Minot Education Assoc. v. Minot School Committee, No. 96-27; aff'd sub nom. Minot School Committee v. MLRB and Minot Education Assoc., AP-97-52; Law Court affirmed in part, modified in part 1998 ME 211, Aug. 14, 1998. STATE OF MAINE MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Case No. 96-27 Issued: June 30, 1997 _____________________________ ) MINOT EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, ) ) Complainant, ) ) v. ) DECISION AND ORDER ) MINOT SCHOOL COMMITTEE, ) ) Respondent. ) _____________________________) The question presented in this prohibited practice case is whether the Minot School Committee (hereinafter "the Committee") violated 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E), as elaborated in Sections 965 (1)(C) & (E) and 965(4), by: engaging in surface bargaining throughout contract negotiations; failing to participate in good faith in impasse resolution procedures; and unlawfully imple- menting its last, best offer after the issuance of an arbitration decision. We conclude that the Minot School Committee failed to nego- tiate in good faith and will, therefore, fashion an appropriate remedy to redress this violation and effectuate the policies of the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law ("the Act"). 26 M.R.S.A. ch. 9-A. This complaint was filed by the Minot Education Association ("the Association") on June 13, 1996, amended on August 27, 1996, and further amended at the hearing on January 23, 1997. A pre- hearing conference was conducted by Board Chair Peter T. Dawson on September 26, 1996. The parties entered into several stipulations at the conference which appear in the Prehearing Conference Memorandum and Order issued on October 2, 1996; the Memorandum and order is incorporated herein and made a part of this Decision and order. -1- ______________________________________________________________________________ An evidentiary hearing was conducted on January 23, 1997, by Chair Dawson, Employee Representative Gwendolyn Gatcomb, and Employer Representative Edwin S. Hamm. The Association was represented by J. Donald Belleville, Maine Education Association UniServ Director. The Committee was represented by Daniel C. Stockford, Esq. The parties were provided full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, introduce documentary evidence and make argument. Both parties filed post-hearing briefs which have been considered by the Board. JURISDICTION The jurisdiction of the Board to hear this case and to issue a decision and order lies in 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(C) (1988), Neither party has raised an objection to the Board's jurisdiction. FINDINGS OF FACT Upon review of the entire record the Maine Labor Relations Board finds the following facts: 1. The Minot Education Association is a "bargaining agent" and the Minot School Committee is a "public employer," as these terms are defined in the Act, 26 M.R.S.A. 962(2) and (7), respectively, for a bargaining unit consisting of teachers. 2. At the time of the filing of this complaint the parties had been without a collective bargaining agreement for approximately one year. The expired contract was a one-year contract covering the 1994-1995 school year. 3. The Association and the Committee began negotiations for a successor contract in December, 1994. Karen Nichols (chief negotiator), Suzanne Reny and Sandra Ferland, all teachers at the Minot Consolidated School, were the negotiators for the Association. The Committee's negotiating team originally included the superintendent of School Union 29, Robert Wall, and two School Committee members, George Buker (chief negotiator) and Jackie Rybeck. Ms. Rybeck was replaced in March, 1996, by Becky -2- ______________________________________________________________________________ Gould, a newly-appointed member of the School Committee. 4. The parties did not establish ground rules and, with the exception of one tentative agreement reached early on in the process, the parties failed to reach any tentative agreements. Ms. Gould testified that members of the Committee's negotiating team were given authority to make tentative agreements at the bargaining table. Ms. Nichols testified that her negotiating team was never informed as to the authority of the Committee's team to reach tentative agreements. Ms. Nichols states: No. They never told us that they could--we never made decisions at the table. Nothing was ever decided at the table. It was always taken back to the School Committee and the five made a decision and they brought them in [to negotiation sessions]. They were messengers between the school board and us. 5. The Committee presented its first proposal in January, 1995. It is unclear from the record whether the Committee's proposal addressed anything other than salary. The Committee's proposal was for a one-year contract and it offered $23,052 for salary increases. The Association's opening position proposed salary increases totalling approximately $59,000. 6. The Committee presented a second proposal in February, 1995, for a two-year contract offering $18,435 in the first year and $15,437 in the second year; shortly thereafter it went back to its original offer of a one-year contract for $23,052. The Association countered with an offer of approximately $35,000. 