STATE OF MAINE MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Case No. 79-14
______________________________
)
EASTON TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, )
)
Complainant, )
)
v. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
EASTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE, )
)
Respondent. )
______________________________)
This case comes to the Maine Labor Relations Board ("Board") by way of a
prohibited practice complaint filed on September 5, 1978, The response was
filed on September 18, 1978. A pre-hearinq conference was held on October 24,
1978 with Alternate Chairman Donald W. Webber presiding. Alternate Chairman
Webber issued a Pre-Hearing Conference Memorandum on October 31, 1978, the
contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. The parties stipu-
lated to a number of facts in writing summarized in a letter to the Board from
the representative of Complainant, dated November 15. 1978. and reproduced in
pertinent part in the findings of fact.
The parties each submitted briefs and reply briefs by December 11, 1978.
The Board met to deliberate the matter on January 26, 1979, Chairman Edward H.
Keith presiding, with Michael Schoonjans, Employee Representative, and Paul D.
Emery, Employer Representative.
JURISDICTION
There are no challenges to the jurisdiction of the Board to hear and
render a decision under 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5).
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon review of the Pre-Hearing Conference Memorandum, the exhibits sub-
mitted at the pre-hearing conference, the pleadings and the stipulated
facts,[fn]1 the Board finds:
1. Complainant Easton Teachers Association ("Teachers Association")
was at all material times the bargaining agent for the profes-
sional staff of the Easton School System and Respondent Easton
School Committee ("School Committee") is a public employer
as defined in 26 M.R.S.A. 962(2) and (7).
2. The parties executed a collective bargaining agreement, admitted in
evidence, as of September 1, 1976 which expired on July 31, 1978.
3. The parties were negotiating for a successor collective bargaining
agreement at all material times, and were utilizing mediation and
fact-finding procedures in aid of their negotiations.
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1 We note that facts germane to the issues but not part of the stipulations
were included in one of the briefs. This is improper and we disregard them
here although we caution that non-stipulated facts could be viewed as a con-
cession by the party advancing them.
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4. The parties stipulated that the School Committee made changes
without prior negotiation in the following list of "terms and
conditions" of employment, essentially transpiring through the
School Committee's action of no longer meeting or observing
items described in the expired contract:
(1) No salary step increase has been granted.
(2) No grievance procedure is acknowledged.
(3) Blue Cross/Blue Shield and Major Medical payments
are no longer being made by the Committee.
(4) Professional dues deductions are no longer being
made.
(5) Four (4) emergency leave days are not being granted,
as provided in said Agreement.
(6) Three (3) personal leave days are not being granted,
as provided by the Agreement.
(7) Three (3) professional leave days are not being granted,
as provided by the Agreement.
(8) The provision of Article XIV (B) Just Cause, is not
being observed as provided in said Agreement.
(9) The provisions of Article XV - Evaluation, are not
being observed as provided in said Agreement.
(10) The part time music accompanist provisions of Article
XIII (B) are not being observed as provided.
(11) No "experience factor" increases have been granted for
extra curricular activities.
(12) Accumulation of sick leave is limited to that provided
in 20 M.R.S.A. 1951.
5. The School Committee also stated that it "recognizes that until a new
contract is agreed upon by the parties other terms and conditions
from the expired contract may not be observed or met."
6. The School Committee's positions in fact finding with respect to the
twelve items were:
(1) Salary structure, Article 11 A: propose to increase base
and all steps.
(2) Grievance procedure, Article 1: propose to modify lan-
guage.
(3) Blue Cross/Blue Shield with Major Medical, Article II B:
propose to increase its contribution from $17.00 to
$19.00 per month.
(4) Professional dues deductions, Article XVI: had reached
tentative agreement before Agreement expiration.
(5) Emergency leave days, Article XI: propose to retain
and clarify.
(6) Personal leave days: (see para. 7, below).
(7) Professional leave days, Article X: had reached tentative
agreement before Agreement expiration.
(8) Just Cause, Article XIV B: proposed to retain.
(9) Evaluation, Article XV: proposed to retain.
(10) Music Accompanist, Article XIII B: proposed to delete.
(11) Experience Factor, Article XIII F (4): proposed to retain.
(12) Sick leave, Article IX: proposed to retain.
