STATE OF MAINE MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Case No. 90-13
Issued: December 3, 1990
___________________________________________
)
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 340, )
)
Complainant, )
v. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
PORTLAND HOUSING AUTHORITY, )
Respondent. )
___________________________________________)
On February 28, 1990, Teamsters Local Union No. 340 ("Union") filed a pro-
hibited practice complaint with the Maine Labor Relations Board ("Board")
alleging that the Portland Housing Authority ("Authority") had violated the
Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law ("MPELRL"), 26 M.R.S.A.
964(1)(A), (C) and (E) (1988). More specifically, the Union alleges that
by instructing employees to discontinue discussing union business during
working hours and by posting and distributing a memo threatening discipline up
to and including discharge for certain activities, the Authority has violated
section 964(1)(A) and (C) of the MPELRL. It alleges that the Authority violated
section 964(1)(E) by failing to give its negotiator sufficient authority to
reach a tentative agreement, and by going through the motions of negotiation
with no intention of reaching an agreement. The Authority denies all of the
allegations.
On April 11, 1990, Board Alternate Chair Jessie B. Gunther convened a pre-
hearing conference in this matter. Her May 4, 1990 Prehearing Conference
Memorandum and Order is incorporated in and made a part of this decision and
order.
Chair Peter T. Dawson presided at the evidentiary hearing on September 6,
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1990,1 accompanied by Employer Representative Thacher E. Turner and Employee
Representative George W. Lambertson. Harvard Brassbridge represented the Union,
and Annalee Z. Rosenblatt represented the Authority. The parties were given
full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce documentary
evidence and to make oral argument. The parties filed simultaneous post-hearing
briefs, which were received on October 2, 1990; the Board deliberated this
matter on October 24, 1990.
JURISDICTION
The Union is the bargaining agent, within the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A.
962(2) (1988), for the administrative and clerical bargaining unit. The
Authority is the public employer of the employees in that unit, within the
meaning of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(7) (Supp. 1989). The jurisdiction of the Board to
hear this case and to render a decision and order lies in 26 M.R.S.A.
968(5) (1988).
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon review of the entire record, the Board finds:
1. The collective bargaining agreement for the administrative and
clerical bargaining unit, which contains 23 unit members, expired on September
30, 1989. Negotiations for a successor agreement began on September 12, 1989,
with additional meetings between the parties occurring on September 14th or
15th, September 26th and October 3rd. Mediation sessions occurred on November
13th, November 20th and January 23, 1990; a post-mediation negotiating session
took place on February 6, 1990.
2. Bruce Loring, Deputy Executive Director of the Authority, has been
negotiating contracts for the administrative and clerical unit, on behalf of
the Authority, since 1982. On behalf of the Union, Harvard Brassbridge acted as
chief negotiator for the first time in the negotiations that are the subject of
__________________________
1The delay in the hearing was due to a request by the parties.
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this prohibited practice case. The shop steward, Linda Herbert, has par-
ticipated in the last three rounds of negotiations (that is, for the last three
contracts). She perceived no difference between Loring's bargaining authority
in the current round and his authority in the two previous rounds in which
she participated. For this round of negotiations, the only ground rule between
the parties was an agreement that both negotiators had authority to negotiate a
final tentative agreement, subject to ratification by unit employees and by the
Authority's Board of Commissioners.
3. The Union's initial bargaining proposals, provided to the Authority by
letter dated July 25, 1989, included an immediate wage adjustment of 8.04% to
offset the loss of income that had occurred when the Authority, under a previous
agreement, phased in a market-based wage study adjustment over three years
instead of implementing it all at once (which it had done with other bargaining
units); a general wage increase of 7.5% for each of the next two years; eye,
dental and prescription drug coverage; an increase in the monthly auto
allowance from $80 to $150 and an increase in the mileage rate from 18c to 25c
per mile; reimbursement for the cost of books for employees receiving an A grade
average in approved training courses; and deletion of the maternity leave provi-
sion so that pregnancy would be treated in the same manner as any illness (as
required by the Maine Human Rights Act).