7. The Association made proposals on "language" issues during negotiation sessions held in March, 1995. The Committee's team did not explain their objections to the Association's proposals or offer "language" counter-proposals. Neither party had budged on salary. 8. In April, 1995, the Association requested the Maine Labor Relations Board to provide mediation services. During the -3- ______________________________________________________________________________ course of several mediation sessions which were conducted through August, 1995, the following issues were addressed, none of which were resolved: - notification for ensuing year; - just cause provision; - bereavement leave; - sick leave; - family medical leave; - retirement benefits; - health insurance; - salary; - contract duration. 9. The parties exchanged salary proposals during August, September and October, 1995. 10. In November, 1995, the Association filed a request for fact-finding and a fact-finding hearing was conducted on December 11, 1995. The issues presented at fact-finding and the positions taken by the parties were identical to those presented in mediation. 11. After the close of the fact-finding hearing, the Association's chief negotiator approached the Committee's negotiating team, at the suggestion of the employee repre- sentative on the fact-finding panel, and attempted to discuss resolution of an issue. Ms. Nichols asked if the Committee's team could agree to increase bereavement leave from three to five days. The Committee's team caucused and returned with the response that they were not able to agree to anything then and there. 12. The fact-finding report was issued on January 8, 1996, with the following recommendations: - notification for ensuing year (adopted Committee's position); - just cause provision (adopted Committee's position); - bereavement leave (recommended compromise); - sick leave (recommended compromise). - family medical leave (adopted Committee's position); -4- ______________________________________________________________________________ - retirement benefits (adopted Committee's position); - health insurance (recommended compromise); - salary (recommended compromise); - contract duration (recommended compromise). 13. The Association notified the Committee that its membership would accept all of the recommendations in the fact- finding report. In a session held in February, 1996, the Committee proposed a salary scale different from that recommended by the fact-finding panel; it made no proposal on "language" issues. The Committee's offer reduced the off-scale amounts by $100 and indicated that the scale was "retro - to the 7th payroll." The superintendent testified that the intent was to make the proposed pay scale effective on the 7th payroll check of the 1995-1996 school year. 14. The Association's team believed that "retro - to the 7th payroll" meant the Committee's proposed pay scale would take effect on the date the contract was ratified and apply to the seven (7) paychecks immediately preceding ratification. Their belief was fortified by comments made by Committee members in February, and again in March, that the longer the Association waited to accept the offer, the less money they would have in-pocket. 15. A negotiation session was held on March 4, 1996. It is unclear from the record whether the parties were presenting proposals different from those discussed in February. This was Ms. Gould's first session as a member of the Committee's negotiating team so some time was spent bringing her up-to-date on the negotiations. At this session Ms. Gould stated that the Association should have settled before and that the Committee was really only required to give each teacher a $500 raise.' ____________________ 1 Ms. Gould testified that she was given a manual when she became a School Committee member and it was her understanding from the manual that the Committee was obligated by state law to offer a raise of at least $500 for each teacher. Ms. Gould did not explain her rationale for mentioning this at this negotiation session, except to say that it -5- ______________________________________________________________________________ Mr. Buker stated that the Committee would make no further offers and the longer the Association waited the smaller the "retro" check would be. It was also mentioned that the costs of mediation and arbitration would be coming directly from the teachers' salary line of the budget. 16. The parties jointly filed for arbitration in March, 1996. 17. At the May 18, 1996, Minot town meeting, there was much discussion about the school budget and the failure of the parties to ratify a contract. After numerous motions were made to appropriate differing amounts for the school budget, including two by Becky Gould, the residents of Minot voted to appropriate $46,000 more than the School Committee's recommended budget. The monies were earmarked: $20,000 to settle the contract with the teachers, and $26,000 to hire an additional teacher. 18. On May 20, 1996, George Buker, the Committee's chief negotiator, sent the following letter to Karen Nichols: At this time, the Minot School Committee requests that the Minot Teacher Association submit to our negotiators the following: 1. A fully articulated contract proposal that the members of the association will support for ratification. 