STATE OF MAINE MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Case No. 86-01
Issued: January 24, 1986
________________________________
)
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 48, )
State, County, Municipal and )
University Employees in the )
State of Maine, )
)
Complainant, )
) DECISION AND ORDER
v. )
)
TOWN OF FORT FAIRFIELD, )
)
Respondent. )
________________________________)
The questions presented in this prohibited practice case are
whether the Town of Fort Fairfield (hereinafter referred to as
"Employer") violated 26 M.R.S.A. [Sec.] 964(1)(E) by unilaterally offering
overtime work to the Reserve Officers of the Fort Fairfield Police
Department before offering it to the full-time Patrolmen, as had alle-
gedly been the past practice, and whether the Employer violated 26
M.R.S.A. [Sec.] 964(1)(B) and (A) by issuing a written reprimand to the
Union steward, allegedly without just cause. Finding that there was
no established past practice concerning the allocation of overtime
work and that the written reprimand was deserved, we hold that the
Employer's actions did not transgress any provision of the Municipal
Public Employees Labor Relations Act ("Act"), 26 M.R.S.A. ch. 9-A.
The prohibited practices complaint, filed pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A.
[Sec.] 968(5)(B) by Teamsters Local Union No. 48 ("Union"), was received on
August 14, 1985. The Union's complaint alleged that the Employer's
actions violated 26 M.R.S.A. [Sec.] 964(1)(A), (B), (C), (D) and (E). The
Employer filed its answer on September 4, 1985, denying that its
actions violated any portion of the Act and moving to dismiss the
Union's complaint.
A prehearing conference on the case was held on September 12,
1985, Alternate Chairman Donald W. Webber presiding. By agreement of
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the parties at the prehearing conference, the complaint was dismissed
as to Fort Fairfield Town Manager Alphonse Dixon, as a separate named
Respondent. On September 17, 1985, Alternate Chairman Webber issued a
Prehearing Conference Memorandum and Order, the contents of which are
incorporated herein by reference.
Hearings on the case were conducted on October 16 and 23, 1985,
Alternate Chairman William M. Houston presiding, with Employer
Representative Thacher E. Turner and Alternate Employee Representative
Russell A. Webb. The Union was represented by Business Agent John A.
Perkins, and the Employer was represented by Peter R. Kraft, Esq.
The parties were given full opportunity to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, to introduce documentary evidence, and to make argument.
The Employer filed a post-hearing brief on December 3, 1985, which was
duly considered by the Maine Labor Relations Board ("Board").
JURISDICTION
Teamsters Local Union No. 48 is the certified bargaining agent,
within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. [Sec.] 962(2), for two bargaining
units - one composed of the Patrolmen and the other containing the
Sergeant - of persons employed by the Fort Fairfield Police Depart-
ment. The Town of Fort Fairfield is the public employer, within the
definition of 26 M.R.S.A. [Sec.] 962(7), of the employees mentioned in the
preceding sentence. The jurisdiction of the Maine Labor Relations
Board to hear this case and to render a decision and order herein lies
in 26 M.R.S.A. [Sec.] 968(5).
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon review of the entire record, the Labor Relations Board
finds:
1. Teamsters Local Union No. 48 is the certified bargaining
agent, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. [Sec.] 962(2), for two bargain-
ing units of persons employed by the Fort Fairfield Police Department.
One bargaining unit is composed of the Patrolmen and the other con-
sists of the Sergeant.
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2. Teamsters Local Union No. 48 attained bargaining agent
status for the units mentioned in the preceding paragraph through
a bargaining agent election conducted by the Executive Director on
April 4, 1985.
3. The Town of Fort Fairfield is the public employer, within the
definition of 26 M.R.S.A. [Sec.] 962(7), of the employees in the job
classifications noted in paragraph 1 hereof.
4. The regular shift coverage at the Fort Fairfield Police
Department consists of one officer on duty per shift, twenty-four
hours per day, seven days per week.
5. When, due to illness, vacations, attendance at the Maine
Criminal Justice Academy, or for some other reason, a full-time offi-
cer is unavailable for duty, a shift vacancy occurs. Such open shifts
can be filled in one of three ways: the shift can be offered to a
full-time officer as overtime, the shift can be offered to a Reserve
officer, or the Chief of Police can work the shift.
