSEA to tell him about it.  
     Mr. Neily's claim that the parties violated SELRA by failing
to conduct a market pay evaluation on his classification is
dependent upon a distorted reading of the Public Law enacted in
2001 implementing the economic terms of the 2001-2003 collective
bargaining agreement, Public Law 2001, ch. 438.  This statute,
entitled "An Act to Fund the Collective Bargaining Agreements and
Benefits of Employees Covered by Collective Bargaining and for
Certain Employees Excluded from Collective Bargaining," included
increases to the General Fund and the Highway Fund to cover the
costs of the economic terms of the collective bargaining
agreements with MSEA and the Maine State Troopers Association. 
It specifically included market and pay equity adjustments and
benefits.[fn]6  Section A-6 is at the heart of Mr. Neily's argument:

     Sec. A-6.  New employees; similar and equitable
     treatment.  Employees in classifications included in
     bargaining units referred to in sections 1 and 2 of
     this Part but who are excluded from collective
     bargaining pursuant to the Maine Revised Statutes,
     Title 26, section 979-A, subsection 6, paragraphs E and
     F must be given equitable treatment on a pro rata basis
     similar to that treatment given employees covered by
     the collective bargaining agreements.

Mr. Neily's asserts that this section entitles him to have a
market pay evaluation for his classification because that would
be "equitable treatment" similar to those covered by the
memorandum of agreement.  Mr. Neily states in his complaint that 
     6 PL 2001, ch. 438, Section A-1 states:
Sec. A-1.  Costs to General Fund.  Costs to the General Fund must be
provided in the Salary Plan program, referred to in Part C, section 1
of this Act, in the amount of $9,882,391 for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 2002 and in the amount of $16,514,688 for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 2003 to implement the economic terms of the collective
bargaining agreements, including market and pay equity adjustments and
benefits, made between the State and the Maine State Employees Assoc-
iation and the Maine State Troopers Association and, notwithstanding
the Maine Revised Statutes, Title 26, section 979-D, subsection 1,
paragraph E, subparagraph (3), for confidential employees.


Chapter 438 "requires that the State fund the economic terms of
the agreement," which it does.  He goes on to state that
"Employees covered by the collective bargaining agreements are to
receive 'market and pay equity adjustments' where applicable,"
which is true as well, but he adds "after having their respective
class analyzed."  That is where Mr. Neily asserts a right that
does not exist.  Section A-6 does not create a right to a market
pay evaluation; it merely assures similar economic benefits to
employees who are excluded from collective bargaining because
they have less than six months of employment (26 M.R.S.A. 979-A,
sub-6(E)) or because they are temporary, seasonal, or on-call
employees (26 M.R.S.A. 979-A, sub-6(F)).  Thus, a new employee
hired into a classification that had been determined to warrant a
market pay adjustment in the 2001 agreement would get that
adjustment, even though that person was not yet part of the
bargaining unit nor covered by the collective bargaining
agreement.  Section A-6 makes no reference to conducting a market
pay analysis for new employees or new classifications.
     Section A-7 of Ch. 438 provided for similar treatment of
most of the other state employees excluded from collective
bargaining, including those confidential and managerial employees
whose positions are excluded from collective bargaining because
of the functions of the positions, not because of the length of
employment service.[fn]7  If Mr. Neily's interpretation of Section  
A-6 were correct, all of those individuals covered by Section A-7
would be statutorily entitled to have a market pay evaluation 

     7 Sec. A-7.  Confidential employees; similar and equitable
treatment.  Confidential employees must be given similar and equitable
treatment on a pro rata basis to that given employees covered by the
collective bargaining agreements.  For the purposes of this Part,
"confidential employees" means those employees within the executive
branch, including probationary employees, who are in positions
excluded from bargaining units pursuant to the Maine Revised Statutes,
Title 26, section 979-A, subsection 6, paragraphs B, C, D, I and J.


