STATE OF MAINE MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Case No. 86-02
Issued: March 18, 1986
_______________________________
)
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 48, )
State, County, Municipal and )
University Employees in the )
State of Maine, )
)
Complainant, )
) DECISION AND ORDER
)
BOOTHBAY/BOOTHBAY HARBOR )
COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT )
and DAVID A. HOPKINS, )
Superintendent, )
)
Respondents. )
_______________________________)
The questions presented in this prohibited practices case are
whether the Boothbay/Boothbay Harbor Community School District and its
Superintendent of Schools, David A. Hopkins (hereinafter referred to
together as "Employer"), violated 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E) and (A) by
failing and refusing: (1) to negotiate a successor collective
bargaining agreement for the Boothbay/Boothbay Harbor Community School
District Custodians Bargaining Unit, (2) to negotiate over the
Employer's decision to subcontract all of said bargaining unit's
employees' work and (3) to negotiate over the impact of said decision
upon the mandatory subjects of bargaining. After providing the
bargaining agent with notice of its intention to subcontract all of
the unit employees' work, the Employer refused the bargaining agent's
demands to negotiate over both the subcontract decision and over the
impact of said decision upon the wages, hours, and working conditions
of the employees affected. We hold that the Employer's actions
violated 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E).
The prohibited practices complaint, filed pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A.
968(5)(B) by Teamsters Local Union No. 48 ("Union"), was filed on
September 12, 1985. The Union's complaint alleged that the Employer's
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actions violated 26 M.R.S.A. 963; 964(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), and
(E); and 964(1)(C). The Employer filed its answer on October l, 1985,
denying that its actions transgressed any provision of the Municipal
Public Employees Labor Relations Act ("Act"), 26 M.R.S.A. ch. 9-A and
moving to dismiss the Union's complaint.
A prehearing conference on the case was held on October 24, 1985,
Alternate Chairman Donald W. Webber presiding. On October 28, 1985,
Alternate Chairman Webber issued a Prehearing Conference Memorandum
and Order herein. Alternate Chairman Webber issued a Supplemental
Prehearing Conference Memorandum and Order on November 5, 1985. The
contents of both Memoranda and orders are incorporated herein by
reference.
A hearing on the merits of the case was conducted on December 4,
1985, Alternate Chairman William M. Houston presiding, with Employer
Representative Thacher E. Turner and Alternate Employee Representative
Russell A. Webb. The Union was represented at the hearing by Business
Agent John A. Perkins, and the Employer was represented by Ervin D.
Snyder, Esq. The parties were afforded full opportunity to examine
and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence, and to make argu-
ment through post-hearing briefs. The Employer's brief was filed on
December 17, 1985, and the Union apparently opted not to submit a
written argument since none was received by the Board.
JURISDICTION
Teamsters Local Union No. 48 became the certified bargaining
agent, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(2), for a bargaining
unit composed of the custodians employed by the Boothbay/Boothbay
Harbor Community School District through a bargaining agent election
conducted by a Board agent on December 23, 1982. The Boothbay/
Boothbay Harbor Community School District is the public employer,
within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(7), of the employees men-
tioned in the preceding sentence. At all times relevant hereto, David
A. Hopkins has been the Superintendent of Schools for the Boothbay/
Boothbay Harbor Community School District. Since the acts alleged
concerning Hopkins are said to have arisen out of and been performed
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by him in the course of his employment with the Boothbay/Boothbay
Harbor Community School District, Mr. Hopkins is a public employer,
within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(7), of the employees of
said school district. The jurisdiction of the Maine Labor Relations
Board ("Board") to hear this case and to render a decision and order
herein lies in 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5).
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon review of the entire record, the Labor Relations Board
finds:
1. Teamsters Local Union No. 48 became the certified bargaining
agent, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(2), for a bargaining
unit composed of the custodians employed by the Boothbay/Boothbay
Harbor Community School District through a bargaining agent election
conducted by a Board agent on December 23, 1982.
2. The Boothbay/Boothbay Harbor Community School District is the
public employer, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(7), of the
employees mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
3. At all times relevant hereto, David A. Hopkins has been the
Superintendent of Schools for the Boothbay/Boothbay Harbor Community
School District. Since the acts concerning Hopkins arose out of and
were performed by him in the course of his employment with the
Boothbay/Boothbay Harbor Community School District, Mr. Hopkins is a
public employer, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 962(7), of the
employees of said school department.