4. In its first response, offered at the second negotiating session, the
Authority proposed a smaller increase in wages (a cost-of-living adjustment, or
"COLA," of approximately 4%); agreed to the change in maternity leave and the
book reimbursement; proposed a smaller increase in mileage reimbursement ($105
for the monthly allowance and 20c per mile for the mileage rate); and proposed
one decrease in benefits -- a reduction in the employer contribution toward
insurance premiums from 100% to 85%.
5. Yearly budget increases for the Authority from the federal government
are based on COLA; approximately 95% of the Authority's costs are fixed.
6. In its second response to the Union, at the fourth negotiating session,
the Authority increased its monthly mileage allowance proposal (which affects
two unit members) to $110; the remainder of its proposals were unchanged.
Throughout the remaining negotiating and mediation sessions, the Authority
neither offered nor agreed to any changes in its bargaining position.
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7. As negotiations progressed, the Union reduced its demands on such items
as wages and transfer of unused sick leave to vacation leave.
8. The employer's proposal to decrease its share of insurance premiums
was a major point of contention throughout the negotiations. During face-to-
face negotiations, discussions occurred regarding a possible change in the
insurance carrier (suggested by the Union); in mediation, suggestions to the
mediator included reliance on spousal insurance (suggested by the Union) and a
decrease in the employer's share of insurance premiums in exchange for dental
insurance (suggested by the Authority). At the time the prohibited practice
complaint was filed, no agreement had been reached on the issue of insurance.
9. There are three other bargaining units at the Authority, as well as a
group of non-unionized management employees. In the last round of negotiations
for each of the three bargaining units, the last of which was completed before
negotiations began for the administrative and clerical unit, the Authority
agreed to provide employees with dental insurance while continuing to provide
fully paid health insurance. Each unit also received a COLA wage increase.
Non-unionized management employees receive both dental and health insurance, and
are on a merit pay system in which an employee may receive no increase, COLA, or
COLA plus 2%. This merit system was most recently utilized to give some
employees raises of COLA plus 2% in July of 1990.
10. During negotiations for a successor agreement, the Union began an
effort to recruit new union members within the administrative and clerical
bargaining unit. The Authority agreed, when asked, to provide the Union with a
list of all unit employees. The Union contacted said employees, and told them
to contact the shop steward if they wished to join. The shop steward was also
designated to approach employees one-on-one during work time for recruitment
purposes. On one or two occasions the shop steward, Linda Herbert, spoke to
Charlotte Brown, a unit member, about joining. Until January 10, 1990, the
Authority made no attempt to stop such recruiting.
11. Deputy Executive Director Bruce Loring informed employees of the
following, by memo dated January 10, 1990 (the memo was posted and each
employee in the unit was given a copy):
It has been brought to my attention that some employees
have been exerting pressure on their peers to join the union.
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In this regard be advised that conducting such union business
during working hours is a violation of the contract and is
not permitted. Be further advised that membership in the
union is not mandatory for employment at the Housing Authority,
and that individuals are free to join or not join entirely
according to their own wishes. Consequently, any intimidation,
harassment, or disparate treatment of employees based on their
membership status will not be tolerated. Individuals found
to be engaging in this type of discriminatory activity will
be subject to discipline up to and including discharge.
12. Prior to distribution of the memo, supervisor Mary Bostwick was told by
four employees that they had been pressured to join the Union by other employees
in the unit. One of the four, Charlotte Brown, told Bostwick that when she
refused to join, the employees who had pressured her began to ignore her
socially. Brown told Bostwick that as a result of these events, she was think-
ing about resigning from her job. When Bostwick brought that fact to the atten-
tion of Bruce Loring, he drafted the January 10th memo.
13. Both the shop steward and the assistant shop steward, as well as other
employees who contacted them about the January 10th memo, felt threatened by it.
14. By the employer's own admission, employees were also advised, through
supervisor Mary Bostwick, that "union business was not to be discussed during
working hours." Until then, conversations about union matters during work time
were a common occurrence among employees, including supervisor Mary Bostwick.
15. During this period of time, the Authority was concerned about the fact
that employees were congregating as they arrived for work in the morning and not
beginning work promptly. However, the Authority has not promulgated and noti-
fied employees of either a general no-solicitation rule or a general no-talk
rule to be applied during work time.