conducted on their behalf as well. 
     The Complainant's erroneous conclusion that chapter 438
gives him a statutory right to have a market pay evaluation
conducted for his classification is the basis for his assertion
that the State had a statutory obligation to inform him of this
"right" and its failure to do so should toll the six-month
limitation period.  The Complainant relies on Title 5, 7068,
sub-2, which states that the employer must give new employees
"written information as to the employee's rate of pay and
circumstances under which the rate may be changed, including
merit increases."  As the market pay study was over and done with
long before Mr. Neily's date of hire and there was no on-going
obligation to conduct further evaluations, the past events did
not constitute "circumstances under which the rate may be
changed."  In sum, the Executive Director was correct in
dismissing Count I of the complaint as untimely.  We also hold
that even if Count I of the complaint had been filed within six
months of Mr. Neily's employment, the factual allegations, even
if true, do not constitute a violation of SELRA.
     Count II of Mr. Neily's complaint asserts that the State and
MSEA's failure to conduct a market pay analysis for the five
classifications created since 2001 violated 26 M.R.S.A. 979-D
(1)(E)(4)(a) and therefore was a failure to bargain as required
by 979-D.  While bargaining over certain aspects of the
compensation system is permissible, 979-D(1)(E)(4)(a) provides
that such authorization "shall not be construed to authorize any
more than one system for evaluating jobs of state employee in
bargaining units . . . ."  The Complainant presents two legal
arguments:  1) the failure to conduct a market pay analysis for
these five classifications created more than one system for
evaluating jobs and 2) this interfered with his "right" to a 


single evaluation system.[fn]8  We need not address these legal
assertions because we agree with the Executive Director's
conclusion that this Count must be dismissed as time barred. 
Like Count I of the complaint, Count II was contingent upon
rights alleged to have accrued in 2001, and it was not filed
until nearly three years after Complainant's date of hire.  
     Both Count I and Count II allege violations of provisions of
SELRA requiring the State and the Union to bargain in good faith.
The Executive Director ruled that the Complainant did not have
standing to bring a charge against the State for "refusing to
bargain collectively with the bargaining agent of its employees"
in violation of 979-C(1)(E) or a similar charge against the
Union for violating 979-C(2)(B) for refusing to bargain with the
employer.  The Executive Director was correct in observing that
the employer has a duty to bargain with the bargaining agent and
no other because the statutory duty to bargain runs exclusively
between the bargaining agent and the employer.  See 26 M.R.S.A.
979-F(2)(B) (The bargaining agent is "the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent for all the employees in the bargaining unit");
MSEA v. Maine Maritime Academy, No. 05-04, at 15 (Jan. 31, 2006)
(Dealing directly with employees is a failure to bargain in good
     The Complainant argues that his case is similar to the
position of the complainant in Powers McGuire v. The University
of Maine System, in which the Board permitted an individual to
bring a refusal-to-bargain charge against the employer.  No. 93-37,  

     8 The Complainant asserts that this violated 979-C(1)(A) and
979-C(2)(A), both of which prohibit "interfering with, restraining or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by section
979-B," which protects collective bargaining and representational
rights and "the free exercise of any other right under this chapter"
such as the right to vote, the right to refrain from union activities,
and the right to seek assistance from the Board.  For a thorough
discussion of what constitutes an independent interference, restraint
or coercion violation, see Teamsters v. Aroostook County, No. 03-09,
at 19-20 (Feb. 2, 2004).


at 14 (Apr. 4, 1994), aff'd sub nom. The University of
Maine System v. Powers McGuire, No. CV-94-153 (Me. Super. Ct.,
Ken. Cty., Oct. 11, 1994).  After reviewing the facts in the
present complaint and the nature of the charge, we conclude that
the Executive Director correctly applied the proper analysis
regarding standing to bring a charge of refusing to bargain.  
The Executive Director stated:

     The Board explicitly noted in [Powers McGuire] that the
     statutory obligations and attendant conduct of the
     public employer and the bargaining agent "in the actual
     bargaining process leading up to and including the
     execution of the collective bargaining agreement" are
     "aspects of the duty to bargain [that] run specifically
     between the employer and the bargaining agent and
     should be enforced by them."  Even if they were not
     time-barred, the 979-C(1)(E) and (2)(B) charges,
     incorporating alleged violations 979-D, would be
     dismissed for lack of standing by the complainant to
     prosecute such charges, as would any charged violations
     of  979-C(1)(A) and (2)(A) that were derivative
     violations based thereon.