4. A collective bargaining agreement between the Employer and
the Union for the bargaining unit mentioned in paragraph 1 was signed
on November 23, 1983. The terms of that agreement were effective from
July 1, 1983 through June 30, 1985.
5. On February 7, 1985, the Union served the Employer with a
"120-day notice" of the Union's intention to bargain over wages and
other matters requiring the appropriation of money in the negotiations
for a successor agreement to that noted in the preceding paragraph.
This notice was given in satisfaction of the requirement outlined
in 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(E) and in Article 34 of the agreement men-
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tioned in the preceding paragraph.
6. On March 12, 1985, the Union sent the Employer specific writ-
ten proposals for a successor collective bargaining agreement to that
mentioned in paragraph 4 above.
7. Article 34 of the parties' 1983-1985 collective bargaining
agreement stated:
This Agreement shall be effective as of the date of
the execution of this contract, and it shall remain in
full force and effect until June 30, 1985. It shall be
automatically renewed from year to year thereafter unless
either party shall notify the other, in writing, one
hundred twenty (120) days prior to the anniversary date
that it desires to modify this Agreement. In the event
that such notice is given, negotiations shall begin not
later than sixty (60) days prior to the anniversary date.
This Agreement shall remain in full force and be effective
during the period of negotiations and until notice of
termination of this Agreement is provided to the other
party in the manner set forth in this following paragraph.
In the event that neither (sic) party desires to
terminate this Agreement, written notice of desire to
cancel or terminate the Agreement must be given to the
other party not less than sixty (60) days prior to the
desired termination date, which shall not be before the
anniversary date set forth in the preceding paragraph.
If a notice is given in accordance with the provisions
of this Section, the expiration date of this Agreement
shall be the sixty-first (61st) day following such notice.
8. During December of 1983, the Town of Boothbay Harbor narrowly
averted defaulting on its obligation to the school district, through a
loan arrangement with a bank. At the school district's public budget
meeting in June of 1984, the public cut the district's 1984-1985 budget
by $80,000.00.
9. During January and February of 1985 and in response to the
financial difficulties faced by the school district, the Superinten-
dent of Schools began to consider subcontracting all of the bargaining
unit employees' work and looked at several private cleaning services
around the state. At that time, the Superintendent received firm cost
figures for both the 1985-1986 and for the 1986-1987 school years and
decided to use a paticular private concern to perform the unit work.
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10. In projecting the savings to be accrued from subcontracting
the unit work, the Employer used the Union's salary proposal for a
successor collective bargaining agreement, contained in the document
mentioned in paragraph 6 above, as well as the amounts paid for the
unit employees' medical insurance, Social Security, and state retire-
ment as a basis for comparision with the cost figures provided by the
private cleaning concern. Using these figures, the Employer estimated
that it would realize an annual savings of approximately $30,000.00 as
a result of entering into the subcontract for its custodial services.
11. The Boothbay/Boothbay Harbor Community School District Board
of Trustees met on April 8, 1985 and voted to subcontract all of the
bargaining unit employees' work, effective on July 1, 1985.
12. On April 12, 1985, the Superintendent of Schools sent a
letter to the Union which stated:
In accordance with Article 34 - Duration of Agreement,
in the Agreement between the Boothbay-Boothbay Harbor
Community School District Trustees and the Teamsters
Local Union No. 48, the Trustees wish to terminate the
agreement as of June 30, 1985.
The Trustees, at their April 8, 1985 meeting, voted
to contract a cleaning service to take care of our
buildings at a substantial financial savings for the
taxpayers of the Community School District.
13. The letter cited in the preceding paragraph was the first
notice which either the Union or its membership received of the
Employer's intent to subcontract all of the bargaining unit employees'
work.
14. On May 8, 1985, the Superintendent of Schools sent identical
letters, with the enclosures listed therein, to each of the bargaining
unit employees. Each letter stated:
This letter is to inform you that your respective job
will be terminated as of the end of work on June 30, 1985.
I would suggest that vacation time earned for this
contract year (1984-1985) be taken before the June 30,
1985 termination date.
The Community School District Board of Trustees have
authorized two maintenance positions and a half-time
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maintenance/groundskeeper position. One of the maintenance
positions has been filled. However, we will fill the other
positions before June 1, 1985.
I have enclosed a job description, a pay scale and an
application. Applications must be submitted before May 22,
1985, to the Superintendent of Schools.
I regret that this step was made necessary. The
Trustee's decision is a sound, economical one which was
taken to reduce the tax assessment increase in the towns
of Boothbay and Boothbay Harbor.