7. Although the parties stipulated that three personal leave days are
provided in the Agreement, such a clause does not appear in the
Agreement, rather, it is an Association proposal.
8. Roger Kelley signed the complaint and did so, as the parties stipu-
lated, in his capacity as Northern Maine UniServ Director on the
staff of the Maine Teachers Association, and as the chosen repre-
sentative and agent of the Easton Teachers Association.
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DECISION
The Teachers Association urges that the School Committee has violated 26
M.R.S.A . 964(1)(A)(B)(C) and (E) by making unilateral changes in wages,
hours and working conditions of the bargaining unit members, that is, without
bargaining or negotiating the change with the Association. While admitting
that it has made the stipulated changes, the School Committee defends its
actions on the ground that it is not required to maintain these conditions
since the collective bargaining agreement has expired and a successor agree-
ment not yet reached.
The School Committee also argues that the complaint is not a cognizable
legal complaint before the Board because it is signed by Roger Kelley who is
neither a member of the Teachers Association nor a person authorized to
practice law.
We conclude that the School Committee has committed per se violations of
Title 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(E) because of its unilateral changes in terms and
conditions of employment without first negotiating these changes with the
bargaining agent of its employees as required by 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(C).
Moreover, we find that the School Committee has specifically bargained in bad
faith because of these unilateral changes and by its coercive conduct of
discontinuing and withholding certain benefits from its employees while
simultaneously proposing in fact-finding procedures that these benefits be
continued or even increased. As a corollary matter, the School Committee has,
therefore, also violated 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(A).
The School Committee's defense, based on the law of contracts, is invalid
and in total derogation of the plain meaning and spirit of collective bargain-
ing laws.
In light of these conclusions, we find it unnecessary to reach the issues
of whether the School Committee has also violated 26 M.R.S.A. 964(1)(B) or
(C).
The complaint as filed by Mr. Kelley is proper under the Act and the
Rules of the Board, and he had the authority to do so as agent of the
complainant Association pursuant to Title 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(B) discussed
more fully at page 7 hereof.
I
It is axiomatic that a party may not make unilateral changes in conditions
of employment at any time without bargaining the change with the bargaining
agent. See the cases collected in Maine State Employees Ass'n v. State of
Maine, MLRB No. 78-23 (1978), appeal docketed, CV 78-484 (Kennebec Co. Super.
Ct. July 31, 1978) and Kittery Teachers Assn v. Kittery, PELRB No. 73-03
(1973). In none of our decisions is the rule restricted to negotiations for
a first contract. There is no logical basis for such. As we stated in Maine
State Employees Ass'n v. State of Maine, supra, at p. 4:
"[Al unilateral change in a mandatory subject of bargaining
undermines negotiations just as effectively as if the public
employer altogether refused to bargain over the subject."
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743-47, 82 S. Ct. 1107 (1962), and its
progeny also clearly apply to all periods during the collective bargaining
relationship. See Hinson v. NLRB, 428 F.2d 133, 74 LRRM 2194 (8th Cir. 1970);
Allen W. Bird II,
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Receiver, 227 NLRB 1355, 95 LRRM 1003 (1977); AAA Motor Lines, 215 NLRB No.
149, 88 LRRM 1253 (1974).
In its brief, the School Committee argues that it did not change the
status quo itself but that the change happened by operation of contract law.
Although the proposition is false, the School Committee found support in the
majority opinion of a Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. In re Cumberland
Valley School Dist., 376 A.2d 674, 96 LRRM 2245 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1977).
This anomalous decision of the Commonwealth Court majority, however, was
unanimously reversed by a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on
November 18, 1978. In re Cumberland Valley School District, 394 A.2d 946,
100 LRRM 2059 (Pa. 1978), rev'g 376 A.2d 674, 96 LRRM 2245 (Pa. Comwlth Ct.
1977). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that unilateral cancellation
of benefits during the collective bargaining process violated the duty to
bargain in good faith. Its explanation was succinct:
"The policy underlying this proposition was well-stated in
Hinson v. NLRB, 428 F.2d 133, 73 LRRM 2667, 74 LRRM 2194
(8th Cir. 1970):
'The spirit of the National Labor Relations Act
and the more persuasive authorities stand for the
proposition that, even after expiration of a col-
lective bargaining contract, an employer is under
an obligation to bargain with the Union before he
may permissibly make a unilateral change in those
terms and conditions of employment comprising man-
datory subjects of bargaining.' (Emphasis added)
The [Hinson] Court went on to explain that the employer's
duty to bargain arose
". . . not by reason of the contract itself but
because of the dictates of the policy embodied
in the National Labor Relations Act.' (Emphasis
in original.)