16. Article 3 of the contract that expired on September 30, 1989, reads as
follows:
ARTICLE 3. NO DISCRIMINATION BY PARTIES: Employees covered
by this Agreement shall have the rights afforded under Section
963 of Chapter 9-A, Title 26, MRSA.
No employee shall be favored or discriminated against by
either the Employer or the Union because of his membership or
non-membership in the Union.
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The parties to this Agreement agree that they shall not
discriminate against any employee because of creed, race, color,
sex or age.
17. Article 4 of the expired contract reads as follows:
ARTICLE 4. TIME OFF WHILE PERFORMING UNION DUTIES: The
Union Steward shall be allowed time off with pay for meeting
with the Employer concerning Union business, provided in the
judgment of the Employer said time off does not interfere
with workflow requirements. The Steward shall not leave regu-
larly assigned work in order to investigate a grievance without
first obtaining approval.
The Steward shall be allowed time off with pay during a
regular work day for investigating grievances up to a maximum
of one-half (1/2) hour per grievance, but not to exceed a
total of three (3) hours per week except with permission of
of the Executive Director or his designee.
The Employer agrees to meet once a month with a Union
Committee to discuss matters pertaining to nongrievable items
not covered by this Agreement, provided the Union Committee
submits a written agenda of items for discussion at least
three (3) working days prior to the meeting date. Such meetings
shall be held at mutually convenient times. Whenever such
meetings are held during normal working hours, the Union
Committee shall be composed of no more than two (2) repre-
sentatives.
The name of the employee selected as Steward and the names
of other Union representatives who may represent employees
shall be certified in writing to the Employer by the Local
Union and individuals so certified shall constitute the Union
Grievance Committee.
18. When Mary Bostwick spoke to union members about the effects of their
pressuring and their ostracism of Charlotte Brown, it was her impression that
they had not understood what the effect of their actions would be and were sorry
that the incident had happened. Since then, union members have changed their
behavior, and in Bostwick's words, "Everyone's getting along fine." When Bruce
Loring drafted the January 10th memo, he had no information to indicate that the
Union members intended the consequences of their activities.
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DISCUSSION
Refusal to bargain
The Board has outlined the factors relevant to a determination of whether
parties have bargained in good faith pursuant to section 965(1)(C) of the
MPELRL. (Failure to do so is a violation under section 964(1)(E)). "Among such
indicators of good faith bargaining are whether the parties have: met and nego-
tiated at reasonable times, observed the negotiating ground rules, offered coun-
terproposals, made compromises, accepted the other party's positions, explained
and provided justification for their own positions, reduced tentative agree-
ments to writing, and participated in the dispute resolution procedures."
Auburn Firefighters Assoc. v. Valente, No. 87-19, slip op. at 10, 10 NPER
ME-18017 (Me.L.R.B. Sept. 11, 1987), citinq Waterville Teachers Assoc. v.
Waterville Bd. of Educ., No. 82-11, slip op. at 4, 4 NPER 20-13011 (Me.L.R.B.
Feb. 4, 1982); and Sanford Highway Unit v. Town of Sanford, No. 79-50, slip
op. at 10-11, 1 NPER 20-10012 (Apr. 5, 1979), aff'd, 411 A.2d 1010 (Me. 1980).
Lack of authority to bargain
The Union alleges that the Authority has violated section 964(1)(E) of the
MPELRL, 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E) (1988), by failing to give its negotiator the
authority to reach a tentative agreement, contrary to the ground rule between
the parties stating that both parties would have such authority. The complaint
more specifically alleges that Loring, during mediation, indicated that his
failure to respond to the mediator's recommendation for settlement was caused by
the fact that the "Executive Director and the Commissioner" were in Florida on
travel.
The Union elicited no testimony from any of its negotiating team members,
including chief negotiator Harvard Brassbridge, regarding the allegation related
to the mediator's recommended settlement. In addition, Deputy Executive
Director Bruce Loring has been negotiating contracts for the administrative and
clerical unit, on behalf of the Authority, since 1982. No evidence was pre-
sented to indicate that his authority was any different than it had been in pre-
vious years, and in fact one of the members of the Union's negotiating team
testified that she had seen no difference. Under these circumstances, the Board
concludes that Loring had the authority to reach a tentative agreement, in
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accordance with the parties' ground rule.