If I can be of any help to you, please do not hesitate
to ask.
15. On May 13, 1985, the parties held their first negotiation
session to bargain a successor collective bargaining agreement to that
mentioned in paragraph 4 hereof.
16. At the meeting mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the par-
ties agreed to ground rules for their negotiations. The Superin-
tendent of Schools then outlined the Employer's position that, since
the Employer was going to subcontract all of the unit employees' work
and the current agreement was to be terminated, there was no point in
negotiating for a successor collective bargaining agreement for the
custodial unit.
17. During the course of the May 13, 1985 negotiation session,
the Union demanded that the Employer negotiate over both the sub-
contracting decision and over the impact of that decision upon the
mandatory subjects of bargaining of the unit employees. The latter
demand was made at least to the extent that the Union Business Agent
present asked the Superintendent: "Are we going to negotiate
severance pay?"
18. In furtherance of its demand to negotiate over subcontracting
at the May 13, 1985 session, the Union requested that the Superin-
tendent provide the Union with the detailed financial information
which was used to calculate the savings allegedly to be accrued from
subcontracting and which constituted the primary justification for the
subcontracting decision.
19. Stating that all of the financial data sought by the Union
was included in the school district's proposed budget published in a
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local newspaper, the Superintendent denied the Union request noted in
the preceding paragraph.
20. Subsequently at the May 13, 1985 meeting, the parties went
"off the record" and the Superintendent started to provide the Union
with some of the financial justification for the subcontract decision
which had not been published in the newspaper. As soon as the Union
representative began taking notes, the Superintendent stopped pro-
viding information from his budget book.
21. The Superintendent's budget book contained much more detailed
information used in formulating the district's proposed budget than
did the published budget proposal. Among such data were breakdowns
used to calculate the cost of medical insurance, salaries, workers
compensation, Social Security contributions, and state retirement
expenditures. This information had been used as a basis for the sub-
contract decision.
22. The parties met for a second negotiation session on May 16,
1985. At that time and in connection with its demands to bargain over
the subcontracting decision, the Union renewed its request for the
detailed financial information used in making the subcontracting deci-
sion. The Union Business Agent stated that, if such data were pro-
vided, the Union might well be able to propose a less costly successor
collective bargaining agreement which might obviate the financial
justification for the subcontracting.
23. The Superintendent again denied the Union's request for
detailed financial information relevant to the subcontracting decision
and neither that decision nor its impact upon the mandatory subjects
of bargaining was negotiated at the May 16, 1985 session.
24. The Boothbay/Boothbay Harbor Community School District Board
of Trustees held their annual public budget meeting on June 3, 1985.
After receiving public comment thereon, the Board of Trustees approved
the school district's final operating budget for the 1985-1986 school
year at that time. That budget included an amount to compensate a
private concern to perform the work of the custodians bargaining unit
employees.
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25. During mid-June, 1985, the school district's Board of
Trustees entered into a written contract with a private company,
effective July 1, 1985, to perform the custodial duties which had been,
discharged by the bargaining unit employees.
26. Article 6 of the parties' 1983-1985 collective bargaining
agreement, mentioned in paragraph 4 above, stated:
The "EMPLOYER" reserves the right to subcontract,
however, each subcontracting shall not reduce the
normal work week of employees covered under this
Agreement.
27. Although the parties met with a state mediator on July 2,
1985, no negotiations over either the subcontract decision or over its
impact upon the mandatory subjects of bargaining occurred at that
time.
DECISION
The principal issue presented in this prohibited practices case
is whether the Employer violated 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E) by sub-
contracting all of the custodial bargaining unit employees' work and,
consequently, discharging all of the unit employees. The Union con-
tends that it demanded and that the Employer refused to negotiate over
both the subcontract decision and over the impact of that decision
upon the unit employees' wages, hours, and working conditions. The
Employer's position is that it gave the Union notice of its intention
to enter into the subcontract more than two months prior to imple-
menting its decision and that, despite having received said notice,
the Union failed to demand negotiations over the subcontract decision
and/or over the impact of that decision upon the mandatory subjects of
bargaining.
Both the decision to subcontract the unit employees' work and
the impact of that decision upon the wages, hours, and working con-
ditions of the affected employees are mandatory subjects of bargaining
within the scope of 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(C). The leading case in this
area is Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 85 S.Ct.