428 F.2d at 136, 74 LRRM at 2195."
In re Cumberland Valley School District, supra, 394 A.2d at 951, 100 LRRM at
2062.
The School Committee's argument that this results in the extension in
perpetuity of the previous contract is erroneous. The existing terms and
conditions of employment cannot be unilaterally changed once a bargaining
agent is certified or recognized until the proposed changes have been
negotiated with the bargaining agent. This does not mean that it is necessary
to obtain the bargaining agent's agreement. Thus, if a bona fide impasse is
reached, the employer may institute the proposed change.[fn]2
Normally the two parties reach a complete written agreement on the terms
and conditions and agree to be bound by that agreement for a given length of
time. Thereafter, the parties again have the opportunity to negotiate
proposed changes in the existing terms and conditions. Again, however, the
employer cannot make
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2 The parties agreed that they were presently negotiating and thus not at
impasse. Complaint paragraph 3; Response paragraph 4. Respondent's Brief at
page 6. We render no opinion whether Fact-Finding procedures were properly
invoked. See 26 M.R.S.A. 965(3)(A). If at impasse, a serious question of
whether it was caused by the Committee's bad faith would present itself. See
NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131,32 LRRM 2225 (1st Cir.). cert.
denied 346 U.S. 887 (1953). In any event the School Committee would be bound
to either continue existing conditions or institute its last best offer. See
NLRB v. Intracoastal Terminal, Inc., 286 F.2d 954, 47 LRRM 2629 (5th Cir.
1961).
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unilateral changes in these terms and conditions as embodied in the prior
agreement until the proposed changes have been negotiated with the bargaining
agent.
In essence, there is no difference between collective bargaining for an
initial agreement, during which all existing terms and conditions of employ-
ment are frozen until proposed changes have been fully negotiated, and
collective bargaining for subsequent agreements, during which existing terms
and conditions of employment (as embodied in a prior agreement) are again
frozen until proposed changes have been fully negotiated.
There are, of course, three exceptions to this rule in addition to the
previously noted exception of impasse: business exigency, waiver, and
traditional practice. MSEA v. State of Maine, supra, at page 4.
In short, by terminating fringe benefits and by refusing to abide by the
existing terms and conditions described in the expired Agreement without bar-
gaining those proposed changes with the union, the School Committee has
totally bypassed its duty to bargain and has undermined the bargaining agent's
authority. This plainly frustrates the statutory objective of establishing
working conditions through bargaining and is a per se violation of 26 M.R.S.A.
964(1)(F) as described in 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(C). Thus we will direct a
remedy concerning those items which constitute mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing.
However, we also find a specific lack of good faith in the School
Committee's overall conduct. In short, it is both bad faith bargaining and
unlawful interference and coercion of employee's rights to terminate benefits
during ongoing negotiations while at the same time not proposing to eliminate
those benefits in the next collective bargaining agreement.
We find, moreover, that it is most irresponsible to terminate the Blue
Cross/Blue Shield payments of $17.00 per month during negotiations. It is
extreme bad faith to do so while at the same time proposing to increase the
payments to $19.00 per month.
Other examples abound: dues deductions and professional leave day
provisions had already been tentatively agreed to for the successor agreement
at the time that these benefits were terminated; grievance procedure,
emergency leave days, just cause, evaluation, and sick leave provisions of
the prior agreement were proposed by the School Committee in fact finding to
be retained in whole or with only slight modification in the successor agree-
ment while it totally eliminated these benefits during the bargaining process.
Such conduct by the School Committee can only poison the atmosphere of
fruitful collective bargaining. Moreover, there is a direct, coercive effect
on the employees who must endure the elimination of all these benefits for
which they should have the right to bargain. Thus, we conclude that the
School Committee has specifically failed to bargain in good faith as required
by 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(C) through 964(1)(E) and has also violated 26
M.R.S.A. 964(1)(A).