6. The decision as to which of the alternative methods, men-
tioned in the preceding paragraph, will be used to fill each shift
vacancy has always been left to the discretion of the Chief of Police
or, in his absence, the Police Sergeant.
7. The person who served as the Chief of the Fort Fairfield
Police Department, from January, 1969 to December, 1984, harbored
serious concerns about the competence of the Reserve Officers to per-
form patrol duties in lieu of the full-time officers because the
Reserve officers had not attended the Maine Criminal Justice Academy.
8. Despite the former Police Chief's concerns about utilizing
Reserve Officers for patrol duty in lieu of full-time officers, the
Reserve Officers have been used to perform such duties, since at
least 1981.
9. Despite the objection of the Patrolmen, the Chief of Police
often has, during the past several years, scheduled himself to cover
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shift vacancies, rather than offer said shifts to the full-time offi-
cers as overtime.
10. For the past several years, the Chief of Police has scheduled
a Reserve officer to work the same patrol shift every Sunday. Had the
Reserve officer not been used to cover the Sunday shift, those hours
would have been available to be worked by full-time officers as over-
time. The Patrolmen voiced protest over the use of the Reserve
Officer for the Sunday patrol duty; nevertheless, the Chief of Police
continued to assign such duty to the Reserve officer.
11. Prior to May of 1985, no consistent general practice had
developed concerning the allocation of overtime at the Fort Fairfield
Police Department.
12. The initial return date for all Fort Fairfield Police Depart-
ment cases in the Presque Isle District Court occurs on Tuesday
morning each week. The Chief of the Fort Fairfield Police Department
represents the department in court at that time.
13. Since the Police Chief is in court every Tuesday morning, he
is unavailable to perform his duties in Fort Fairfield and his absence
creates an open shift which must be filled.
14. For the past several years, a consistent practice has devel-
oped of using the officer, who works from midnight on Monday to 8:00
a.m. on Tuesday, to fill the open shift, from 8:00 a.m. to about noon
on Tuesday, created by the Chief's absence. The latter Tuesday morn-
ing hours are compensated at the overtime rate for the full-time
officer who stays on to cover for the Chief.
15. The new Chief of Police reported for duty in early May of
1985. In mid-May, the Chief, pursuant to a general directive to mini-
mize overtime hours from the Town Manager and the Town Council, used
a Reserve officer to fill the open shift on a Tuesday morning, rather
than offering this time as overtime to the regular officer who, nor-
mally, would have worked those hours. The Chief took this action
without first notifying the bargaining agent thereof.
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16. A few days after the Chief's action mentioned in the pre-
ceding paragraph, the Sergeant approached the Chief and informed him
of the past overtime assignment practice for the Tuesday morning open
shift.
17. Shortly after the conversation mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, the Police Chief reinstated the past practice noted in
paragraph 14 above.
18. The current shift swapping policy at the Fort Fairfield
Police Department has been in effect since at least 1963. Under that
policy, a Patrolman wishing to swap a shift must first obtain agree-
ment from the officer with whom the swap will be made and the arrange-
ment must be approved, prior to the occurrence of the swap, by either
the Chief of Police or the Police Sergeant.
19. Once the assent of the officer who will work the shift in
question has been secured, shift swaps are usually routinely approved
by the Chief or the Sergeant. Such swap requests are denied if grant-
ing the swap would result in an officer's working a double shift.
20. At all times relevant hereto, Patrolman Wallace Fraser has
served as the Union shop steward and as a member of the Union bargain-
ing team for the patrolmen's bargaining unit mentioned in paragraph I
above.
21. During mid-April, 1985, Patrolman Fraser asked Patrolman
Wayne Monson to work a shift for him from midnight to 8:00 a.m. on
May 10, 1985. Officer Monson agreed and Fraser requested and received
approval for the May 10th shift swap from Sergeant DeMerchant.
22. At a later time, when it appeared that he might wish to
extend his vacation and not return from New Jersey in time to work his
scheduled midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift on May 13, 1985, Officer Fraser
asked and Officer Monson agreed to cover that shift, in the event that
Fraser did not in fact return to Fort Fairfield in time to work that
shift.
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23. While in the course of working the midnight to 8:00 a.m.
shift for Officer Fraser on May 10th, Patrolman Monson learned that
Fraser had allegedly made some disparaging remarks about certain mem-
bers of the Fort Fairfield Police Department, including Officer
Monson.