398, 13 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964). In that case, the employer sought to
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reduce its labor costs by subcontracting the plant maintenance which
had, to that time, been performed by bargaining unit employees. The
employer subcontracted the unit work without first negotiating thereon
with the maintenance employees' bargaining agent. The Supreme Court
of the United States, under the parallel provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act, held that the subcontracting decision itself is a
mandatory subject of bargaining. We have recognized that the decision
to subcontract bargaining unit work is a mandatory subject of
bargaining. Teamsters Local 48 v. City of Augusta, MLRB No. 78-04,
slip op. at 4 (June 7, 1978); Sanford Highway Unit v. Town of Sanford,
MLRB No. 79-50, slip op. at 12 (April 5, 1979), aff'd, 411 A.2d 1010
(Me. 1980).
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has held that the impact of a
subcontracting decision upon unit employees' wages, hours, and working
conditions is a mandatory subject of bargaining within the ambit of 26
M.R.S.A. 965(1)(C). In Bangor School Committee v. Bangor Education
Ass'n., 443 A.2d 383 (Me. 1981), the Court upheld the arbitrability of
an interest arbitration award provision which stated:
"Nothing in this contract shall be interpreted as
limiting the right of the committee to subcontract
work, except that such subcontracting shall not
cause the discharge or layoff of any member of the
bargaining unit."
In reaching its decision, the Law Court stated:
A two-step examination must be made to deter-
mine whether a matter is subject to interest
arbitration. "The first step is to decide whether
the matter is within the statutorily defined scope
of bargaining. If it is, the next step is to
determine whether the matter is limited by any
other existing statutory enactments."
Superintending School Committee of the Town of
Winslow v. Winslow Education Association, Me., 363
A.2d 229, 231-32 (1976).
It is the obligation of the public employer
and the bargaining agent "[t]o confer and nego-
tiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
working conditions and contract grievance arbitra-
tion . . . ." 26 M.R.S.A. Sec. 965(1)(C).
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Here, the arbitration award does not purport
to limit the [Employer's] right to subcontract
work. Rather, the award limits the impact of a
decision to subcontract by prohibiting the
discharge or layoff of any bargaining unit member
as a result of subcontracting. That limitation
clearly affects "wages, hours, [and] working
conditions." Thus, the impact of subcontracting
with regard to the continued employment of
bargaining unit members is within the statutorily
defined scope of bargaining. See State v. Maine
Labor Relations Board, Me., 413 A.2d 510, 513-14
(1980) (construing State Employees Labor Relations
Act, 26 M.R.S.A. 979 et seg.).
Bangor School Committee, supra, at 385. The Law Court then went on to
determine that the interest arbitration award provision in dispute was
not limited by any existing statute and, therefore, was arbitrable.
In recent years, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") and
the Federal Courts have held that decisions in areas related to sub-
contracting, such as plant relocations and closings, themselves are
not mandatory subjects of bargaining. Despite such rulings, both the
NLRB and the Federal Courts have continued to hold that the effects of
such management decisions upon the mandatory subjects are manditorily
negotiable. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666,
681, 101 S.Ct. 2573, 2582, 69 L.Ed.2d 318 (1981); Otis Elevator Co.,
269 NLRB 891, 894 (1984). The Supreme Court of the United States and
the NLRB have also been careful to point out that the Fibreboard deci-
sion continues to be "good law," within the factual context in which
it was decided. First National Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S., at 679-
680, 101 S. Ct., at 2581; Olinkraft, Inc. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 302, 306
(5th Cir. 1982); Otis Elevator Co.., supra, 269 NLRB, at 893; Ellmore,
Subcontracting: Mandatory or Permissive Subject of Collective
Bargaining, 36 Labor Law Journal 773, 775 (1985).
We have long held that changes in the mandatory subjects of
bargaining unilaterally implemented by the public employer contravene
the duty to bargain created by 965(1) of the Act and violate 26
M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E). In a recent case, we discussed this legal tenet
as follows:
The rationale behind this principle of labor law is
that an employer's unilateral change in a mandatory
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subject of bargaining "is a circumvention of the
duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives
of (the Act] much as does a flat refusal." NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 1111, 8
L.Ed.2d 230 (1962); Lane v. Board of Directors of
M.S.A.D. No. 8, 447 A.2d 806, 809-810 (Me. 1982).