Refusal to compromise; no intention of reaching an agreement
The Union's second basis for a 964(1)(E) violation is the Authority's
alleged failure to compromise during negotiations for a successor contract.
More specifically, the Union asserts that the Authority's refusal to move from
its initial bargaining position, other than to increase its mileage proposal
slightly, amounts to a refusal to bargain. (The mileage allowance affects two
people in the 23-member bargaining unit.)
While the Board finds that in fact the mileage allowance increase was the
only compromise made by the Authority over the period of negotiations and
mediation sessions that occurred up until the Union filed its complaint, we do
not believe that the Authority's lack of movement rises to the level of a
failure to bargain.
The basis for our finding lies in large measure in the nature of the
Authority's initial bargaining position, which was in response to the Union's
original package of bargaining proposals. While the Authority's first response
came nowhere near granting the Union's requests, it did represent a change from
the status quo. It included a COLA wage increase of approximately 4%. It also
included increases in the mileage rate and allowance, and textbook reimburse-
ment for approved training courses in which employees receive an A grade
average.2
The nature of the dispute between the parties is also relevant. The biggest
source of disagreement was the Authority's proposal to decrease its share of
health insurance premiums. As the Authority points out, health insurance has
increasingly become a sticking point in public sector negotiations, because pre-
miums have increased so dramatically over the past few years. While we can
understand the reluctance of the Union to agree to any givebacks, we do not
believe that the Authority's position is any less reasonable, given its funding
_______________________
2The Authority also agreed to treat maternity leave as sick leave, but as the
Union pointed out, that change is required by the Maine Human Rights Act.
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source. While the Board does not pretend to have a solution for this very tough
problem, we do not believe the solution lies in finding a violation of the
requirement that the parties bargain in good faith. The Authority, while
bargaining tough, negotiated at reasonable times, observed the negotiation
ground rule, provided justification for its own position, and participated in
dispute resolution procedures. Accordingly, the Union's charge of a refusal to
bargain is dismissed.
Domination/interference with formation, existence or administration of the Union
The alleged violation of section 964(1)(C) of the MPELRL warrants only brief
mention. As the Board has stated on numerous occasions, "This section of the
Act is directed at the evil of too much financial or other support of,
encouraging the formation of, or actually participating in, the affairs of the
union and thereby potentially dominating it." Teamsters Local 48 v. City of
Calais, No. 80-29, slip op. at 5, 2 NPER 20-11018 (Me.L.R.B. May 13, 1980).
Since there is no evidence to support the Union's allegation, it is dismissed.
Interference, restraint, coercion
Section 964(1)(A) of the MPELRL prohibits employers from interfering with,
restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their section 963 rights.
The Union alleges two grounds for finding a violation of section 964(1)(A) --
the posting and distribution of a memo threatening discipline up to and
including discharge for certain union-related activities, and an oral admonition
to employees not to discuss union business during working hours. These allega-
tions will be addressed separately.
Memo
The memo that was posted and distributed to employees addresses two types of
activity: pressuring non-union employees to join the Union, and disparate
treatment of employees who decided not to join. Regarding putting pressure on
unit members to join, the memo states that "conducting such business during
working hours is a violation of the contract." In its brief, the Authority
asserts that Article 4 of the collective bargaining agreement in effect bars
such activity, because it specifies what types of activities are permissible
during work time. We disagree.
Nowhere in Article 4 is there an explicit prohibition either against
pressuring employees to join the Union or against more formal union solicitation
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by the shop steward. We refuse to infer that such activities are barred simply
because they are not mentioned in that article, particularly in light of the
employer's admitted past permissiveness in this regard. The subject of Article
4 is "TIME OFF WHILE PERFORMING UNION DUTIES." Such a provision typically
addresses activities in connection with administration of the contract. In the
Board's experience, it would be highly unusual for any employer to specifically
agree to paid time off for union membership solicitation during work time (that
is, during times other than breaks, lunch periods and after work). Some
employers do permit such activities, if they do not unreasonably interfere with
production; they do so simply by not promulgating rules against such activity,
not by listing them as permitted activities in the contract.