2. A written request for a meeting to review the proposal. Following our meeting with you, we will bring that proposal to the full school committee for discussion. A written response will be given to you following that process. 19. The Association prepared the complete contract proposal requested by the School Committee. The proposal adopted the "language" recommendations in the fact-finding report, and factored in the $20,000 raised at the town meeting to meet salary demands. A negotiation session was held on May 24, 1996. ____________________ was not presented as a proposal. -6- ______________________________________________________________________________ Members of both negotiating teams worked from budget sheets provided by the Committee's team to discuss the salary scale and, according to Mr. Buker, the parties "made some corrections on wording and things . . . dates that were mistakes in the thing." 20. According to Ms. Nichols, this May 24 session was: . . . the most productive meeting we had ever had. We got budget sheets out and we talked numbers and we were figuring things from both sides of the table. And that's the day we got right down to, so, if we hire a new teacher and we use this 20,000 for teachers' raises at the recommendation of the fact-finding report, we are $133 away from each other . . . I really thought we were just very, very close to settling . . . . Ms. Nichols jokingly suggested to Mr. Buker that he should take $133 out of his own pocket to settle the contract. Toward the end of the session, Ms. Nichols asked Mr. Buker whether he thought they had a deal. Mr. Buker refused to give an opinion about the likelihood of a deal; he said he would have to get back to the full committee and had no idea whether the proposal would be acceptable to the full Committee. 21. On May 29, 1996, George Buker sent the following letter to Karen Nichols: Upon review of the Minot Education Association contract proposal submitted to School Committee Negotiators on Friday, May 24, 1996, the School Committee requested that I write this reply. The Minot School Committee agrees with many provisions submitted. However, there are aspects of the proposal that are not acceptable. Since the proposal was submitted for a "full package" decision, the School Committee cannot accept it as a package. We remain willing to meet with you at any time to continue efforts to come to a final agreement. Please send me a written request for a meeting if you wish to get back together. -7- ______________________________________________________________________________ 22. At about this time the School Committee voted to accept the $46,000 upward adjustment of the school budget raised at the May 18 town meeting, rather than ask for reconsideration of this issue. 23. At the June 3, 1996, Minot town meeting, Mr. Buker presented a petition he had drafted which requested, among other things, that a special town meeting be held: to see if the Town wishes to rescind its vote on Article #19 of the May 18, 1996 Town Meeting and authorize the School Committee to expend $628,773 from the state - local allocation-and other revenue for Regular Program Elementary Instruction. The effect of this article, if passed, would be to return the additional $46,000 appropriated to the school budget at the May 18 town meeting. Four of the five members of the Minot School Committee, including Mr. Buker and Ms. Gould, signed this petition. 24. The Association requested a meeting as a result of the letter mentioned in #21 above, and the parties met on June 5, 1996. At this meeting, the Committee's negotiating team refused to discuss particulars; it did not indicate which parts of the Association's May 24 proposal were acceptable, nor did it specifically indicate items which were unacceptable. The Association's team was not informed as to which proposal was presented to the full Committee (their original one, or the one which resulted from the May 24 negotiation session where Ms. Nichols believed the parties were $133 apart) . The Committee only indicated that they were not authorized to accept the complete package. Mr. Buker stated he was not to give out too much information since the parties were headed to arbitration. This was the last negotiation session scheduled to be held prior to arbitration and, despite the Association's repeated attempts to negotiate, nothing was accomplished at this meeting. 25. An arbitration hearing was conducted on June 12, 1996. -8- ______________________________________________________________________________ The parties informed the panel of the May 18 appropriation to the school budget and Buker's June 3 petition to schedule a special town meeting to rescind this appropriation. 26. At about this time, a counter-petition was circulated throughout the town of Minot which reads: We the citizens of the Town of Minot support the May 18, 1996, Special Town Meeting vote on the K-8 School Budget in the amount of $674,773.00. Included in the approved school budget was authorization for $20,000 for teacher salaries and $26,000.00 for one additional teacher to the Minot School Staff. We the citizens of the Town of Minot DO NOT support ANOTHER SPECIAL TOWN MEETING. (emphasis in the original) 27. The petitioned-for special town meeting was held on June 18, 1996. The original vote to appropriate $46,000 additional monies to the school budget was upheld and an additional $3,400 was appropriated to cover the Committee's legal fees incurred in negotiations. This information was not presented to the arbitration panel prior to the issuance of its decision on July 12, 1996. 