Teamsters Local 48 v. Eastport School Department, MLRB No. 85-18, slip
op., at 4 (Oct. 10, 1985). The unilateral change rule applies
throughout the relationship between the public employer and the cer-
tified bargaining agent. During the time period between the cer-
tification of a bargaining agent and the execution of the initial
collective bargaining agreement between the parties, the unilateral
change rule is embodied in the requirement that the "dynamic status
quo" be maintained by the public employer in connection with the man-
datory subjects of bargaining for the newly-organized employees. This
means that, until the initial collective bargaining agreement is exe-
cuted, "benefits customarily given or already provided for under
arrangements in effect at the time of certification of the bargaining
agent must be continued." Council #74, AFSCME v. Town of Brunswick,
MLRB No. 85-08, slip op., at 6 (April 19, 1985); Council #74, AFSCME
v. M.S.A.D. No. 1, MLRB No. 81-12, slip op., at 6 (March 11, 1981).
During the interval between the expiration of a collective bargaining
agreement and the execution of a successor agreement, the "static
status quo" must be maintained. Upon the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement, the wages, hours, working conditions, and
contract grievance procedure established in the expired agreement must
remain in effect until they are superseded by the successor agreement.
Sanford Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Sanford Fire Commission, MLRB No.
79-62, slip op., at 10 (Dec. 5, 1979); Easton Teachers Ass'n v. Easton
School Committee, MLRB No. 79-14, slip op., at 5 (March 13, 1979).
Applying the above precedent in the instant case, we note that,
in the abstract, both the Employer's decision to subcontract the unit
employees' work and the impact of that decision on the employees'
wages, hours, and working conditions would be mandatory subjects of
bargaining. The Employer's position is that it gave the Union notice
of its intention to enter into the subcontract arrangement over two
months prior to implementing that decision and that, despite having
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received said notice, the Union failed to demand negotiations over the
subcontracting decision and/or over the impact of that decision upon
the mandatory subjects of bargaining. Had the Employer's averment
been established through the evidence presented, the Employer's
actions would not have violated the statutory duty to bargain.
Teamsters Local 48 v. City of South Portland, MLRB No. 86-05, slip
op., at 5-6 (Jan. 14, 1986); MSEA v. State of Maine, MLRB No. 85-19,
slip op., at 22-23 (Dec. 2, 1985). We have, however, found that the
Union did demand negotiations over the subcontracting decision and
over severance pay, one of the manditorily negotiable effects of sub-
contracting. City of Augusta, supra, at 6-7. Since the Union
demanded negotiations over the subcontracting decision and over
severance pay, the Employer would, in the absence of an agreement to
the contrary, be statutorily obligated to bargain over both matters.
The parties had previously reached an agreement in connection with
the subcontracting of bargaining unit work in Article 6 of their
1983-1985 collective bargaining agreement. That agreement expired on
June 30, 1985 and no successor agreement has been negotiated by the
parties. Whether one views the "termination" of the collective
bargaining agreement as merely allowing the agreement to expire or as
reverting the parties to their relationship prior to the existence of
the agreement, the unilateral change rule applies to the employees'
wages, hours, and working conditions. The level of the mandatory sub-
jects in effect at the expiration of a collective agreement must be
maintained until they are superseded by a subsequent agreement of the
parties, except in certain limited instances not present here. The
parties' respective rights and responsibilities in connection with
subcontracting are, therefore, determined by Article 6 of the expired
agreement. That contract section provides as follows:
"The 'EMPLOYER' reserves the right to
subcontract, however, such subcontracting shall not
reduce the normal work week of employees covered
under this Agreement."
Since this contractual provision is materially similar to the
arbitration award paragraph in contention before the Law Court in
Bangor School Committee, supra, we will interpret this article in a
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manner consistent with the Court's analysis of the paragraph at issue
therein. We hold, therefore, that the above-quoted provision expli-
citly permits the Employer to subcontract the bargaining unit
employees' work. The passage also provides that the impact of sub-
contracting shall be such as not to reduce the work hours of the unit
employees.fn1
Upon the expiration of the collective agreement, its provisions
controlling the mandatory subjects of bargaining became the status quo
which may not be unilaterally altered by either party, except in
limited instances not present here. Since it had agreed that the
Employer reserved the right to subcontract bargaining unit work, the
Union may not now successfully allege that the Employer violated the
statutory duty to bargain by exercising that reserved right. We hold,
therefore, that the Employer's unilateral decision to subcontract the
unit work did not violate 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E).
The status quo concerning the impact of subcontracting, in effect
at the expiration of the collective agreement, was that the only sub-
contracting permitted was that which would not have the impact of
reducing the work hours of the bargaining unit employees. The
Employer violated 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E) when it implemented the sub-
contract decision and, thereby, reduced the work hours of the unit
employees to zero, without first negotiating with the Union over the
impact of the subcontract decision on the mandatory subjects of
bargaining. The evidence established that the Union demanded such
impact bargaining--at least to the extent that it requested that the
Employer negotiate over severance pay for the unit employees.
