Teamsters Union Local 340 v. City of Augusta, MLRB No. 93-28 (Alternate 
Chair Chute dissenting in part, Jan. 13, 1994), aff'd, Nos. CV-94-38 & -49 
(Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., May 10, 1994) 

STATE OF MAINE                     MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
                                   Case No. 93-28
                                   Issued:  January 13, 1994
 
_______________________________
                               )
TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL 340,     )
                               )
               Complainant,    )
                               )
             v.                )       DECISION AND ORDER
                               )
CITY OF AUGUSTA,               )
                               )
               Respondent.     )
_______________________________)


     On March 22, 1993, Teamsters Union Local 340 ("Teamsters"
filed a prohibited practice complaint with the Maine Labor
Relations Board ("Board") alleging various violations of the
Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law ("MPELRL") by the
City of Augusta ("City").  The complaint was amended after the
Teamsters received a notice of insufficiencies from the executive
director (for lack of specificity and failure to cite subsections
of MPELRL section 964 allegedly violated).  The complaint was
amended again pursuant to an order of the prehearing officer
regarding remaining insufficiencies.

     The amended complaint alleges that the City violated section
964(1)(E) of the MPELRL, 26 M.R.S.A.  964(1)(E) (1988), by    
1) its refusal to meet at reasonable times for negotiations, in
violation of section 965(1)(A) and the parties' contract; 2) its
failure to pay 100 percent of health insurance premiums after
contract expiration (when insurance premiums increased); 3) its
deduction of the premium increase through payroll deduction three
months before the increase was due to be paid; and 4) its failure
to honor the parties' grievance procedure in connection with a
grievance filed regarding the health insurance dispute.  The City
denies the allegations and further responds that 1) the complaint
fails to state a cause of action; 2) the Board lacks jurisdiction 

                               -1-

over the subject matter of the complaint; and 3) the complainant
has failed to exhaust its contractual and administrative remedies
prior to filing its prohibited practice complaint.  

     On May 4, 1993, Board Chair Peter T. Dawson convened the
prehearing conference in this matter.  His Prehearing Memorandum
and Order, dated May 12, 1993, is incorporated in and made a part
of this decision and order.  

     An evidentiary hearing was held on June 16, 1993.  Alternate
Chair Pamela D. Chute presided over the hearing, accompanied by
Employer Representative Howard Reiche, Jr., and Employee Repre-
sentative George W. Lambertson.  Mr. James E. Carson represented
the Teamsters, and Charles E. Moreshead, Esq., represented the
City.  The parties were given full opportunity to examine and
cross-examine witnesses, introduce documentary evidence, and make
oral argument.  Briefs were filed by both parties; only the City
filed a reply brief, which was received on October 20, 1993.  Due
to its heavy schedule and an illness, the Board was unable to
deliberate this matter until December 17, 1993.  

                          JURISDICTION
     Teamsters Union Local 340 is the bargaining agent, within
the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A.  962(2) (1988), for employees in the
Augusta Police Bureau Patrolmen's Unit.  The City of Augusta 
is the public employer, within the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A.       
 962(7) (Supp. 1993), of the employees in that unit.  The
jurisdiction of the Board to hear this case and to render a
decision and order lies in 26 M.R.S.A.  968(5)(A)-(C) (1988). 

                        FINDINGS OF FACT
     Upon review of the entire record, the Board finds:
     1.   In June of 1990, the Teamsters and the City entered
into a successor collective bargaining agreement effective from
December 1, 1989, through December 31, 1992 ("89-92 agreement").

                               -2-

     2.   The parties have begun negotiations for another
successor agreement.  Unlike negotiation teams under the previous
city manager, the City's negotiating team for the new patrolmen's
contract now includes members of City Council, some of whom are
employed during the regular work day.  Successor negotiations
began in November of 1992; the first meeting was scheduled by the
City, and was held sometime after 4:00 p.m.  The second meeting
was also scheduled by the City for after 4:00 p.m.  At one of
those two meetings, the Teamsters objected to scheduling further
negotiation sessions after 4:00 p.m., for the convenience of City
Council members, on the basis of Article 11, section 5(1).  That
provision reads as follows:

                             ARTICLE 11
                       GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

     Section 5:  General Considerations.

          1.   All grievance discussions, meetings,
     conferences, hearings, shall be conducted during the
     normal work day.


After the City made proposals at the second session for extensive
changes in the contract, the Teamsters requested mediation. 
Meetings with the mediator have all begun at 1:00 p.m.; some have
extended beyond 4:00 p.m.  

     3.   When the issue of meeting times for negotiations arose,
the Teamsters asked the city manager, Mr. St. Peter, to contact
the prior assistant city manager, who had negotiated the 89-92
agreement, regarding the meaning of Article 11, section 5(1). 
Mr. St. Peter did not do so.  

     4.   The parties' 88-89 agreement contained a provision
identical to section 5(1) of Article 11 of the 89-92 agreement. 
The provision was proposed by Dan Fitzpatrick, the previous city
manager, because of his desire to hold contract negotiations, as

                               -3-

well as grievance meetings and other meetings related to union
business, during the regular work day.  Mr. Fitzpatrick did not
want to work after 5:00 p.m., and also did not want the City
Council involved in contract negotiations.  At the request of the
city manager, the parties' negotiation ground rules for the 88-89
agreement also included an agreement not to meet after 5:00 p.m. 

     5.   The 89-92 agreement contains the following provisions:

                            ARTICLE 5
                    MAINTENANCE OF STANDARDS

          It is mutually agreed that existing rights,
     privileges, or benefits affecting the Augusta Police
     Bureau and its members shall remain in force throughout
     the duration of this AGREEMENT.  The Director of Public
     Safety shall have the right to delete, change, or
     implement rules and regulations.  Any changes shall be
     posted prominently for a period of ten (10) working
     days whenever possible before becoming effective.  Any
     disagreements resulting from this Article will be
     handled in accordance with the existing procedure.
  
     
                             ARTICLE 11
                       GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

     Section 1:  Declaration of Policy.

          It is the purpose of this procedure to secure at
     the lowest possible administrative level, equitable
     solutions to grievances free from coercion, restraint,
     reprisal.