24. Upon hearing what Patrolman Fraser had allegedly said about
him, Patrolman Monson approached the Chief on the morning of
May 10th and informed him that, despite his earlier agreement to do
so, Monson would not cover the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift on May 13th
for Officer Fraser. Knowing what Fraser had allegedly said about
Monson, the Chief told Monson that, in the circumstances, the Chief
understood Monson's position, that Monson would not have to work the
Monday shift, and that the Chief would make certain that the shift in
question was covered. The Chief himself worked the midnight to 8:00
a.m. patrol shift on May 13th.
25. Upon learning of the May 13th shift swap during the conver-
sation mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Chief asked Sergeant
DeMerchant whether the Sergeant had approved thereof. The Sergeant
responded that he had not given his assent to the May 13th shift swap.
26. Upon Officer Fraser's return to work on May 14, 1985, the
Chief confronted him with two problems: Fraser's unexcused absence
from his scheduled work shift on May 13th and Fraser's allegedly
making a certain false arrest.
27. The Chief and Fraser discussed both of the charges mentioned
in the preceding paragraph on May 14th. At that time, Fraser did not
claim that he had secured prior authorization for the shift swap at
issue.
28. Having determined that the first charge listed in paragraph
26 was well founded, the Chief decided to give Fraser a written repri-
mand for that transgression and elected to overlook the alleged false
arrest incident.
29. The written reprimand mentioned in the preceding paragraph
stated: "Due to the action of not reporting to work in proper channels
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on 5/13/85, Sunday, 12:00 p.m. to Monday 8:00 a.m., this is a written
warning."
30. After giving him the reprimand cited in the preceding
paragraph, the Chief advised Officer Fraser of his right to file a
grievance over the issuance of the warning at the next level of the
grievance procedure - the Town Manager's level.
31. Patrolman Fraser exercised his right to file a grievance with
the Town Manager over the Police Chief's issuance of the written
reprimand.
32. Upon receipt of the grievance mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, the Town Manager asked Sergeant DeMerchant to provide him
with a written statement concerning the occurrence which was the sub-
ject of the reprimand.
33. In response to the request noted in the preceding paragraph,
the Sergeant wrote a memorandum which stated, in pertinent part:
Officer Fraser was not aware and in no way could
have known that a problem had arisen regarding his
12-8 shift on May 13, 1985. Officer Fraser has
always been very conscientious about being at his
assigned shifts. I did not authorize nor was I
approached to authorize the 12-8 shift on May 13,
1985 because it was uncertain if in fact it would
have to be covered. I would have authorized
Officer Monson to cover the shift(s) in question
because he was on day-off both days.
34. As part of his investigation of officer Fraser's grievance,
the Town Manager examined the Town's personnel files and determined
that the issuance of the written reprimand here was consistent with
the type of discipline meted out for transgressions of similar seri-
ousness in the past.
35. After meeting with and hearing from all pertinent witnesses,
the Town Manager affirmed the issuance of the written reprimand to
officer Fraser. During the course of the meeting with the Town Mana-
ger, Officer Fraser did not dispute that he had failed to gain the
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approval of a superior officer prior to the May 13th shift swap; how-
ever, Fraser stated that he felt that the written reprimand was too
harsh a penalty for the infraction at issue.
36. Patrolman Fraser appealed the Town manager's decision to the
next step of the grievance procedure - the Town Council. In taking
his appeal, Officer Fraser wrote a letter to the Police Chief and the
Town Manager, on June 21, 1985, which read, in relevant part:
As a result of our meeting on June 17, 1985, I
agree with you on the points that were discussed.
But I still feel that the written reprimand is too
harsh a punishment for the alleged violation. As
you said in our meeting that if I wished that I
could have a meeting with the Town Council on the
subject of my grievance. By this letter I am
requesting that you set up a meeting with the Town
Council. . . .
37. Pursuant to Officer Fraser's request therefor, the Fort
Fairfield Town Council met in executive session to hear the grievance
appeal, during July of 1985. After hearing testimony from all wit-
nesses and deliberating the matter, the Town Council affirmed the
issuance of the written reprimand.
DECISION
The Union's first contention is that, by unilaterally changing
the overtime allocation policy, the Employer violated 26 M.R.S.A. [Sec.]