28. The arbitration decision and award adopts the Committee's proposed salary scale. The Committee's proposed scale is the same one it had proposed in October, 1995, and at fact-finding in December, 1995. In addition, the arbitrators adopted the recommendations of the fact-finding panel in the first six issues listed in #12 above. 29. On July 22, 1996, the Committee submitted a proposal to the Association which incorporated all of the recommendations in the arbitration decision. The Association responded that it would not accept the salary scale proposed by the Committee and recommended in the decision. 30. On August 5, 1996, the parties met again at which time the Association presented a salary scale counter-proposal to the Committee. The Committee indicated that it would not accept the -9- ______________________________________________________________________________ counter-proposal but was prepared to agree to a contract that fully incorporated the arbitration decision. 31. On August 6, 1996, the Committee notified the Association in writing that it was prepared to implement the arbitrators' findings and recommendations in full, and that the recommendations in the decision represented the last, best proposal of the Committee. The Committee indicated that it was prepared to meet again to attempt to settle the contract, even though it appeared that the parties were "deadlocked." 32. On August 13, 1996, the parties met again. The Committee did not budge from its offer to implement the arbi- tration decision in its entirety. The Association indicated that it rejected the offer as to salary and insurance, but was interested in entering into a contract which would include every article, as recommended by the arbitrators, except for those related to salary and insurance. The Committee did not agree to enter into such a contract. 33. On August 20, 1996, the School Committee held a meeting at which it voted to implement the recommendations of the panel of arbitrators. By letter dated August 21, 1996, the Committee gave the Association written notice of the School Committee's decision to implement. This letter reads, in part: It is clear that the parties have reached an impasse. With no prospects for reaching an agreement as the new school year is about to begin, the School Committee reluctantly has voted to implement the arbitrators' decision effective as of September 1, 1996. Consistent with the arbitrators' decision, the recommendations of the arbitrators will be implemented retroactive to September 1, 1995. DISCUSSION The Association has charged the Committee with violations of the duty to bargain in good faith. The Association's original complaint addresses the Committee's course of conduct prior to -10- ______________________________________________________________________________ interest arbitration and the two amendments address post- arbitration conduct.[fn]2 Our decision focuses on the conduct of the Committee prior to arbitration, between the months of February and June, 1996.[fn]3 The crux of the Association's complaint is that the Committee engaged in surface bargaining, never intending to budge from its salary proposal of October, 1995. We agree with the Association that the employer engaged in surface bargaining and, even worse, took steps to avert a likely settlement of the contract.[fn]4 We have delineated many times the factors relevant to a determination of whether the parties have engaged in good faith bargaining: Among such indicators of good faith bargaining are whether the parties have: met and negotiated at reasonable times, observed the negotiating ground rules, offered counterproposals, made compromises, accepted the other party's positions, explained and provided justification for their own positions, reduced tentative agreements to writing, and participated in the dispute resolution procedures. Bangor Firefighters Association v. Robert W. Farrar and City of ____________________ 2 We will not address an allegation raised for the first time in the Association's brief, that the committee violated Section 964(1)(A) by making statements which tend to interfere with the free exercise of rights, although some of the alleged statements play a part in our finding of bad faith bargaining. 3 We admitted evidence pertaining to events which occurred prior to the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of this complaint "to shed light on the true character of matters occurring within the limitations period." See Teamsters Local 48 v. City of Waterville, No. 80-14, slip op. at 2-3, 2 NPER 20-11017 (Me.L.R.B. April 23, 1980). 