     Section 2:  Definitions.

          a.   Employee shall mean any person covered by     
               this agreement as provided for under Article  
               I - Recognition.

          b.   Employer shall mean the individual designated 
               by management to review and resolve           
               grievances.

          c.   UNION shall mean Teamster's (sic) Local 340

          d.   Grievance shall mean any claimed violation,   
               misinterpretation or inequitable application  
               
                               -4-

               of this agreement or of any laws, rules,      
               procedures, regulations, administrative order 
               or work rules of the employer, or those       
               matters affecting employees' health or        
               safety, physical facilities, materials or
               equipment furnished to the employees or            
               supervision of employees.

          e.   Supervisor shall mean the employee on the     
               next higher level of authority above the      
               employee in the department wherein the        
               grievance exists and who normally assigns and 
               supervises the employee's work.

          f.   Days shall mean all days other than Saturday, 
               Sunday, and holidays which shall be excluded  
               in computing the number of days within which  
               action must be taken or notice given within   
               the terms of this procedure.

          g.   The grievance shall consist of a written      
               statement served upon the CITY or the UNION   
               as the case may be, by registered or certi-   
               fied mail or by personal service.  The        
               grievance must:  (a) cite the contractual     
               provision in issue; (b) contain a statement   
               of the claimed violation which is in dispute; 
               and (c) set forth a statement of the re-      
               quested relief.

          No grievance shall be permitted to be initiated
     more than fifteen (15) days after the date upon which
     the acts underlying the grievance arose; provided that
     such limitation shall not apply to payment of salary or
     benefits.

     Section 3:  Rights of the Parties.

     a.  Rights of Grievant

          1.   The grievant may select any representative(s)
     to assist him in the processing and/or preparing of
     grievances, except that no representative may be
     present from any other employee organization other than
     union.

          2.   The grievant shall have access to all written 
     statements, records, and materials relating to the
     grievance.
     
                               -5-

     b.  Rights of the Union

          1.   The UNION shall receive a copy of any claim,
     including supporting materials and of any decision
     rendered pursuant to the grievance as outlined in
     Section 4, Step 1.

          2.   The UNION shall have the right to submit
     briefs to support or refute allegations of any party in
     a grievance.


          3.   The employee may have a union representative
     at any hearing, conference, meeting held under this
     procedure, if so requested.

     c.   Mutual Rights

          In the event of the unexcused failure on the part
     of any aggrieved party to be timely, the grievance
     shall be deemed to be withdrawn.  If the employer or
     his representative fail to make a decision within the
     required time period, the grievance shall be deemed to
     be upheld and in all respects final and binding upon
     the parties.

     Section 4:  Presentation.

     Step One

          1.   An employee(s) who claims to have a grievance
     shall present this grievance to the Deputy Police Chief
     in writing within fifteen (15) calendar days of its
     occurrence.

          2.   The Deputy Police Chief shall meet with the
     parties to resolve the grievance within three days. 
     After the request for the meeting, he shall render a
     decision in writing within five (5) days thereafter, a
     copy of which is sent to both the employee(s) and his
     representative.

     Step Two

          The aggrieved party, if not satisfied with the
     decision at Step One, may within ten (10) days request
     a review by the department head.  Such request is to be
     in writing with a copy to the immediate supervisor. 
     The department head shall convene a hearing within ten
     (10) days after receipt of the request for said
     hearing.  The department head shall render a decision
     in writing, within ten (10) days after the hearing,

                               -6-

     copies to the aggrieved and his representative. 

     Step Three

          The aggrieved party, if not satisfied with the
     decision at Step Two, may within five days request in
     writing a hearing before the City Manager.  The
     requested hearing shall be held within ten days after
     it is received and a decision shall be made within ten
     days thereafter, copies of the decision to the
     aggrieved party and his representative.


     Step Four

          The aggrieved party with the approval of the UNION
     may appeal an unsatisfactory decision at Step Three to
     an arbitrator selected by the UNION and employer.  The
     decision arrived at shall be final and binding upon
     both parties to the agreement.

          If the parties fail to select an arbitrator, they
     shall use the Maine Board of Arbitration and Concili-
     ation Service tripartite.

          The fees and expenses of the arbitrator shall be
     borne equally by the parties.

          The arbitrator should hold a hearing within twenty
     (20) days after he has been selected and shall render a
     decision within twenty (20) days after the hearing has
     been concluded.

          The arbitrator shall have no power to add to,
     subtract from or change any other provision of this
     agreement, nor to render any decision which conflicts
     with a law.

     Section 5:  General Considerations.

          1.   All grievance discussions, meetings,
     conferences, hearings, shall be conducted during the
     normal work day.

          2.   The time limits at any step(s) may be
     extended by written mutual consent of the parties.

          3.   The move to arbitration must be approved by
     the UNION. 

                               -7-

                           ARTICLE 22
                    HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS

          The City will contribute towards Northern New
     England Benefit Health Trust for hospital, dental and
     eye care insurance for each employee according to the
     following schedule:

                 December 1, 1989 - 240 per month
                 December 1, 1990 - 266 per month
                 December 1, 1991 - 292 per month

          The remainder, if any, will be paid by each
     employee using weekly payroll deductions.

          When a police officer retires with minimum twenty
     (20) years of service in good standing, the CITY will
     pay 100% of employee hospital insurance benefits until
     such time as accepted for medicare coverage.  Dependent
     coverage may be picked up at group rate at employees
     (sic) full cost.


     6.   The contract covering the supervisors in the Augusta
Police Department, a three-year contract which expires at the end
of 1993, provides for Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance, 100
percent of the premium to be paid by the City for all employees
who were in the unit at the time the contract went into effect. 
Anyone promoted to supervisor during the contract term brings
with him/her whatever insurance benefits he/she had previously.  
The City has also been paying 100 percent of the Blue Cross/Blue
Shield premium for the dispatchers' unit.  Other City employees
are covered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield as well. 

     7.   Article 22 of the parties' 88-89 agreement reads as
follows:1
                   HOSPITAL INSURANCE BENEFITS
          The CITY will provide for those individuals
     employed as of the signing of the 1985-87 AGREEMENT, at
_________________________

     1Apparently, this or a similar provision appeared in the
parties' 1985-87 agreement, and they failed to change the dates
when carrying it over to the 88-89 agreement.

                               -8-

     no cost to said employees, hospital insurance benefits
     for which the employee is qualified.  Effective upon
     signing the 1985-87 AGREEMENT, the CITY will pay $8.70
     per week for the Teamsters Northern New England Benefit
     Trust plan for dental, eye care and prescription insur-
     ance; effective January 1, 1986, the CITY shall pay
     $9.70 per week and effective January 1, 1987, the CITY
     shall pay $10.70 per week for said insurance coverage.

          Effective upon the signing of the 1985-87
     AGREEMENT, all new employees hired thereafter shall
     receive insurance benefits for which the CITY will pay
     up to $43.85 per week, said amount to be used toward
     hospital insurance and the Teamsters benefit plan for
     dental  eye care and prescription insurance.  Employees
     shall pay any additional costs for such insurances.