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II
We conclude that ten of the twelve stipulated items are mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining and thus we will order that employees be made whole for
the termination or denial of these benefits with the exceptions of item (1),
the salary step increase and item (11), experience factor, discussed infra.
With respect to the remaining two of the twelve items, however, it is not
necessary to decide whether the just cause provision is mandatory or permis-
sive,[fn]3 and it is irrelevant that the evaluation provision is a matter of
educational policy[fn]4 since we have already indicated that the School
Committee is guilty of bargaining in bad faith and of coercing its employees
substantially by terminating these provisions while at the same time proposing
to retain them in the next agreement. Thus we find that the unilateral
changes in any of the 12 items constitute violations.
The ten stipulated items which are clearly mandatory subjects of
bargaining are as follows:
(1) Salary step increases, see Katz, supra, 396 U.S. at 745-46, 82 S.
Ct. at 1113; Galloway Bd. of Educ. v. Galloway Educ. Ass'n, 393
A.2d 218, 100 LRRM 2250, 2259 (N.J. 1978).
(2) Grievance procedure, see 26 M.R.S.A. 965(1)(C)(second line).[fn]5
(3) Medical insurance reimbursements, see Local 155, Inter-
national Molders v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 742, 76 LRRM 2133
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Borden, Inc. v. NLRB, 196 NLRB No.
172, 80 LRRM 1240 (1972).
(4) Professional dues deductions, see NLRB v. J. P. Stevens
& Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 1152, ll65 (5th Cir. 197); United
Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295, 295 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
(5), (6) & (7) Emergency/Personal/and Professional leave days,
see Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131, 136 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied 313 U.S. 595 (1942).
(10) Music accompanist, see City of Biddelord v. Biddeford
Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 422-23 (Me. 1977).
(11) Experience factor (wages), see item (1), above.
(12) Sick leave, see Katz, supra, 396 U.S. 736.
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3 Superintendinq School Comm. of the Town of Winslow v. Winslow Education
Ass'n, 363 A.2d 229, 231 n. 2 (Me. 1976).
4 See Caribou School Dept. v. Caribou Teachers Ass'n, MLRB No. 76-15 (1977).
5 See also, City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 398
(Me. 1973):
"It is clear that the Legislature has recognized that the maintenance of
a satisfactory quality of public education requires harmonious relations
between school officials and the teaching staffs and that disagreements
inevitably arise during the carrying out of their respective responsibili-
ties. The abrasive effect of the existence of unresolved grievances is
one of the threats to harmonious relations which the Legislature considers
should be removed."
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With respect to the mandatory subjects of salary step increases and ex-
perience factors, however, we do not consider the School Committee to have
made a change at all. It has not terminated the wage. Rather it has simply
held it at the level it was at the time that the contract expired. This com-
ports with our view that the status quo should be maintained as if the
existing conditions were frozen rather than to give effect to a built-in wage
escalator. Thus, we prefer a static view of the status quo such as that
adopted in New York, see Board of Co-Op Educ. Services v. Public Employment
Relations Bd., 395 N.Y.S.2d 439, 95 LRRM 3046 (N.Y. 1977), as opposed to the
dynamic or "automatic" view explained in Galloway Bd. of Educ. v. Galloway
Educ. Ass'n, 393 A.2d 218, 100 LRRM 2250, 2258-60 (N.J. 1978).
In summary, we find violations because of unilateral changes in items
(2), (3), (4), (5), (7), (8), (9), (10) and (12) and we order an appropriate
remedy which is aimed at restoring the Association and its bargaining unit
members to a position they would have enjoyed but for the prohibited practices
of the School Committee.
III
As a threshold issue, the School Committee argues that the complaint
should be dismissed because the complaint has not been brought by a person who
is either a member of the Teachers Association or a person authorized to
practice law in the State of Maine and therefore is not a cognizable legal
complaint before the Board.
There is no merit to this contention. The Act is quite explicit in its
authorization of this complaint. "[A]ny public employee organization or any
bargaining agent . . . may file a complaint . . . ." 26 M.R.S.A. 968(5)(B).
"'Bargaining agent' means any lawful organization, association or individual
representative of such organization or association . . . ." 26 M.R.S.A.
962(2). Roger Kelley is such a representative and the complaint is therefore
proper.