4 Although the Association's complaint alleges that the Committee made a regressive proposal on March 4, 1996, and that the Committee's proposals were "erratic generally becoming more regressive as negotiations continued," it is not clear from the record that this was the case. In any event, we find that the Committee failed to participate in any meaningful negotiations after February, 1996. -11- ______________________________________________________________________________ Bangor, No. 94-45, slip op. at 10-11 (Me.L.R.B. February 15, 1995) (quoting Auburn Firefighters Association v. Valente, No. 87-19, slip op. at 10, 10 NPER ME-18017 (Me.L.R.B. Sept. 11, 1987)). Surface bargaining is the antithesis of good faith bargaining. We have used this term to describe those instances "when a party goes through the motions of collective bargaining with no intention of reaching agreement on the matters under discussion." Teamsters Local Union No. 48 v. Town of Bar Harbor, No. 82-35, slip op. at 11, 5 NPER 20-14004 (Me.L.R.B. November 2, 1982) (quoting MSAD No. 22 Board of Directors v. Tri-22 Teachers Association, No. 82-33, slip op. at 6, 5 NPER 20-14003 (Me.L.R.B. October 5, 1982)). In this case, the Minot School Committee went through the motions of sending two of its members back and forth to meetings with the Association's negotiating team. What happened at those meetings is a far cry from what we expect from parties engaged in good faith collective bargaining. While it is true that the duty to negotiate does not require either party to make a concession on any specific issue or to adopt any particular position, "the parties are obliged to make some reasonable effort in some direction to [compromise]. . . ,' if the [duty to bargain] is to be read as imposing any substantial obligation at all." Auburn Firefighters, slip op. at 10-11 (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F. 2d 131, 135 (1st Cir. 1953) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953)). Aside from the session on May 24, 1996, which we will further discuss below, there is no evidence that the Committee's team "bargained" at the table in the traditional sense of working from a proposal, explaining a proposal,[fn]5 striking language, ____________________ 5 For example, it was obvious at the hearing that the Association did not understand the "retro to 7th payroll" offer when it was made, but easily understood it once Superintendent Wall provided his explanation during the course of the hearing before us. We believe -12- ______________________________________________________________________________ making compromises back and forth, and providing justification for its position on various issues. Not one decision was made at the table beyond the single "t.a." reached early on, and this failure to reach tentative agreements cannot be attributed to the Association. Either the Committee's negotiating team did not have the authority to reach tentative agreements or they chose not to exercise the authority they had. In either event, their failure to tentatively agree in these circumstances constitutes bad faith bargaining. Auburn Firefighters, slip op. at 11. The Association attempted to bargain and made concessions: (i) it came down in its salary demand from $59,000 to $35,000 between December, 1994, and February, 1995; (ii) it proposed language on issues other than salary and insurance in March, 1995, and received no reaction whatsoever to its proposals; (iii) it tried to negotiate the single issue of bereavement leave on the advice of a member of the fact-finding panel and was turned away; (iv) it agreed to adopt every recommendation in the fact- finding report, five of which were compromise proposals (the other four being the proposals put forward by the Committee); (v) at the Committee's request, it presented a complete contract proposal only to have it rejected in its entirety, despite vague references to agreement on some issues; (vi) it dickered over this proposal and made changes to language at the suggestion of the Committee's team; (vii) it expressed its willingness and ability to enter into tentative agreements and encouraged the Committee's team to do the same to no avail; (viii) it attempted to negotiate at the June 5, 1996, meeting and was turned down. The May 24 session was different from all of the others. We credit Ms. Nichols' testimony that the parties were finally making progress by "crunching numbers" and working on "wording" ____________________ the Association's confusion about this offer must have been as apparent to the Committee's team as it was to us. No attempt was made to clear up the confusion either because the Committee's team did not itself understand the proposal, or because they did not care to clarify it. -13- ______________________________________________________________________________ (to quote Mr. Buker). We believe that, after some dickering, Ms. Nichols thought the parties were $133 apart, and that she made the comment to Mr. Buker about taking this money out of his pocket to finally settle the contract. The Committee contends that its May 20, 1996, letter to Ms. Nichols was fair warning to the Association that no actual negotiating would take place at this meeting.