          The intent is to find a comparable plan which will
     provide the same benefits at a lower cost to the CITY. 
     If the CITY finds a comparable plan at a lower cost,
     the CITY's only obligation will be to fund the cost of
     the comparable plan.

          When a police officer retires with minimum twenty
     (20) years of service in good standing, the CITY will
     pay 100% of employee hospital insurance benefits until
     such time as accepted for medicare coverage.  Dependent
     coverage may be picked up at group rate at employees
     (sic) full cost. 

The premium cap for new employees was never enforced.   

     8.   The health insurance provided under the 88-89 agreement
was a Blue Cross/Blue Shield health plan.  The decision to move
to another health plan stemmed from the City's desire to reduce
its health care costs, and the Teamsters' desire that unit
members not be required to begin sharing the cost of premiums.

     9.   Unlike blue Cross/Blue Shield, the Northern New England
Benefit Health Trust is a defined contribution plan rather than a
defined benefit plan.  As a result, the Trust was able to provide
guaranteed premium amounts to the Teamsters for each of the three
years of the contract.  For those three years, premiums were
$240, $266 and $292, rather than $266, $292 and $402.25, because
the parties made their contract retroactive to December 1, 1989,

                               -9-

rather than to January 1, 1990.  The parties were aware, when
they entered into the 89-92 agreement, that insurance premiums
would be increasing to $402.25 as of January 1, 1993.
     
     10.  Specific dollar figures for the City's insurance
premium contribution (and the statement that employees would pay
the remainder, if any) were placed in the 89-92 agreement because
the City did not want to be responsible for any premium increase
that might occur during the term of the contract.  (The City was
not convinced that premiums would not increase during the con-
tract term, in spite of the Trust's guarantee to the Teamsters.) 
The Teamsters recommended that members ratify the 89-92 agreement
in part because there would be no cost sharing on health insur-
ance premiums during the life of the contract.  During the
contract term, premiums did not increase (although benefits were
reduced).      
    
     11.  By letter dated December 30, 1992, Northern New England
Benefit Trust notified the City that effective January 1, 1993,
through December 31, 1993, the monthly premium for the insurance
package for the patrolmen's unit would increase to $402.25 per
member.  

     12.  By memorandum dated January 6, 1993, and prepared by
the city manager and the personnel director, the City notified
members of the unit of the premium increase and of the City's 
intention to deduct the increase from employees' paychecks
pursuant to Article 22 of the 89-92 agreement.  

     13.  By letter dated January 8, 1993, Northern New England
Benefit Trust informed the City and the Teamsters as follows:

     Recognizing that contract negotiations are in progress
     and, given the fact that the collective bargaining
     agreement expired but a few days ago, ie, December 31,
     1992, the Trust is willing to await payment of the

                              -10-

     required additional contributions amount due beginning
     January 1, 1993, if necessary, until March 31, 1993. 
     It must be understood by both parties to the collective
     bargaining agreement, that the retroactive amount is
     expected to be paid once the agreement is settled.  
 
     However, no further extension of coverage is available
     after midnight March 31, 1993, except as full payment
     of the accumulated additional contributions has been
     made at this office on or before that date.  

     If you have any questions regarding this matter please
     feel free to contact me at the Fund office.  
     

The same information was conveyed to the city manager in a phone
conversation with an official of Northern New England Benefit
Trust. 

     14.  By letter dated January 12, 1993, James Carson of the
Teamsters contacted City Manager Terrence St. Peter regarding,
among other things, the payroll deduction.  The letter stated:

          I am writing to you pursuant to our telephone
     conversation of yesterday January 7, 1993 regarding our
     contract negotiations with particular reference to the
     issue of health insurance premiums and coverage under
     the current Northern New England Benefit Trust carrier.

          As you know the fund (NNEBT) has notified our
     respective parties by phone that they are willing to
     allow the parties to wait until March 31, 1993 to
     submit the difference between the $292.00 the City is
     now paying to provide the 100% benefit without employee
     contributions and the $402.25 which has become the new
     premium effective 1/1/93 that would represent 100% of
     premium.  Given that grace period it is not necessary
     for you to payroll deduct the difference between the
     $292.00 and the $402.25 from the employees (sic)
     checks.

          In order to maintain the status quo both parties
     should make plans on their own to set aside funds that
     will be available to make retroactive payments of the
     difference between the two figures which amounts to
     about $27.00 per week per employee.

                              -11-

          I also told you that the Union considers your
     payroll deduction of these monies from the employees
     (sic) paychecks to be a prohibited practice in keeping
     with the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law
     Section 965.C which requires you to confer and negoti-
     ate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, working
     conditions and contract grievance arbitration.  Medical
     insurance coverage and premiums are considered manda-
     tory subjects of bargaining and as such the employer
     cannot unilaterally implement changes without negoti-
     ations with the Union over such subjects, unless and
     until the parties have reached contract impasse.

          In addition to that I also told you that the Union
     will be filing a second prohibited practice complaint
     under Section 965.A that requires the parties to
     bargain collectively and to meet at reasonable times. 
     With respect to this complaint I explained to you that
     the clause contained within Article 11, Section 5, (1)
     requires the parties to meet for all grievance discus-
     sions, and that all meetings, conferences and hearings
     will be conducted during the normal work day.  I
     explained to you that I had been told that this clause
     was inserted into the contract by the former City
     Manager to specifically provide that contract negoti-
     ations be conducted during normal business hours.  Had
     you complied with the contract we may have been able to
     reach agreement on the question of insurance benefits
     and premiums which would have averted your questionable
     need to payroll deduct any monies from anyone, or at
     least to do so in a lawful way after having bargained
     with the Union.

          I further told you during our conversations that
     Article 5, of the collective bargaining agreement
     between our parties titled "Maintenance of Standards",
     requires the employer to keep in effect during the life
     of the agreement all rights, privileges or benefits
     affecting the Augusta Police Bureau and its members,
     and such rights, privileges and benefits are to remain
     in force.

          Thus, in order to maintain the benefits provided
     under Article 22 of the contract, "Health Insurance
     Benefits", it will be necessary for the employer to
     provide the full premium required by the Trust in order
     to keep the insurance in force beyond January 1, 1993. 
     Failure to do so would put you in violation of your
     commitment under Article 5.

          In addition I told you that if the City felt
     aggrieved by the fact that they were being required to

                              -12-

     pay the difference between the $292.00 premium and the
     $402.25 premium, that you as the employer have access
     to the grievance procedure contained within Article 11
     of the collective bargaining agreement Section 2.G,
     namely, that a grievance shall consist of a written
     statement served upon the City or the Union as the case
     may be.  Therefore should you feel that your payment of
     100% of the insurance premiums is a violation of the
     collective bargaining agreement you are compelled to
     file a grievance and arbitrate the issue of who is
     wrong and who is right.  With respect to this dispute,
     and the loser will be bound by the decision of the
     arbitration panel until a new agreement can be reached
     that resolves the issue of 100% payment of the
     insurance premiums.