The School Committee argues that the individual who represents the
Teachers Association before the Board must be an attorney, relying on Land
Management, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 368 A.2d 602 (Me.
1977). However, this case involved an appearance "in court." Land Management,
supra, 368 A.2d at 603. The Maine Labor Relations Board, in contrast, is an
"Agency" authorized to take final action in an "adjudicatory" (not a judicial)
proceeding. 5 M.R.S.A. 8002(1) & (2). The requirement for representation
by an attorney in such a proceeding is not evident anywhere in the Administra-
tive Procedures Act ("APA"). 5 M.R.S.A. 8001 et seq. Rather, non-
attorneys are actually encouraged to appear before the Board by our Municipal
Public Employees Labor Relations Act, 26 M.R.S.A. 968(6), and by the general
APA, 5 M.R.S.A. 9057(2) which acts both explicitly relax the rules of
evidence which normally prevail in "judicial" proceedings.
Furthermore, our own rules recognize the practice that has prevailed
before this Board since its inception and, to the best of our knowledge,
before other labor boards,
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to wit, that non-attorneys routinely represent parties in all phases of the
proceedinq. Thus - "Any party . . . shall have the right to be represented by
counsel or by other representatives . . ." Rule 4.08 - and - "[M]isconduct of
an aggravated character, when engaged in by an attorney or other representa-
tive of a party, shall be grounds for suspension by the Board from further
practice before it . . . ." Rule 4.14. (Emphasis added) See also Rule 4.01
and Rule 4.03(A)(1).
The School Committee's argument is thus without merit.
REMEDY
In view of the flagrent nature of the violations and their number we
shall direct a broad cease-and-desist provision in the order. We further
direct that the Executive Director or his designee shall monitor compliance
with the affirmative action provisions of this order which we consider
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. He shall make recommenda-
tions to the Board for such further orders as may be necessary to ensure full
compliance within 90 days of date.
ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and pursuant to the powers
granted to the Maine Labor Relations Board by 968 of the Municipal Public
Employees Labor Relations Act ("Act"), it is ORDERED:
That Respondent, Easton School Committee, its members, agents, successors
and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain in good faith over wages, hours, working
conditions and contract grievance arbitration with the Easton
Teachers Association as the exclusive bargaining agent of the
professional staff members of the Easton School Department.
(b) Unilaterally implementing changes in wages, hours, working
conditions or contract grievance arbitration without first
notifying Easton Teachers Association and negotiating such
changes if requested.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in
Section 963 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act:
(a) Make whole the employees in the unit for the monetary loss they
have suffered as a result of Respondent's failure to contribute
toward the cost of Blue Cross/Blue Shield and Major Medical in-
surance in accordance with Article II (B) of the Agreement
(effective September 1, 1976) (hereafter "Agreement") by paying
each bargaining unit member $17.00 per month plus legal interest
from August 1, 1978 to the execution date of a collective bar-
gaining agreement, to the decertification of the bargaining
agent, to reinstitution of the benefit as it was prior to dis-
continuance, or to the point of bona fide impasse, whichever
occurs first. In the case of impasse, the Respondent has the
option of continuing the $17.00 per month payments or insti-
tuting its last best offer.
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(b) Honor any grievance arising after July 31, 1978 as if
Article I of the Agreement were still in effect. No
time limit in Article I shall bar the processing of the
grievance if the limit was exceeded directly or indirectly
as the result of Respondent's refusal to observe this
provision of the Agreement. Respondent is specifically
directed to give effect to Article I (4) concerning im-
partial arbitration. This subparagraph shall apply from
August 1, 1978 as delineated in paragraph 2(a), above.
(c) Reinstitute the procedure of professional dues deductions
in accordance with Article XVI of the Agreement or in
accordance with the tentative agreement reached on the
subject within 5 days of receipt of this order.
(d) Make whole any bargaining unit member for any lost pay or
other benefit as a result of Respondent's failure to honor
a request for emergency leave in accordance with Article XI
of the Agreement from August 1, 1978 as delineated in para-
graph 2(a), above.
(e) Give immediate effect to either Article X of the Agreement
(professional leave) or the tentative agreement reached on
the subject and to Article XIII (B) (Accompanist).
(f) Give effect to Article XIV (B) (Just cause) and Article XV
(Evaluation) of the Agreement as if effective from August 1,
1978 as delineated in paragraph 2(a), above.