Citing McGuire, No. 93-27, at 14.  The present case involves the
decision of the parties at the bargaining table to limit the
market pay study to classifications existing at the time.  In
contrast, while granting Mr. McGuire standing, the McGuire Board
noted that the complained-of conduct did not involve the
negotiations process but centered on the employer's unilateral
change of a well-established pay practice.  
     The McGuire case presented some very unique circumstances
regarding the practices that were changed that are not present in
this case.  In McGuire, the University System and the union had
negotiated an "overload" compensation schedule that applied to
all system campuses and determined the minimum compensation for
teaching summer courses.  Individual campuses were free to pay
higher overload rates and individual faculty members were free to
negotiate higher rates as well.  The Augusta campus had an 


established practice of paying twice the overload rate for summer
ITV courses, plus a $500 preparation fee.  The unilateral change
at the heart of the complaint was a reduction to the single
overload rate for ITV courses offered at the Augusta campus that
were under-enrolled.  The Board considered it permissible to
allow an individual to bring a unilateral change charge in that
case because the union was not involved in negotiating or
enforcing the higher-than-minimum overload rates that had been
established at the various campuses.  McGuire, No. 93-37, at 15.
     In the present case, the Complainant asserts that the
conduct he complains of is a unilateral change and that he has
standing because neither the State nor MSEA have been interested
in his complaints.  In spite of the fact that the Board used some
broad language in McGuire,[fn]9 we conclude that it should not be 
used to support Mr. Neily's standing argument.  First of all, as
previously noted, his complaint, in essence, alleges a failure to
bargain.  There are no facts alleged that indicate a unilateral
change--his complaint is that the State and MSEA did not do what
Mr. Neily believes the funding law (chapter 438) and 979-D
required them to do.  Even if what Mr. Neily is complaining of
can accurately be described as a unilateral change, the Board's
case law since McGuire was decided twelve years ago does not
provide any support for the suggestion in that case that an
individual can "enforce the collective bargaining agreement" by
"complaining of unilateral changes."  As we have stated, "[a]
contract violation, by itself, is not a prohibited practice over
which the Board has jurisdiction."  Langley v. State of Maine,
Dept. of Transportation, No. 00-14, at 4 (March 29, 2002).  This
Board does not have jurisdiction to hear grievances, so we must 

     9 Such as, "We know of no policy reason to prohibit an employee
from enforcing a collective bargaining agreement (that is, from
complaining of unilateral changes), since employees are the direct
beneficiaries of any agreement that is reached." McGuire, No. 93-37,
at 15.


be careful not to interpret "unilateral change" so broadly as  
to expand our jurisdiction into areas beyond our statutory
authority.  See State of Maine v. MSEA, 499 A.2d 1228, 1239 
(Oct. 29, 1985) (The MLRB has jurisdiction over prohibited
practices complaints, but not over grievances.)  
     With respect to the claim that the State and MSEA created a
discriminatory evaluation system in violation of 979-D, the
Complainant is again without standing as he is alleging a failure
to bargain in violation of 979-C(1)(E).  The Complainant
attempts to transform a refusal to bargain charge (979-C(1)(E))
into an interference, restraint and coercion charge (979-C
(1)(A)) by simply saying the employer's conduct interfered with
the Complainant's "right" to a single evaluation system. 
Section 979-D deals exclusively with the employer's and the
bargaining agent's mutual obligation to bargain--it does not
establish any individual rights. 
     For the forgoing reasons, we hold that the Complainant does
not have standing to bring a complaint against either the State
or MSEA alleging a violation of the duty to bargain as required
by 979-D.  Accordingly, the Executive Director was correct to
hold that even if Count I or II of the Complaint were not time
barred, they would be dismissed for lack of standing to prosecute
such charges, as would any derivative violations of 979-C(1)(A)
and 979-C(2)(B).


     On the basis of the foregoing discussion, and by virtue of
and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor Relations
Board by 26 M.R.S.A.  979-H(2), it is ORDERED:

     10 For a full discussion of the scope of rights protected by the
interference, restraint and coercion prohibition, see Teamsters v.
Aroostook County, No. 03-09, at 19-20.

     The Executive Director's Order dated February 14, 2006,
     dismissing the prohibited practice complaint filed by
     Complainant William D. Neily on October 17, 2005,
     against the State of Maine and the Maine State
     Employees Association, Local 1989, SEIU, in Case 
     No. 06-13, is affirmed.

Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 11th day of May, 2006.

                                   MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

The parties are advised of
their right pursuant to 26
M.R.S.A.  979-H(7) (Supp.         /s/___________________________
2005) to seek a review of this     Peter T. Dawson
decision and order by the          Chair
Superior Court.  To initiate
such a review, an appealing
party must file a complaint
with the Superior Court within     /s/___________________________
fifteen (15) days of the date      Karl Dornish, Jr.
of issuance of this decision       Employer Representative
and order, and otherwise
comply with the requirements
of Rule 80(C) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.                   /s/___________________________
                                   Wayne W. Whitney
                                   Employee Representative