          By way of this letter, I am notifying you that the
     Union is requesting collective bargaining for the pur-
     pose of reaching a new collective bargaining agreement
     to replace the agreement that expired on December 31,
     1992 and demanding impact bargaining on the question of
     health insurance benefits owing to the fact that my
     membership would suffer adverse harm due to your
     refusal to pay the newly required premium of $402.25
     effective 1/1/93 to the NNEBT.

          I am offering you the following dates to continue
     negotiations, that were started in December prior to
     your raising the issue of evening meetings; January 20,
     1993, January 22, 1993, January 25, 1993 and January
     28, 1993.

          Please notify us as to which days you may be
     available to meet during the "normal work day".  
   

     15.  Attached to the January 12th letter was the following
one-page document:

                              -13-
                                  
               TRUCK DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS
                         LOCAL UNION #340
                         GRIEVANCE REPORT

     CAREFULLY EXPLAIN THE FACTS, TIME & DATE.  TURN OVER TO
     STEWARD OR UNION.

     DATE:   1/11/93            EMPLOYER:  City of Augusta
 

          The employer by authorizing payroll deductions
     from the employees (sic) paychecks to cover a pending
     increase in health insurance premiums is in violation
     of Article 5 - Maintenance of Standards, Article 11
     Grievance Procedure, Article 16 - Wages and Article 22
     - Health Insurance Benefits.


                                    SIGNED: 

     STEWARD'S OR AGENT'S REPORT:





     SIGNED:                        SIGNED:

     [signed by James E. Carson]

     BUSINESS AGENT, LOCAL 340      SHOP STEWARD


The letter and the grievance report were sent by certified mail,
and were received by the City on January 14th.  The grievance 
was not presented to the deputy chief or chief before it was
presented to the city manager.

     16.  Upon receipt of Mr. Carson's January 12th letter, the
City did not cease deducting the insurance premium increase from
employees' paychecks.  The Teamsters' letter regarding setting
aside the money notwithstanding, the City was concerned, based on
a similar situation reported in the newspaper of a nearby
community, that the retroactive premium increase due March 31,
1993, would not be paid and that employees' health insurance

                              -14-

would be terminated.  

     17.  The city manager took the grievance report that he
received on January 14th as a grievance, and directed the
personnel manager to set up a "meeting or hearing" regarding Mr.
Carson's January 12th submission.  The city manager did not
reject the grievance outright for failure to follow the
contractual grievance procedure, because he thought to do so
would be "unfair or improper or not looking to deal in good
faith."

     18.  On January 20, 1993, the personnel director called Mr.
Carson's office to set up a negotiation session for January 28th. 
The personnel director did not talk directly to Mr. Carson,
because he was not available.  In his conversation with office
personnel, the personnel director mentioned the possibility of a
meeting prior to negotiations for the purpose of discussing Mr.
Carson's January 12th letter.  

     19.  On that same date the personnel director sent Mr.
Carson the following letter:

     This letter is to inform you that I have scheduled a
     contract negotiation session for the Police Unit on
     January 28, 1993, at  4 p.m. in Conference Room A of
     the City Center. 

     Please let me know if the date and time are convenient
     for you.


     20.  One or two days before the negotiation session set for
January 28, 1993 (which eventually was cancelled by the
Teamsters), the personnel director mentioned to the shop steward,
a member of the negotiating team, that the City would be willing
to hold a meeting on the Teamsters' health insurance grievance
before the negotiation session, at 3:00 p.m. on January 28th. 
The shop steward had not filed the grievance, had not asked for a

                              -15-

grievance meeting, and has no general responsibility for setting
up grievance meetings.  He did not contact the Teamsters about
the personnel director's comment.    

     21.  Mr. Carson sent City Manager St. Peter a letter on
February 10, 1993, stating:

           The enclosed grievance was forwarded to you on
     the 12th of January, 1993 by certified mail.  As you
     can see by the enclosed mail receipts the package was
     received by the city on January 14th, 1993, signed for
     by city employee Ken Austin.

          A quick check of the calendar reveals that it has
     been seventeen (17) working days since the City signed
     for and received this grievance from the Union. 
     Article 11, Section 3, C of the expired collective
     bargaining agreement between the parties states:

          "if the employer or his representative fail
          to make a decision within the required time
          period, the grievance shall be deemed to be
          upheld and in all respects final and binding
          upon the parties".

          As the grievance states, the employer is to cease
     and desist from deducting monies from employee's (sic)
     paychecks to cover a pending increase in employee
     health insurance premiums.  Such premiums are to be
     paid by the employer in keeping with the parties (sic)
     intentions in the 1989 to 1992 collective bargaining
     agreement.  The figures stated in that collective
     bargaining agreement reflect an employer agreement and
     a Union promise that the numbers indicated represent
     100% of the required premium under that particular
     health and welfare policy.



     22.  On February 12, 1993, Mr. St. Peter sent the following
letter to Mr. Carson:

          Although it was not clear in your January 12
     letter, for reasons which I will explain later in this
     letter, that you were filing a grievance, we did in
     fact respond to you to set up a hearing in case you
     really thought you were filing a grievance.

                              -16-

          That meeting time, communicated to both your
     office and Steward Michael Toman by Personnel Director
     David Jowdry, was offered to be a 3 p.m., January 28,
     preceding a negotiation meeting which we offered to be
     scheduled at 4 p.m. that day.  You never confirmed
     either session but did, as January 28 approached,
     cancel the session.

          If indeed this was a grievance request, as your
     "Grievance Report" would imply but your letter
     contradicts, then a hearing with the City Manager would
     be in order (assuming the first two steps under the
     contract had been complied with, which apparently has
     not been done).  Not knowing whether the first two
     grievance steps had been followed or not, we proceeded
     to attempt to have a hearing on the matter with you
     nonetheless.  You apparently were unable to meet the
     schedule or, to this point, give us an acceptable
     alternative time.

          Nowhere in your letter or attached "Grievance
     Report," both of which are attached to this corres-
     pondence, do you state you want a hearing or whether
     you are filing a grievance.  Your letter states that
     the "Union considers your payroll deduction of these
     monies from the employees (sic) paychecks to be a
     prohibited practice in keeping with the Municipal
     Public Employees Labor Relations Law Section 965.C ..." 
     