(g) Allow unused sick leave to accumulate at the rate and to the
maximum in accordance with Article IX as if effective from
August 1, 1978 as delineated in paragraph 2(a), above.
(h) Have copies of the Notice attached to this Decision and Order
signed and dated by a representative of the Easton School
Committee and posted at all work locations of the members of the
bargaining unit represented by the Easton Teachers Association,
where notices are normally posted, for a period of 60 consecu-
tive calendar days from the date of posting, to commence within
5 days from receipt of this order.
(i) Notify the Executive Director of the Maine Labor Relations Board
and the Easton Teachers Association in writing within 30 days
from the date of this Order, and again after 45 days but within
60 days from the date of this Order, of what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith.
Dated at Augusta, Maine this 13th day of March, 1979.
MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
/s/________________________________________
Edward H. Keith, Chairman
/s/________________________________________
Michael Schoonjans, Employer Representative
/s/________________________________________
Paul D. Emery, Employer Representative
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STATE OF MAINE STATE OF MAINE
MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Augusta, Maine 04333
NOTICE
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
a Decision and Order of the
MAINE LABOR RELATIONSbb0ARD
and in order to effectuate the policies of the
MUNICIPAL PUBLIC EMPLOYEES LABOR RELATIONS ACT
we hereby notify our employees that:
(1) WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good faith over wages, hours, working
conditions and contract grievance arbitration with the Easton Teachers
Association as the exclusive bargaining agent of the professional staff
members of the Easton School Department.
(2) WE WILL NOT unilaterally implement changes in wages, hours, working
conditions or contract grievance arbitration without first notifying
Easton Teachers Association and negotiating such chances if requested.
(3) WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 963
of the Act.
(4) WE WILL make whole the employees in the unit for the monetary loss they
have suffered as a result of our failure to contribute toward the cost
of Blue Cross/Blue Shield and Major Medical insurance in accordance with
Article II (B) of the Agreement (effective September 1, 1976) (hereafter
"Agreement') by paying each bargaining unit member $17.00 per month plus
legal interest from August 1, 1978 to the execution date of a collective
bargaining agreement, to the decertification of the bargaining agent, to
reinstitution of the benefit as it was prior to discontinuance, or to
the point of bona fide impasse, whichever occurs first. In the case of
impasse, we will either continue the $17.00 per month payments or
institute our last best offer.
(5) WE WILL honor any grievance arising after July 31, 1978 as if Article I
of the Agreement were still in effect. No time limit in Article I shall
bar the processing of the grievance if the limit was exceeded directly
or indirectly as the result of our refusal to observe this provision of
the agreement. WE WILL specifically give effect to Article 1 (4) con-
cerning impartial arbitration. This subparagraph shall apply from
August 1, 1978 as delineated in paragraph (4) above.
(6) WE WILL reinstitute the procedure of professional dues deductions in
accordance with Article XVI of the Agreement or in accordance with the
tentative agreement reached.
(7) WE WILL make whole any bargaining unit member for any lost pay or other
benefit as a result of our failure to honor a request for emergency
leave in accordance with Article XI of the Agreement from August 1, 1978
as delineated in paragraph (4) above.
(8) WE WILL give immediate effect to either Article X of the Agreement
(professional leave) or the tentative agreement reached on the subject
and to Article XIII (B) (Accompanist).
(9) WE WILL give effect to Article XIV (B) (Just cause) and Article XV
(Evaluation) of the Agreement as if effective from August 1, 1978 as
delineated in paragraph (4) above.
(10) WE WILL allow unused sick leave to accumulate at the rate and to the
maximum in accordance with Article IX as if effective from August 1,
1978 as delineated in paragraph (4) above.
(11) WE WILL notify the Executive Director of the Maine Labor Relations Board
and the Easton Teachers Association in writing within 30 days from the
date of this Order what steps we have taken to comply herewith.
EASTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE
Dated _______________________________ By ___________________________________
(Representative) (Title)
This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days as required by the
Decision and Order of the Maine Labor Relations Board and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any questions concerning this Notice or compliance with its
provisions, they may communicate directly with the offices of the Maine Labor
Relations Board, State Office Building, Augusta, Maine O4333, Telephone
289-2016.
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