964(1)(E). The implementation of changes in mandatory subjects of
bargaining, without first notifying and affording the bargaining agent
the opportunity of demanding negotiations thereon, contravenes the
duty to bargain created by [Sec.] 965(1) of the Act and violates [Sec.] 964(1)
(E). This tenet of labor law is grounded on the principle that an
employer's unilateral change in a mandatory subject of bargaining "is
a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frustrates the objec-
tives of [the Act] much as does a flat refusal." NLRB v. Katz, 369
U.S. 736, 743, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 1111, 8 L.Ed.2d 230 (1962); Lane v.
Board of Directors of M.S.A.D. No. 8, 447 A.2d 806, 809-810 (Me.
1982). The Board has outlined the elements required to establish an
unlawful unilateral change as follows:
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In order to constitute a violation of [Sec.] 964(1)
(E), three elements must be present. The public
employer's action must: (1). be unilateral, (2) be a
change from a well-established practice, and (3)
involve one or more of the mandatory subjects of
bargaining. Bangor Fire Fighters Association v.
City of Bangor, MLRB No. 84-15, at 8 (Apr. 4,
1984). An employer's action is unilateral if it is
taken without prior notice to the bargaining agent
of the employees involved in order to afford said
repesentative a reasonable opportunity to demand
negotiations on the contemplated change. City of
Bangor v. A.F.S.C.M.E., Council 74, 449 A.2d 1129,
1135 (Me. 1982).
Teamsters Local Union No. 48 v. Eastport School Department, MLRB No.
85-18, at 4 (Oct. 10, 1985). As the party averring that a prohibited
practice had occurred, the Union bears the burden of proving the ele-
ments of the prohibited practice alleged.
The Union has averred that the Employer implemented unlawful uni-
lateral changes in two separate instances. First, the Union contended
that the consistent past practice had been to offer open shifts to the
full-time officers as overtime. Despite this alleged past practice,
the Union charged that the Employer has begun to offer open shifts to
the Reserve officers, without first offering those hours to the full-
time officers as overtime. As noted above, one of the elements which
must be established to prove the occurrence of an unlawful unilateral
change is that the employer's action must be a departure from a well-
established practice. In this context, we are unable to find that the
full-time officers had, as a consistent past practice, the right of
first refusal to work open shifts as overtime. Even adopting the
Union's view of the Chief of Police as a full-time officer, we were
unable to discern a consistent past practice in connection with the
filling of open shifts with full-time officers. The evidence demon-
strated that the filling of open shifts was a matter left solely to
the Chief's discretion and that the former Chief followed no consis-
tent policy in exercising that discretion. On occasion, the Chief
would work the open shift himself, other times he would assign the
hours to the full-time officers as overtime, and in some instances he
would offer the hours to Reserve officers. The Union was unable to
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show that, on those occasions when the open shifts were covered by
Reserve officers, the full-time officers had been offered and had
refused to work the hours in question. Since the Union was unable to
establish the existence of the past practice which was allegedly
contravened, we are unable to conclude that the Employer's actions, in
connection with the general overtime allocation policy, constituted an
unlawful unilateral change.
The second instance, in which the Union averred that the Employer
had violated [Sec.] 964(1)(E), concerned a change in the Tuesday morning
shift coverage policy. In this case, the Union did establish all of
the elements necessary to prove an unlawful unilateral change. In one
of our earliest decisions, we held that an overtime allocation policy
is a mandatory subject of bargaining, within the scope of [Sec.] 965(1)(C)
of the Act. Council 74, AFSCME v. City of South Portland, PELRB Nos.
73-13 and 73-14, at 19-20 (Sept. 28, 1973). Second, the record esta-
blished that, for the past several years, a consistent practice had
developed of using the officer who works the midnight to 8:00 a.m.
shift on Tuesday to cover the Tuesday morning shift for the Chief, who
is in District Court at that time. Finally, the evidence showed that,
in early May of 1985 and without prior notice to the Union, the Chief
used a Reserve Officer to fill the Tuesday morning shift, rather than
offering it to the regular officer. The Employer, therefore, unila-
terally changed the Tuesday morning overtime allocation practice.