Having concluded that the Employer's action violated 964(1)(E)
of the Act, we will order such remedies as are appropriate to effec-
_______________
1 The evidence established that the Union filed a grievance on
behalf of the bargaining unit employees challenging the Employer's
action. The evidence was unclear as to the exact nature of the
grievance and of the contractual provision which the Employer had
allegedly violated. In any event, the grievance appears to have been
abandoned since it was not pursued to the Superintendent's level, after
having been denied at the first two steps of the contractual grievance
procedure.
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tuate the policies of the Act. 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(C). In addition
to ordering the Employer to cease and desist from refusing to nego-
tiate over the mandatory subjects of bargaining with the certified
bargaining agent representing its employees in the future, we will
also order the Employer to pay to each of the employees[fn2] affected by
the subcontract decision severance pay in an amount equal to one-
month's wages. The amount of severance pay paid to each employee
shall be determined at the rate at which each employee was being com-
pensated as of June 30, 1985. The former half-time employee is to be
paid one-half of a month's pay as severance pay. Although we are
aware that the traditional remedy for violations of the sort committed
by the Employer is an order for reinstatement of the employees with
payment of full back-pay and benefits, Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp., supra, 379 U.S., at 215, 85 S.Ct., at 405; Sanford Highway
Unit, supra, 411 A.2d, at 1015-1016, we believe that, in these cir-
cumstances, the payment of one-month's severance pay is the remedy
most appropriate to effectuate the policies of the Act. In deciding
upon this order, we are persuaded that the Employer's poor financial
status provided ample legitimate justification for the decision to sub-
contract the unit work. Second, no anti-Union animus was established
before the Board. Third, the only impact bargaining demanded by the
Union which was established in the record was negotiations over
severance pay for the unit employees. Fourth, the Union and the
employees abandoned the prosecution of their grievance over the imple-
mentation of the subcontract decision.
We have considered the balance of the Union's allegations and the
Employer's Request for Sanctions and we conclude that they are without
merit. Accordingly, the balance of the prohibited practices complaint
will be dismissed and the Respondents' Request for Sanctions will be
denied.
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2 The evidence established that, as of May 8, 1986, the Custodians
bargaining unit consisted of the following employees: Ralph Abbott,
Jr., Ronald F. Abbott, Pauline Hardwick, Michael J. Lewis, Richard E.
Lewis, Rena R. Main, Bertha Matthews, and Carroll M. Vannah.
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ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and discussion,
and by virtue of and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor
Relations Board by the provisions of 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(C) (1974),
it is ORDERED:
1. That the Boothbay/Boothbay Harbor Community School District,
David A. Hopkins, its Superintendent of Schools, its rep-
resentatives and agents:
(a) Cease and desist from refusing, in the future,
to negotiate with the certified bargaining
agent representing its employees over the man-
datory subjects of bargaining.
(b) Take the affirmative action, necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act, of paying
severance pay, in an amount equal to that
which each would have earned in one month,
calculated at the rate at which each of them
was being compensated as of June 30, 1985, to:
Ralph Abbott, Jr., Ronald P. Abbott, Pauline
Hardwick, Michael J. Lewis, Richard E. Lewis,
Rena R. Main, Bertha Matthews, and Carroll M.
Vannah.
(c) Notify the Executive Director within 20 days
of the date of this order as to what steps
have been taken to comply with the order.
(d) Thirty days after the date of this order, if
the parties are unable to agree on the amount
of severance pay due to each of the employees
mentioned in paragraph l(b) hereof, the Union
may petition the Board to conduct such further
proceedings as are necessary to supplement this
order.
2. That the balance of the prohibited practices complaint,
filed on September 6, 1985, in Case No. 86-02, be and
hereby is dismissed.
3. That the Respondents' Request for Sanctions, filed on
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December 20, 1985, in Case No. 86-02, be and hereby
is denied.
Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 18th day of March, 1986.
MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The parties are advised of __________________________________
their right pursuant to 26 William M. Houston
M.R.S.A. 968(5)(F) (Supp. Alternate Chairman
1985) to seek review of this
decision and order by the
Superior Court by filing a
complaint in accordance with __________________________________
Rule 80B of the Rules of Thacher E. Turner
Civil Procedure within 15 Employer Representative
days of the date of the
decision.
__________________________________
Russell A. Webb
Alternate Employee Representative
-16-