          You further stated, in the next paragraph, "In
     addition to that I also told you that the Union will be
     filing a second prohibited practice complaint under
     Section 965.A that requires the parties to bargain
     collectively ..."  I inferred from these two paragraphs
     that you were filing prohibited practices complaints to
     the Labor Relations Board, which of course you are free
     to do.

          However, the situation became further muddied in
     the second page of your letter.  There, you stated, "In
     addition I told you that if the City felt aggrieved by
     the fact that they were being required to pay the
     difference between the $292.00 premium and the $402.25
     premium, that you as the employer have access to the
     grievance procedure contained with Article 11 of the
     collective bargaining agreement Section 2.G, namely,
     that a grievance shall consist of a written statement
     served upon the City or the Union as the case may be
     (your emphasis).  Therefore should you feel that your
     payment of 100% of the insurance premiums is a viola-
     tion of the collective bargaining agreement you are
     compelled to file a grievance and arbitrate the issue

                              -17-

     of who is wrong and who is right."

          Were you saying the City should file a grievance? 
     If so, do I conclude that the Union was not filing a
     grievance?

          Later on, you added, "By way of this letter, I am
     notifying you that the Union is requesting collective
     bargaining for the purpose of reaching a new collective
     bargaining agreement to replace the agreement that
     expired on December 31, 1992 and demanding impact
     bargaining on the question of health insurance benefits
     owing to the fact that my membership could suffer
     adverse harm due to your refusal ..."

          Were you filing a grievance, informing me that you
     were going to submit a prohibited practices complaint,
     asking the City to file a grievance, or "demanding
     impact bargaining?"

          The only thing your letter says you were notifying
     me of was the request for collective bargaining.  We
     responded to you with a date on that as well.

          On January 6, we notified the membership as a
     courtesy, of the City's need, under the terms of the
     contract, to begin payroll deductions for health
     insurance.  We need not repeat the very clear reasons
     here; a copy of the January 6 letter is enclosed.

          The position of the City is, therefore, very clear.

          If you believe you want to file a grievance, then
     we of course will have a hearing.  That hearing will
     ascertain whether the proper steps in the grievance
     process have been followed as well as the merits of the
     issue.  Please contact me if you wish to pursue this
     avenue.

          If you believe you have a legitimate complaint,
     you may wish to file a prohibited practices complaint
     with the Labor Board.  We will, of course, comply with
     any rulings from the MLRB.

          The most practical solution to this question
     however, is for us to bargain for a new contract to
     replace the one that expired December 31, 1992.  As we
     have stated to you before, we are ready to meet with
     you any day from 4 p.m. on to negotiate a new contract. 
     Please contact David Jowdry to establish a mutually
     convenient day.

                              -18-

          So that there is no confusion, let me state very
     directly that this letter is in response to your
     February 10 letter.  The City sees no reason to change
     its understanding of the very clear wording of the
     contract unless, or until, a new contract is agreed
     upon.  Therefore, the deductions for health insurance
     premiums will continue.    


     23.  There has never been a waiver of the time limits
established in Article 11, except by mutual agreement.  
  
     24.  The parties have stipulated that in addition to
individual employees, the Teamsters and the City may both file
grievances under the grievance procedure.  

     25.  On another occasion, when the Teamsters filed a
grievance on behalf of all unit members, both the deputy chief
and chief (at the first two steps of the grievance procedure)
wrote on the grievance "Unable to handle at my level," and passed
it on to the next level.  

                           DISCUSSION
Jurisdiction/exhaustion
     At hearing, the City moved for dismissal of the complaint on
the grounds that the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the
complaint and that the Teamsters had failed to exhaust its
contractual grievance remedies.  The Board denied the motion and
proceeded to hear the matter.  The reasons for the denial will be
outlined briefly.  

     In both its original response to the complaint, filed prior
to the prehearing conference, and in its response to the
complaint as finally amended, after the prehearing conference,
the City asserted lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure
to exhaust as affirmative defenses.  The defenses were based on
the City's assertion that any interpretation of the parties'
contract must be processed through the contractual grievance

                              -19-

procedure.  

     The Board clearly has jurisdiction over unfair labor
practice charges, including a charge of failure to bargain.  That
is so even where the charge is based on an alleged contract
violation -- in such an instance, the Board must interpret the
contract in order to determine whether a failure to bargain has
occurred.  State v. MSEA, 499 A.2d 1228, 1230 (Me. 1985).

     Of course, it is within the Board's discretion to defer to
grievance arbitration machinery, and it will do so in certain
circumstances.  Here, however, deferral would be inappropriate
for two reasons.  First, the Board's rules require that any
request for deferral be made in the response to the complaint and
that oral argument on the request be made at the prehearing
conference.  Rules 4.05(A) and 4.07(A).  The City did neither --
rather it simply (and inaccurately) asserted lack of jurisdic-
tion and failure to exhaust.  The Board will not normally defer,
even where deferral would otherwise be appropriate, where a
specific request for deferral is not made.2  

     More important, even if the Board were to have taken the
City's defenses as a request to defer, we would not defer in this
case.  None of the allegations in the complaint involve purely a
matter of contract interpretation.  There are two allegations
regarding meeting times -- that the City's refusal to hold
negotiation meetings before 4:00 p.m. violates the section
965(1)(A)) requirement to meet at reasonable times (which is not
arbitrable), and that it violates the parties' contract (which is
arbitrable, at least until the contract expires).  In connection
_________________________

     2Or if made, was untimely.  The purpose of Rules 4.05(A) and
4.07(A) is to ensure that deferral decisions are made before the
Board and the parties spend time and money preparing for the
evidentiary hearing. 

                              -20-

with post-expiration status quo allegations, which types of
contract provisions "survive" expiration, as well as how the
status quo is defined, are decisions for the Board even though
contract interpretation may also be involved.  Finally, even the
City has acknowledged that the alleged default on a grievance
already filed (in connection with the health insurance dispute)
is appropriately before the Board.  In these circumstances, where
the issues are intertwined and where some (or in this case, most)
issues cannot be arbitrated, deferral to the parties' grievance
procedure would serve no useful purpose.3

Refusal to meet at reasonable times
     When negotiations for a successor agreement began in
November of 1992, meeting times for the first two meetings were
set by the City -- both meetings were held after 4:00 p.m., at
the City's insistence.  Thereafter, the parties met with a
mediator, who set the meeting times.

     The Teamsters allege that the City's insistence that face-
to-face negotiations occur after 4:00 p.m. violated both the
contract itself and the requirement of section 965(1)(A) that
parties meet at reasonable times.  We disagree.