[fn]6 The Committee representatives' actions at this meeting indicated otherwise; this was either good faith bargaining or a ruse. The Association's team certainly believed it was the former and that settlement was imminent. The Committee's refusal to tentatively agree to any of the terms (several of which they had proposed), or to even give an opinion as to the likelihood of a deal on that night, constitutes bargaining in bad faith. Auburn Firefighters, slip op. at 11. Likewise, the May 29, 1996, letter from the Committee vaguely rejecting the Association's "full" proposal and failing to put forth a counter-proposal violated the duty to bargain in good faith as well. M.S.A.D. No. 22 Board of Directors v. Tri-22 Teachers Association, No. 82-33, 5 NPER 20-14003 (Me.L.R.B. October 5, 1982) (The duty to bargain in good faith includes the requirement that parties justify positions taken by reasoned discussions.). We turn now to the issue of Mr. Buker's June 3, 1996, petition. The Committee contends that, in drafting the petition, Mr. Buker was acting as an individual rather than a member of the School Committee; further, that he and the other members of the Committee who signed the petition have a right protected by state law and state and federal constitutions to petition their ____________________ 6 This letter specifically requests a complete contract proposal in writing and indicates that the Committee's response would be in writing. It seems the full Committee decided to change the manner of negotiations and, possibly, the authority of its negotiators, without discussing this with the Association. We do not condone this manner of dealing and, once again, emphasize the value of written ground rules to govern the conduct of negotiations. Westbrook Police Unit v. City of Westbrook and Robert Curley, et al., No. 78-25 (Me.L.R.B. September 5, 1978). -14- ______________________________________________________________________________ government in this fashion. Of course we do not disagree that citizens have a right to petition their government; however, the fact that four out of five School Committee members chose to exercise that right in these circumstances is another matter, and that is the issue before this Board. In complaints alleging bad faith bargaining, we examine the totality of the charged party's conduct to determine whether their actions during negotiations indicate "a present intention to find a basis for agreement." M.S.A.D. No. 22 Board of Directors, slip op. at 5 (quoting Waterville Teachers Association v. Waterville Board of Education, No. 82-11, slip op. at 4, 4 NPER 20-13011 (Me.L.R.B. February 4, 1982)). We find that this effort on the part of the members of the Minot School Committee to return funds which were earmarked to settle this contract was, at best, indicative of their state of mind throughout these negotiations and, at worst, a bold-faced attempt to avert an agreement. The Committee took an "official" vote to accept this appropriation. Its negotiating team attended the May 24 session and learned that the Association was willing to accept all of the recommendations of the fact-finding report related to "language" issues (including four of the Committee's own proposals); moreover, they had arrived at a solution to the salary issue (as far as the Association was concerned) using the funds raised at the town meeting. There is no doubt that rescinding the appropriation would have quashed this proposal. Finally, the Committee's refusal to bargain at the June 5, 1996, session clearly violated the Act. The Committee had just rejected the Association's "full" proposal, vaguely referenced some areas of agreement, indicated that it was willing to meet to continue efforts to come to an agreement, and invited the Association to request a meeting if it "wish[ed) to get back together." The Association did request a meeting, yet the Committee failed to make any counter-proposals or suggest those -15- ______________________________________________________________________________ areas where they could tentatively agree. In this case, we know several tentative agreements were possible since the Association was willing to adopt some of the Committee's fact-finding proposals. The Committee's failure to negotiate at this June 5, 1996, meeting constitutes bad faith bargaining. We find that any one of these events and, most certainly, that this-course of conduct, colored by the petition and culminating in the refusal to bargain on June 5, constitutes bargaining in bad faith. This bad faith bargaining forced the negotiations into arbitration when, in actuality, the parties had not reached a bona fide impasse:[fn]7 The words 'bona fide impasse' constitute a term of art which describes 'a state of facts in which the parties, despite the best of faith, are simply deadlocked.' (citations omitted). In order for a bona fide impasse to develop, the parties must first satisfy the obligation created by 965(1)(C) in the Act that they 'negotiate in good faith with respect to' the mandatory subjects of bargaining. Auburn Firefighters, slip op. at 9-10. The parties in this case were not deadlocked "despite the best of faith"; they were deadlocked because the Committee negotiated in bad faith. The arbitration decision recommended implementation of the Committee's proposed salary scale, and eventually the Committee unilaterally implemented that proposed scale. This unilateral change in wages, absent bona fide impasse, violated the Act. Mountain Valley Education Association v. M.S.A.D. No. 43, 655 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1995). Having concluded that the Committee's pre-arbitration conduct violated 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E), we will provide ____________________ 7 While it is true that the Association enter into a joint request for arbitration, it was still ready and willing to negotiate on May 24 and June 5, 1996. -16- ______________________________________________________________________________ appropriate remedies to effectuate the policies of the Act.