Shortly after being notified of the past practice by a unit employee,
the Chief reinstated the past practice. Since the Chief had been
recently hired and might not have been aware of the past practice and
because he promptly reinstated the practice upon learning of its exis-
tence, we hold that, in the circumstances, the Employer's action did
not violate [Sec.] 964(1)(E) of the Act.
The second major contention in the prohibited practices complaint
was that, by issuing a written reprimand to the Union steward, the
Employer violated [Sec.] 964(1)(B) and, derivatively, [Sec.] 964(1)(A). Since
its initial adoption in Holmes v. Town of Old orchard, MLRB No. 82-14
(Sept. 27, 1982); aff'd sub nom. Town of Old Orchard Beach v. Old
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Orchard Beach Police Patrolmen's Ass'n., York Super. Ct., Docket No.
CV-82-613 (Oct. 27, 1983), we have consistently applied the National
Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) "Wright Line" test in the 'dual motive'
disciplinary context. Ritchie v. Town of Hampden, MLRB No. 83-15
(July 18, 1983), aff'd sub nom. Town of Hampden v. Maine Labor
Relations Board, Penobscot Super. Ct., Docket No. CV-82-407 (Sept. 14,
1984). Our use of the "Wright Line" in 'dual motive' cases arising
under the parallel section of the State Employees Labor Relations Act,
26 M.R.S.A. [Sec.] 979-C(1)(B), has been approved by the Supreme Judicial
Court. Maine State Employees Ass'n. v. State Development Office, 499
A.2d 165, 168-169 (Me. 1985). Subsequent to the Board's adoption
thereof, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the NLRB's
use of the "Wright Line" test. Mr. Justice white, writing for a una-
nimous Court, has outlined the "Wright Line" test as follows:
The Board held that the General Counsel, of course,
had the burden of proving that the employee's con-
duct protected by Section 7 was a substantial or a
motivating factor in the discharge. Even if this
was the case, and the employer failed to rebut it,
the employer could avoid being held in violation of
Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) by proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the discharge
rested on the employee's unprotected conduct as
well and that the employee would have lost his job
in any event. It thus became clear, if it was not
clear before, that proof that the discharge would
have occurred in any event and for valid reasons
amounted to an affirmative defense on which the
employer carried the burden of proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400, 103 S.Ct.
2469, 2473, 76 L.Ed. 2d 667 (1983) (footnotes omitted), cited and
adopted by the Board, Ross v. Portland School Committee, MLRB No.
83-04, at 19 (Aug. 29, 1983). Since there is no General Counsel in
practice before this Board, the complainant must be substituted for
the General Counsel in the above description.
The contention that the issuance of a written reprimand violated
26 M.R.S.A. [Sec.] 964(1)(B) is based on the following premises: (1) there
is a long-standing shift swapping policy in effect at the Fort
Fairfield Police Department, (2) the employee involved was appointed
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to serve as the Union's shop steward shortly before the incident at
issue and he is a member of the Union's bargaining team, (3) in satis-
faction of the shift swapping practice, the employee secured a re-
placement to cover a shift on May 13th by gaining the agreement of the
replacement employee and the approval of a superior officer and (4)
despite having adhered to the established shift swapping practice, the
Union steward received a written reprimand for an unauthorized absence
from duty for the May 13th shift. Had it been able to substantiate
all of these assertions through relevant evidence, the Union may well
have satisfied its burden of proof under the first prong of the
"Wright Line" test. The evidence, however, failed to prove the third
averment. The record indicated that the employee secured the assent
of the officer who would cover the shift in question but that he
failed to seek or gain the approval of a superior officer, prior to
the shift swap. We based this finding on Sergeant DeMerchant's
letter, quoted in paragraph 33 of our findings of fact, as well as
upon the testimony of Chief Nicholson and of the Town Manager. Both
of the latter individuals stated that, when confronted with the alle-
gation that he had failed to gain the approval of a superior officer
prior to the May 13th shift swap, Officer Fraser did not deny the
charge. This testimony was corroborated by Fraser's letter cited in
paragraph 36 of our findings. We must conclude that the reprimand was
well founded and, in the circumstances, was an appropriate sanction
for the transgression involved. Since the Union was unable to
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employee's
protected activities were a substantial or a motivating factor in the
issuance of the reprimand, we hold that the Employer's action did not
violate [Sec.] 964(1)(B) of the Act.