     Article 11, section 5 of the parties' expired contract
states:   
_________________________

     3Bureau of Employee Relations v. AFSCME, 614 A.2d 74 (Me.
1992), cited by the City, is inapplicable to this case, since the
parties' contract contains no zipper clause that would impact the
Board's authority to determine whether a mid-term contract
violation has occurred.  Furthermore, most of the allegations
concern events that occurred after the contract expired, and 
zipper clauses by their very nature do not generally survive
contract expiration.  Consequently, they can have no impact on
the Board's authority to make post-expiration status quo
determinations.   

                              -21-

                           ARTICLE 11
                     GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

     Section 5:  General Considerations.

          1.   All grievance discussions, meetings,
     conferences, hearings, shall be conducted during the
     normal work day.

          2.   The time limits at any step(s) may be extended by
     written mutual consent of the parties.

          3.   The move to arbitration must be approved by
     the UNION. 


The Teamsters argue that the language in subsection 1, which also
appeared in the parties' 88-89 contract at the request of the
previous city manager, was intended to include contract negoti-
ations and not just grievance-related contacts between the
parties.  The City argues that although the previous city manager
may have intended that the provision address contract negotia-
tions, by its own terms it does not.  

     Where a contract provision is vague or ambiguous, it is
appropriate to consider extrinsic evidence regarding the intent
of the parties when the provision was drafted.  Absent extra-
ordinary circumstances, we are not willing to do so where the
contract language is clear on its face,4 especially where the
subject at issue is how the parties will conduct negotiations for
a new contract (in essence, a ground rule for future negoti-
ations).  Section 5 appears in the grievance article of the
contract.  Furthermore, subsection (1), relied on by the
Teamsters, refers to grievance discussions, meetings, conferences
and hearings, and the other two subsections clearly relate only
to grievances.  There is simply no ambiguity to resolve.    
_________________________

     4One such circumstance might be a clearly established past
practice that contradicts a contract provision.

                              -22-

     We also reject the Teamsters' alternative contention that
the City violated section 965(1)(A) -- the requirement that
parties meet at reasonable times.  There was no evidence that the
City insisted on meeting after 4 p.m. in order to delay or avoid
negotiations -- members of City Council wished to participate on
the City's bargaining team, and the meeting time was meant to
accommodate other employment.  It appears from the record that
the City was intransigent about the meeting time for face-to-face
negotiations, but the Teamsters were no better -- their bargain-
ing team members wanted to meet only before 4 p.m.5, and neither
side offered a compromise suggestion.  In these circumstances, we
decline to find that the City acted unreasonably.  However, we
strongly suggest that in the future both parties make an effort
to find common ground, in order that the legitimate interests of
both parties are accommodated to the extent possible.

Failure to maintain the status quo for insurance premiums
     The Teamsters allege that by failing to continue to pay 100
percent of health insurance premiums after expiration of the
parties' contract, the City has failed to maintain the status
quo, in violation of the duty to bargain. 

     The situation before us is analogous in relevant respects to
the facts in Auburn School Support Personnel v. Auburn School
Committee, No. 91-12 (M.L.R.B. July 11, 1991).  There, the health
insurance provision in the parties' three-year contract contained
a fixed dollar amount to be paid by the employer toward the
insurance premium for the first year, with a reopener for the
second and third years.  The fixed dollar amount covered 100
percent of the premium for the first year, but not for the second
and third, when premiums increased.  The parties had not been
able to reach agreement under the reopener provision.  The Board
_________________________

     5Also apparently for legitimate reasons related to
employment or other responsibilities.  

                              -23-

found that pursuant to its post-expiration status quo require-
ment, the employer was required in the second and third years to
continue what it been doing in the first year -- paying the fixed
dollar amount in the contract.6

     In the matter now before us, the parties' expired contract
includes a health insurance provision that contains a fixed
dollar amount to be paid by the employer for each of three years. 
Because the dollar amount covered 100 percent of the premium for
each of those years, the Teamsters argue that paying 100 percent
constitutes the status quo.  Put another way, the Teamsters
suggest that we look not at the fixed dollar amounts in the
contract, but that we look at the "totality of the circum-
stances."  The circumstances to which the Teamsters point are as
follows:  1) the City is paying 100 percent of premiums for the
supervisors' and dispatchers' units and could not have intended
to treat this unit differently; 2) the Teamsters proposed the
switch from Blue Cross/Blue Shield to Northern New England
Benefit Health Trust (the insurance plan in the expired contract)
precisely in order to avoid cost sharing of premiums by unit
members;7 3) the Teamsters provided the City with a windfall
during the contract term by making it retroactive to December 1,
_________________________

     6The post-expiration status quo requirement was applicable
during the period of the contract, because the reopener date in
essence operated as an "expiration date" for the first year of
the health insurance provision.   

     7The parties began exploring alternatives to Blue Cross/Blue
Shield when the City raised the issue of whether newly hired
employees subject to the cost-sharing provisions of the 88-89
contract should retroactively pay increases that had occurred
during the term of that contract.  The City had not been
enforcing the provision during the contract term.   

                              -24-

1989;8 4) there should be a different view of the status quo
where the contract provides a defined contribution plan rather
than a defined benefit plan;9 and 5) the "remainder" language in
the contract was put in simply to satisfy the City's concern that
premiums might go up during the term of the contract even though
the Trust had guaranteed they wouldn't -- the Teamsters were not
told by the City that the fixed dollar amount in the third year
of the contract would be a post-expiration cap.10  

     While some of the Teamsters' arguments hold some appeal, 
the health insurance provision itself is determinative.  That
provision states, in part:   

          The City will contribute towards Northern New
     England Benefit Health Trust for hospital, dental and
     eye care insurance for each employee according to the
     following schedule:

                 December 1, 1989 - 240 per month
                 December 1, 1990 - 266 per month
                 December 1, 1991 - 292 per month

          The remainder, if any, will be paid by each
     employee using weekly payroll deductions.
   

The "remainder" language in the provision is unequivocal. 
Accordingly, we see no way to consider the fixed dollar amounts
in the contract as anything but a cap on the City's responsi-
_________________________

     8By backdating the contract, the 1990 premium was at the
Trust's 1989 rate, the 1991 premium was at the 1990 rate, and the
1992 premium was at the 1991 rate.   

     9The Trust plan is a defined contribution plan for which the
Trust could guarantee the premium rates for three years.  For
defined benefit plans such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, premium
rates are unpredictable.

     10They also suggest that the "remainder" language was put in
because the Trust required it.  No evidence was presented to
support this contention. 

                              -25-

bility for insurance premiums, even though those fixed dollar
amounts covered 100 percent of the premium for each of the three
years.  The City did not violate the status quo when it refused
to pay the premium increase upon expiration of the parties'
contract.          
  