Even if we were willing to make the inference that the Authority wishes us
to make, we would not infer the no-solicitation rule contemplated by the
Authority in its January 10th memo. While employers are entitled to establish
no-solicitation rules, there must be limits on that authority. National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB") case law on this point is instructive. First, the
NLRB has found that a no-solicitation rule must clearly apply only to solicita-
tion during actual work time -- solicitation during breaks, lunch and before and
after working hours cannot be banned. The Authority's use of the term "working
hours" fails that test, because the term "connotes periods from the beginning to
the end of workshifts, periods that include the employees' own time." Our Way,
Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 394, 395 (1983); Essex International, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 749
(1974). More importantly, a valid no-solicitation rule cannot be applied or
enforced in a discriminatory manner -- that is, it cannot prohibit union solici-
tation while permitting other types of solicitation to occur during work time.
C.O.W. Industries, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. 960 (1985). We find the reasoning behind
both restrictions persuasive.
Furthermore, we note that according to her testimony, shop steward Linda
Herbert only approached Charlotte Brown once or twice to solicit her membership
in the Union. Although Ms. Brown was present throughout the evidentiary
hearing, she did not testify; consequently, no evidence was presented to indi-
cate that either Herbert's solicitation or the pressure exerted by other Union
members constituted such intimidation or harassment as to justify the Authority's
otherwise illegal response to these activities.
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The January 10th memo was directed to union activities only, during working
hours, for obvious reasons. The purpose of the memo was not to stop employees
from wasting time; rather, it was to stop union-related activities that the
Authority believed were causing personnel problems. While we understand the
Authority's concern, we cannot condone the method it chose to address that
concern.
The second aspect of the memo -- directed toward disparate treatment of
employees who chose not to join the Union -- is equally troubling. Here, the
Authority points to Article 3 of the collective bargaining agreement, which
by its terms addresses discrimination by the employer and the Union. No evi-
dence was presented, and in fact no suggestion was even made, that the employees
who pressured Charlotte Brown to join did so at the behest of the Union itself;
no evidence was presented to suggest that the Union even knew what was going on,
until the memo appeared.
In addition, we see no reason to read into the union-membership portion of
Article 3 anything other than the usual meaning for non-discrimination articles;
in connection with the collective bargaining agent, the provision is the con-
tractual equivalent of the statutory duty of fair representation, which requires
the agent to administer the contract fairly with respect to all unit members.
We find in that duty no requirement that members of the Union exchange social
pleasantries with non-union members.
It is worth pointing out that the Authority did have other options available
to it. It could have contacted the Union about the problem; it could have
suggested that Brown file a grievance, since it believed the contract was being
violated; or it could have simply contacted Union members (orally or in writing)
in an unthreatening way, to let them know what effect their actions were having
on non-union unit members. In fact, when supervisor Mary Bostwick eventually
did so, members of the Union were sorry about what had occurred, and in
Bostwick's words, now "everyone's getting along fine."
In finding that a violation occurred, we note that the Authority's memo
resembles communications by employers in a series of NLRB cases, in which those
employers, through a personnel rule, a letter or orally, indicated that
employees did not have to put up with pressure to join the union, and that the
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employer would stop the activity if employees informed the employer that it was
occurring. In Bank of St. Louis, 191 N.L.R.B. 669 (1971), an employer letter
ended with the following statement:
Further, if you are threatened in any way or subjected to
constant badgering by union proponents to sign these cards,
please report these matters to your Department Head
immediately.
In Lutheran Hospital of Milwaukee, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 176 (1976), an employer
letter stated, in part:
TO ALL EMPLOYEES:
A number of employees have reported that they are
being pressured to sign Union cards . . . .
. . .
You don't have to put up with pestering or pressure
to join.
Please let me know if you are bothered. I will do
my best to see that the law is observed.
In Sunnyland Packing Company, 227 N.L.R.B. 590 (1976), an employee handbook con-
tained the following language:
. . .If you should be caused any trouble, or be put under
any pressure to support a union, you should report the
matter to your supervisor.
The employer in J.H. Block & Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 262 (1980), posted a notice on
its bulletin board advising employees that:
If anyone is caused trouble in the plant, or put under
pressure to join the union, you should let the Company
know, and we will see that it is stopped.