[fn]8 In exercising our remedial authority, we seek "a restoration of the situation, as nearly as possible, to that which would have obtained" but for the violations of the Act. Maine State Employees Association v. School Committee of the City of Lewiston, No. 90-12, slip op. at 23, 13 NPER ME-21009 (Me.L.R.B. August 21, 1990). In this case, complete reinstatement of the status cruo ante on June 5, 1996, would benefit the Committee, and damage the Association's status in the eyes of these bargaining unit members.[fn]9 We will not permit the Committee to profit from its violation of the Act, but will follow the course we have taken in previous cases where employees are "innocent beneficiaries" of unlawful conduct. See Maine State Employees Association v. Committee of the City of Lewiston, Id.; Lake Teachers Association v. Mount Vernon School Committee, No. 78-15, slip op. at 3 (Me.L.R.B. May 3, 1978); Local 1458 of Council 74 AFSCME v. The City Council of Augusta, et al., No. 74-09 and 74- 14 (April 22, 1974) (All unbargained-for wage increases as the result of unilateral action are incorporated into collective bargaining agreement, unless parties reach a subsequent agreement which incorporates a higher wage rate.). As remedies for the violations established, we will vacate the arbitration decision and order the Committee to: (i) cease and desist from refusing to bargain in good faith; (ii) reinstate the status quo ante as of June 5, 1996, as to all terms of employment except for wages; (iii) within thirty days return to ____________________ 8 In light of our determination that the Minot School Committee violated the Act in its pre-arbitration course of conduct and considering the terms of our Order which follow, we decline to address the allegations set forth in the amendments to the original complaint related to post-arbitration conduct. 9 The employees received a salary increase, albeit not as much of an increase as the Association had attempted to negotiate, when the Committee implemented its proposed scale. Reinstatement of the status quo ante would require the employees to reimburse the Committee for raises received as a result of this unilateral change in wages and reduce their pay rate. -17- ______________________________________________________________________________ the bargaining table with members of the Association's negotiating team; (iv) within thirty days reimburse the Association for all reasonable costs related to its participation in arbitration; and (v) within thirty days notify the Maine Labor Relations Board in writing of the steps they have taken to comply with this Order. ORDER On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and discussion, and by virtue of and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor Relations Board by the provisions of 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5) (1988 & Supp. 1994), it is hereby ORDERED: 1. That the decision and award of the Board of Arbitration and Conciliation be vacated; 2. That the Minot School Committee and its agents and representatives shall: (a) Cease and desist from refusing to bargain in good faith; (b) Reinstate the status cruo ante as of June 5, 1996, as to all terms of employment except for wages; (c) Within thirty days of the date of this Order, return to the bargaining table with members of the Minot Education Association's negotiating team to confer and negotiate consistent with this decision; (d) Within thirty days of the date of this order, reimburse the Association for all reasonable costs related to its participation in arbitration; (e) Within thirty days of the date of this order, notify the Maine Labor Relations Board in writing of the steps they have taken to comply with this Order. 3. If the parties have not agreed, within thirty days of the date of this Order, on the amount of arbitration costs or as to what constitutes the status duo ante as of June 5, 1996, the Association may file with the Executive Director and serve on the Minot School Committee its computation of reasonable costs and/or its understanding of the status duo ante. The -18- ______________________________________________________________________________ Committee will have fifteen days from such filing to respond with documents and/or affidavits bearing on each disputed item. The Board will thereafter issue a supplemental order or conduct such further proceedings as are necessary to supplement this Order. Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 30th day of June, 1997. MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The parties are advised of their right, pursuant to 26 /s/___________________________ M.R.S.A. 968(5)(F) (Supp. Peter T. Dawson 1996), to seek review of this Chair decision and order by the Superior Court. To initiate such a review, an appealing party must file a complaint /s/___________________________ with the Superior Court within Gwendolyn Gatcomb fifteen (15) days of the date Employee Representative of issuance of this decision and order, and otherwise comply with the requirements of Rule 80C of the Maine Rules /s/___________________________ of Civil Procedure. Edwin S. Hamm Employer Representative -19-