Premature deduction of premium through payroll deduction 
     The Teamsters' third allegation is that the City violated
its duty to bargain by prematurely deducting the premium increase
from employees' paychecks.  After the Trust informed the City 
that premiums would be increasing effective January 1, 1993, and
the City notified employees that the increase would be deducted
from paychecks pursuant to the contract, the Trust was apparently
contacted by the Teamsters regarding an extension of time for
contract negotiations.  Shortly thereafter, the Trust informed
the parties that an extension of time would be granted to March
31, 1993, pending contract negotiations over the increase, but
that the full increase would eventually have to be paid retro-
active to January 1st.  The Teamsters then contacted the City by
letter requesting that the payroll deductions not occur during
the grace period, and offering to set aside funds to ensure that
the retroactive payments would be made when due.  (The Teamsters
also suggested that the City do the same.)  In spite of that
request, the City did not cease deducting premiums from
employees' paychecks.

     The City argues that the contract required the deductions in
the absence of a meeting between the parties to agree on some
other arrangement -- for instance, an escrow account to guarantee
payment.  According to the City, it was unable to set up such a
meeting.11  The City also argues that it had a legitimate concern,
_________________________

     11Testimony indicates that the City called the Teamsters
office to arrange a meeting on Mr. Carson's January 12th letter
that, among other things, requested a delay in the payroll
deduction.  The City was unable to reach Mr. Carson.

                              -26-

based on a similar situation in another town, that the
retroactive increase would not be paid and that employees' health
insurance would be cancelled.   We reject the City's argument.  

     The contract requires that the remainder, if any, be paid by
employees through payroll deduction.  Pursuant to the grace
period granted by the Trust, the City was paying only the $292.00
per month per employee that it had agreed to pay in the contract. 
Once the requirement to pay the increase was suspended, the
obligation itself was suspended (though not dissolved).  From
then until March 31st, there was no remainder to be paid by
employees under the contract, and the City had no authority to
withhold monies from employees' paychecks for that purpose.12  By
doing so, the City violated the status quo, as reflected in
Article 22 of the parties' expired contract, thereby violating
section 964(1)(E) of the MPELRL, 26 M.R.S.A.  964(1)(E) (1988). 
We will order the City to cease and desist from making such
premature payroll deductions in the future.13 

Failure to honor the parties' grievance procedure
     The Teamsters' final allegation is that the City has failed
to honor the parties' grievance procedure by failing to deny the
Teamsters' insurance premium grievance, yet continuing to deduct
the premium increase from employee paychecks.  We agree.
_________________________

     12The City's concern that the insurance would be cancelled
seems unfounded, given the Teamsters' agreement to set aside
funds for payment.  In any case, once the premium increase became
due and owing after March 31, 1993, and if the parties had not
reached agreement on a new contract that required the City to pay
the retroactive increase, the City would have had the authority
to deduct the whole retroactive increase from employees' pay-
checks.  

     13Normally, we would order the City to pay the employees
interest for the period of approximately three months during
which money was prematurely withheld.  We will not do so here,
since we are ordering it to pay interest for that time period in
connection with a separate violation.    

                              -27-

     On January 14, 1993, the City received a one-page document
attached to a letter addressed to the City manager.  The document
was labeled "GRIEVANCE REPORT" and, along with the letter, was
sent by certified mail as required by the parties' contractual
grievance procedure.  The grievance alleged the following:      

          The employer by authorizing payroll deductions
     from the employees (sic) paychecks to cover a pending
     increase in health insurance premiums is in violation
     of Article 5 - Maintenance of Standards, Article 11
     Grievance Procedure, Article 16 - Wages and Article 22
     - Health Insurance Benefits.


At the city manager's direction, on January 20th the personnel
manager attempted to contact Mr. Carson of the Teamsters by phone
at his office in order to schedule a negotiation session for
January 28th.  He also mentioned to office personnel the possi-
bility of a meeting prior to the negotiation session to discuss
the January 12th letter and/or the grievance.14  The personnel
director never spoke to Mr. Carson, and his letter to Mr. Carson
on that same date did not mention either the January 12th letter
or the attached grievance.  One or two days before the negoti-
ation session set for the 28th, the personnel director did
mention to the shop steward that the City would be willing to
meet before the negotiation session to discuss the grievance. 
However, the shop steward did not pass that information  on to
the Teamsters, since he had not filed the grievance, had not
asked for a meeting, and has no general responsibility for
setting up grievance meetings.

     On February 10th, twenty-seven days (eighteen working days)
_________________________

     14Testimony was confusing on this point.  The city manager
testified that he and the personnel director discussed contacting
Mr. Carson "to have a hearing or a meeting on the letter or the
grievance."  According to the personnel director, he did not 
mention the grievance itself when he made the call. 

                              -28-

after the City had received the grievance, Mr. Carson sent the
city manager a letter pointing out that the City had failed to
act on the grievance within the time set out in the parties'
grievance procedure.  The grievance procedure states, in part:

       If the employer or his representative fail to make a
     decision within the required time period, the grievance
     shall be deemed to be upheld and in all respects final
     and binding upon the parties. (Emphasis added)

Nevertheless, the City continued to deduct the insurance premium
increase from employee paychecks.  

     The City defends its failure to act on the grievance before
the contractual deadline by pointing out that the Teamsters
themselves failed to follow the grievance procedure:  first by
failing to utilize the first two steps of the procedure, and also
by failing to request a hearing when filing the grievance at step
three.  The City also asserts that it made all reasonable
attempts to address the January 14th submission from the
Teamsters, and that the facts do not establish a pattern which
would constitute a repudiation of the parties' grievance proce-
dure. 

     It is not clear that the Teamsters were required to ask for
a hearing when the grievance was filed at step three -- the
contractual procedure appears to us to contemplate hearings in
response to a denial at the previous step.  The City is correct
that the grievance procedure does not explicitly provide that the
union, when filing a grievance itself, may skip the first two
steps.  However, an arbitrator will not necessarily refuse to
hear a grievance based on this defense where presentation of a
grievance at the early step(s) in the procedure would be futile
and therefore a waste of time.  Bremen Community School District
228, 82 LA 829 (Nathan, 1984); Advance Window Cleaning Co., 43 LA
695 (Kates, 1964); Los Angeles County Probation Dept., 68 LA 1373

                              -29-

(Rothschild, 1977).15  

     In the matter before us, the City may or may not have pre-
vailed before an arbitrator, had it denied the grievance on
either or both of these procedural grounds and submitted the
dispute to arbitration.  However, if an employer has objections
to the procedure utilized by the union to file a grievance, those
objections must be made in a timely manner or they are waived. 
Peabody Coal Co., 87 LA 1003 (Volz, 1986); Los Angeles County
Probation Dept., 68 LA 1373 (Rothschild, 1977); Celluplastic
Corp., 28 LA 659 (Callaghan, 1957); International Shoe Co., 20 LA
618 (Kelliher, 1953); Celanese Corp., 17 LA 187 (Jaffee, 1951). 
See also City of Westbrook v. Teamsters Local 48, 578 A.2d 716,
719 (Me. 1990).  Not only did the City fail to deny the grievance
on procedural grounds -- it failed to act on the grievance at
all.  This casual attitude toward the parties' grievance
procedure is even more surprising in light of the City's
position, in connection with its failure-to-exhaust argument,
that the parties' grievance procedure should be the means through
which allegations of contract violations are resolved. 