The following statement appeared in an employee handbook in C.O.W. Industries:
. . . Also if anybody causes you any trouble at work or
puts you under any sort of pressure to join a union you
should let the Company know and we will see that this
is stopped. No person will be allowed to solicit or
carry [on] union organizing activities on the job. Any-
body who does so and who thereby neglects his own work
or interferes with the work of others will be subject to
discharge.
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In each case, the NLRB found that the employer had discouraged union members in
their protected organizational activities, in violation of 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act; that provision prohibits interference, restraint
or coercion of employees in the exercise of their organizational rights. Once
again, we find the NLRB's reasoning persuasive.
We accept the Authority's position that the purpose of the memo in the
case before us was not to discourage union membership itself, but rather was
meant to address a perceived personnel problem. However, "[a] finding of inter-
ference, restraint, or coercion does not turn on the employer's motive or on
whether the coercion succeeded or failed . . . . but is based on 'whether the
employer engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere
with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act."' MSEA v. Dept. of
Human Services, No. 81-35, slip op. at 4-5, 4 NPER 20-12026, citing N.L.R.B. v.
Ford, 170 F.2d 735, 738 (6th Cir. 1948); and Teamsters Local 48 v.Town of
Oakland, No. 78-30, slip op. at 3 (Me.L.R.B. Aug. 24, 1978). The shop steward,
the alternate shop steward and other employees who contacted the stewards about
the memo were intimidated by it; under the circumstances, we find their reaction
to the memo entirely reasonable. Accordingly, we find that the Authority has
interfered with, restrained and coerced members of the Union in the exercise of
their organizational rights, in violation of 26 M.R.S.A. 954(1)(A). We will
order such relief as will effectuate the policies of the MPELRL. 26 M.R.S.A.
968(5)(C) (1988).
Oral admonition
By the employer's own admission in its answer to the complaint, at the time
the memo was distributed employees were also advised orally that "union business
was not to be discussed during working hours." Most analogous to the case
before us are two cases related to workplace telephone messages. In MSAD #45
v. MSAD #45 Teachers Association, No. 82-10 (Me.L.R.B. Jan. 12, 1982) (Interim
Order), aff'd, Nos. CV-82-34 and CV-82-71 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., June 9,
1982), the Board found that not allowing a union president to receive telephone
messages regarding union activities, contrary to past practice, constituted
illegal interference. The employer in Teamsters Local Union No. 48 v. Rumford/
Mexico Sewerage District, No. 84-08, 6 NPER 20-15008 (Me.L.R.B. Mar. 12, 1984,
violated section 964(1)(A) of the MPELRL when it did not forward a phone call
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from a union representative to the shop steward during working time, since
until that incident, the employer's practice had been to permit employees to
take phone calls during work.
In the matter before us, testimony by the supervisor who made the admonition
indicated that the Authority was concerned about the fact that employees were
congregating as they arrived for work in the morning and not beginning work
promptly; we view this as a legitimate business concern which an employer
is entitled to address. However, it is unlikely that the oral admonition was
meant to address the morning congregation problem, since it was directed to
discussion of union business only, and not to discussion of other topics. More
likely, the admonition was intended, in combination with the memo, to address
the ongoing personnel problem; if employees were forbidden to discuss union mat-
ters at all, they would be less likely to engage in the activities that were the
subject of the memo itself. Once again, the motive of the employer makes no
difference; we find that a ban on discussion that is directed only to union mat-
ters inherently interferes with, restrains and coerces employees in the exercise
of their statutory rights. Accordingly, we find that the Authority's oral admo-
nition violates 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(A), and we will order such relief as will
effectuate the policies of the MPELRL.
Relief
The Authority and its representatives and agents will be ordered to cease
and desist from prohibiting union solicitation, or threatening employees with
discipline for violating no-solicitation rules that may be promulgated, without
making clear to employees when they may lawfully engage in such activities. It
will also be ordered to cease and desist from issuing rules that discrimina-
torily prohibit either union solicitation or the discussion of union business.
Finally, the Authority will be ordered to cease and desist from inviting or
encouraging employees to report to the Authority if they are solicited or
pressured to join the Union.