We have also considered and rejected the argument that the
issuance of the reprimand to Officer Fraser contravened 26 M.R.S.A. [Sec.]
964(1)(A). The legal standard used in considering alleged violations
of said section has been outlined by the Board as follows:
"A finding of interference, restraint or coercion
does not turn on the employer's motive or on
whether the coercion succeeded or failed, however,
but is based on 'whether the employer engaged in
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conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to
interfere with the free exercise of employee rights
under the Act.' NLRB v. Ford, 170 F.2d 735, 738
(6th Cir. 1948); Teamsters Local 48 v. Town of
Oakland, MLRB No. 78-30 at 3 (Aug. 24, 1978)."
Maine State Employees Ass'n. v. Department of Human Services, MLRB No.
81-35, at 4-5 (June 26, 1981); cited with approval in Maine State
Employees Ass'n., supra, at 8-9. The facts cited below dispel any
notion that the Employer's action tended to interfere with the exer-
cise of rights under the Act. The employee who received the reprimand
had violated the established past practice; therefore, the issuance of
some discipline was warranted. Prior to issuing the reprimand, the
Police Chief interviewed all pertinent witnesses in order to ascertain
the relevant facts. In imposing the discipline, the Chief opted to
ignore the equally serious false arrest charge involving the same
employee. Prior to affirming the issuance of the reprimand, the Town
Manager heard from all pertinent witnesses, reviewed the Town's per-
sonnel files and determined that the written reprimand was consistent
with sanctions meted out in the past for similar transgressions. At
each step, the Employer's agents advised the employee of his right to
pursue the matter through the established grievance procedure. In the
circumstances, it cannot reasonably be said that the Employer's action
tended to interfere with the exercise of rights under the Act. We
hold, therefore, that the Employer's issuance of the written reprimand
to Patrolman Fraser did not violate 26 M.R.S.A. [Sec.] 964(1)(A).
The Union further alleged that the Employer's actions violated 26
M.R.S.A. [Sec.] 964(1)(C). We have repeatedly noted that that section of
the Act "is directed at the evil of too much financial or other sup-
port of, encouraging the formation of, or actually participating in,
the affairs of the union and thereby potentially dominating it."
Teamsters Local 48 v. Eastport School Department, MLRB No. 85-18, at 8
(Oct. 10, 1985); Teamsters Local 48 v. Town of Kittery, MLRB No.
84-25, at 4 (July 13, 1984). In this case, the Employer neither par-
ticipated in nor otherwise supported the activities of the Union. The
Board holds, therefore, that the Employer did not violate [Sec.] 964(1)(C)
of the Act.
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The final allegation in the Union's complaint is that the
Employer's actions violated Section 964(1)(D) of the Act. That sec-
tion of the Act protects the rights of employees and employee organi-
zations to file complaints or petitions with or to give testimony
before this Board by protecting employees involved in any stage of
a Labor Relations Board proceeding from a wide variety of discrimina-
tory actions by the employer. See, e.g., NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S.
117, 121-125 (1971).- Town of Kittery, supra at 5, quoting, Southern
Aroostook Teachers Association v. Southern Aroostook Community School
Committee, MLRB Nos. 80-35 and 80-40, at 24 (April 14, 1982). No evi-
dence was submitted to establish that any of the employees of the Fort
Fairfield Police Department had ever appeared as a witness before this
Board or had ever filed a petition or complaint with us. The facts in
this case clearly do not involve a violation of 26 M.R.S.A. [Sec.] 964(1)
(D).
ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and discussion,
and by virtue of and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor
Relations Board by the provisions of 26 M.R.S.A. [Sec.] 968(5)(C) (1974),
it is ORDERED:
That the prohibited practices complaint, filed on
August 14, 1985, in Case No. 86-01, be and hereby
is dismissed.
Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 24th day of January, 1986.
MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The parties are advised of /s/____________________________
their right pursuant to 26 William M. Houston
M.R.S.A. [Sec.] 968(5)(F) (Supp. Alternate Chairman
1985) to seek review of this
decision and order by the
Superior Court by filing a
complaint in accordance with /s/____________________________
Rule 80B of the Rules of Thacher E. Turner
Civil Procedure within 15 Employer Representative
days of the date of the
decision.
/s/____________________________
Russell A. Webb
Alternate Employee Rep.
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