     By failing to act on the Teamsters' grievance within
seventeen working days from the date it was filed, and then
refusing to abide by the default provision of the parties'
grievance procedure [Article 11, section 3(c)], the City has 
_________________________

     15That is the case here; no resolution of the insurance
increase grievance was possible at step one or two of the
parties' grievance procedure.  On a previous occasion when the
Teamsters filed a grievance on behalf of all unit members, both
the deputy chief and chief (at the first two steps of the
grievance procedure) wrote on the grievance "Unable to handle at
my level," and passed it on to the next level. 

                              -30-

violated section 964(1)(E) of the MPELRL.16  Accordingly, we will
order the City to cease and desist from the violation and to take
the affirmative action of reimbursing employees for the insurance
premium deduction that was the subject of the grievance.17  Since
the issuance of this decision and order has been delayed by
circumstances beyond the control of the parties (unusually heavy
caseload and illness), we will limit the City's liability for the
premium increase to the period from January 1, 1993, to December
1, 1993.18  Interest is to be computed in accordance with Florida
Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977), utilizing the interest rates
specified in New Horizons for the Retarded, Inc., 283 NLRB 1173
(1987).19  Payment shall be made within 30 days of the date of
issuance of this Order.  
_________________________

     16The City's argument that no pattern of grievance procedure
repudiation has been established is without merit.  Our finding
that the City violated its duty to bargain is not based upon
application of the totality-of-the-circumstances test, but upon
violation of a contract provision that itself specifies what the
remedy will be for failure to respond to a grievance in a timely
manner.  The Board is simply enforcing that contract provision.   

     Nor are we persuaded by the City's assertion that it made
all reasonable attempts to address the material it received from
the Teamsters on January 12th (apparently by attempting to set up
a meeting).  We see no logic in the City's assumption that
without a meeting or hearing, the grievance procedure was put on
hold.  If the City believed that the union was required to ask
for a hearing, it should have denied the grievance and included
the Teamsters' procedural error in the reasons for the denial.

     17Although the City would have had the right, under the
status quo rule, to deduct the increase, it effectively waived
that right by failing to act on the Teamsters' grievance.  

     18The last brief was received on October 20, 1993.  The case
was not deliberated until December 17, 1993.  

     19Thus, interest is to accrue commencing with the last day
of each calendar quarter of the time period subject to reimburse-
ment, on the total amount then due and owing at the short-term
Federal rate then in effect.  From January 1 to December 1, 1993,
the interest rate was 7 percent.  Interest will begin reaccruing
30 days after the date of this Order, if by that date the City
has not complied with the Order.  

                              -31-

                              ORDER
     On the basis of the foregoing facts and discussion, and by
virtue of and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor
Relations Board by the provisions of 26 M.R.S.A.  968(5) (1988 
& Supp. 1993) and the Board's Rules and Procedures, it is hereby
ORDERED: 
     1.   That the City of Augusta and its representatives and
agents shall:

          a.   Cease and desist from failing to bargain by
               deducting monies from employees' paychecks
               for an insurance premium obligation that has    
               not yet matured.   
                
          b.   Cease and desist from failing to bargain by
               refusing to abide by the default provision in
               the parties' contractual grievance procedure.

          c.   Take the following affirmative action that is nec-
               essary to effectuate the policies of the MPELRL:

               Reimburse members of the Augusta Police Bureau
               Patrolmen's Unit for the premium insurance
               increase deducted from paychecks for the period
               January 1, 1993, to December 1, 1993, plus
               interest.  Payment shall be made within 30 days
               of the date of issuance of this Order.
          
     2.   That the remaining allegations in the complaint are
dismissed. 

     3.   That the City's request for costs and attorney's fees
is denied.

Issued at Augusta, Maine, this 13th day of January, 1994.  
                                                       
                                MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

                                
                                /s/_________________________
                                Howard Reiche, Jr.
                                Employer Representative

               
                                /s/_________________________
                                George W. Lambertson
                                Employee Representative

The parties are hereby advised of their right, pursuant to     

                              -32-

26 M.R.S.A.  968(5)(F) (Supp. 1993), to seek review of this
decision and order by the Superior Court.  To initiate such a
review an appealing party must file a complaint with the Superior
Court within fifteen (15) days of the date of issuance of this
decision and order, and otherwise comply with the requirements of
Rule 80C of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure.



Alternate Chair Pamela D. Chute filed a separate opinion,
dissenting in part.
                             OPINION
     I cannot agree with my colleagues that the City violated
section 964(1)(E) of the MPELRL when it refused to delay
deducting the premium insurance increase from employee paychecks
beginning in January of 1993.  Although the Trust had given the
parties a temporary reprieve on payment of the increase, the
Trust made it absolutely clear that full payment would be due at
the end of the grace period, retroactive to January 1, 1993. 
Thus, the debt was incurred in January, though not due and owing
until April 1st.  In these circumstances, I would find that in
spite of the temporary reprieve on payment, there was immediately
a "remainder" to be paid by employees under the terms of the
health insurance provision of the expired contract, and that the
City was authorized, under that provision, to deduct and hold the
remainder from employees' paychecks immediately.

     On the issue of whether the City violated its duty to
bargain by failing to abide by the parties' grievance procedure,  
I agree with my colleagues that once the Teamsters' grievance was
filed, it was the City's responsibility to act on it in some
fashion.  The parties' contract specifies a time limit within
which the City was required to act, and specifies the penalty for
failure to do so.  However, since the Teamsters also failed to
follow the grievance procedure -- by skipping the first two steps
and by failing to request a hearing at step three -- I would 

                              -33-

require the parties to split the costs of the premium increase
equally for the time period from January 1 to December 1, 1993.  

Issued at Augusta, Maine, this 13th day of January, 1994.


                                MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

                                /s/_________________________
                                Pamela D. Chute
                                Alternate Chair                  
                                

                              -34-