We will also order the Authority to sign, date, post and distribute to indi-
vidual employees the attached "Notice." Because the Authority's January 10th
memo was distributed by hand to each unit employee, distribution of the Notice
shall be by hand, to each employee in the administrative and clerical unit,
within 10 calendar days of the issuance of this decision and order, or if the
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10th day falls on a Saturday or Sunday, on the next regularly scheduled work day
for unit employees. The Notice also shall be posted, at the time it is indivi-
dually distributed, in all places where the Authority's January 10th memo was
posted, and shall remain posted for 30 calendar days thereafter. Within five
days after distribution and posting of the Notice, the Authority shall notify
the Executive Director, in writing, of the steps that have been taken to comply
with our order.
ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and discussion, and by virtue
of and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor Relations Board by the
provisions of 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5) (1988), it is hereby ORDERED:
1. That the Respondent Portland Housing Authority and its representative
and agents shall:
a. Cease and desist from prohibiting union solicitation, or
threatening employees with discipline for violating no-
solicitation rules that may be promulgated, without making
clear to employees when they may lawfully engage in such
activities;
b. Cease and desist from issuing rules that discriminatorily
prohibit union solicitation;
c. Cease and desist from inviting or encouraging employees to
report to the Authority if they are pressured or solicited
to join the Union;
d. Cease and desist from issuing rules that discriminatorily
prohibit the discussion of union business;
e. Sign, date, post and distribute the attached "Notice" to
each employee in the administrative and clerical unit.
Distribution shall be by hand, within 10 calendar days of
the date of issuance of this decision and order, or if the
10th day falls on a Saturday or Sunday, on the next
regularly scheduled work day for unit employees. The
"Notice" also shall be posted, at the time it is indivi-
dually distributed, in all places where the Authority's
January 10th memo was posted, and shall remain posted for
30 calendar days thereafter;
f. Take such reasonable steps as may be necessary to ensure
that said posted notices are not altered, defaced or
covered while they are posted pursuant to this order;
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g. Notify the Executive Director, in writing, within five
days after distribution and posting of the "Notice," of
the steps that have been taken to comply with this order.
2. That the Union's allegations of refusal to bargain in violation of 26
M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E) (1988), and domination or interference with the Union in
violation of 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(C), are dismissed.
3. That the Authority's request for costs is denied.
Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 3rd day of December, 1990.
MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
/s/__________________________
Peter T. Dawson
Chair
/s/__________________________
Thacher E. Turner
Employer Representative
/s/__________________________
George W. Lambertson
Employee Representative
The parties are advised of their right pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(F)
(1988) to seek review of this decision and order by the Superior Court, by
filing a complaint in accordance with Rule 80C of the Maine Rules of Civil
Procedure within 15 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
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STATE OF MAINE
MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Augusta, Maine 04333
NOTICE
_______________________________________________________________________
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND CLERICAL UNIT
Pursuant to
a Decision and Order of the
MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and in order to effectuate the policies of the
MAINE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES LABOR RELATIONS LAW
you are hereby notified that:
1. THE HOUSING AUTHORITY WILL NOT prohibit union solicitation, or threaten
employees with discipline for violating no-solicitation rules that may
be promulgated, without making clear to employees when they may lawfully
engage in such activities.
2. THE HOUSING AUTHORITY WILL NOT issue rules that discriminatorily
prohibit union solicitation.
3. THE HOUSING AUTHORITY WILL NOT invite or encourage employees to report
to the Authority if they are pressured or solicited to join the Union.
4. THE HOUSING AUTHORITY WILL NOT issue rules that discriminatorily
prohibit the discussion of union business.
5. THE HOUSING AUTHORITY WILL, within five calendar days of the distri-
bution and posting of this Notice, notify the Maine Labor Relations
Board, in writing, at its offices in Augusta, Maine, of the steps that
have been taken to comply with the Board's order.
PORTLAND HOUSING AUTHORITY
Dated: __________________________________________
Bruce R. Loring, Deputy Executive Director
If employees have questions concerning this Notice or compliance with its
provisions, they may communicate directly with the offices of the Maine Labor
Relations Board, State House Station 90, Augusta, Maine 04333. Telephone
289-2015.