STATE OF MAINE                                   MAINE LABOR. RELATIONS BOARD
                                                               Case No. 79-43
                      Complainant, )
  v.                               )
STATE OF MAINE                     )
                                   )            DECISION AND ORDER
  and                              )
                      Respondents. )
     The Maine State Employees Association (hereafter "MSEA") filed this pro-
hibited practice complaint on December 15, 1978.  The State of Maine and the
Bureau of Mental Retardation of the Department of Mental Health and Corrections
(hereafter "State" or "Bureau") filed a response on January 16, 1979, which was
timely according to an agreed extension of time.
     A pre-hearing conference was held on February 15, 1979, by Alternate Chair-
man Donald W. Webber, who issued a pre-hearing conference memorandum and order
dated February 20, 1979, the contents of which are incorporated herein by ref-
erence.  A hearing before the Maine Labor Relations Board (hereafter "MLRB") was
held on September 10, 1979, Chairman Edward H. Keith presiding, with Employee
Representative Wallace J. Legge, and Employer Representative Don R. Ziegenbein.
MSEA was represented by Shawn C. Keenan, Esq.; the State and Bureau by John J.
Sears, Esq.  After the hearing the parties each submitted a brief and a reply
     The facts of Count II of this prohibited practice complaint have also been
the subject of a grievance filed by Bureau teacher and teacher aide employees
with the State Employees Appeals Board (hereafter "SEAB").  Briefly, the teacher
employees filed a "class action" grievance with the SEAB that a change of a work
requirement constituted an impermissible violation of past practice.  The Bureau
defended, among other reasons, on the ground that the SEAB had no jurisdiction
over the grievance because it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MLRB
pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A.  979-D(1)(E)(1).
     The SEAB is "an impartial board of arbitration," 5 M.R.S.A.  751, acting
as a quasi-judicial body, Department of Mental Health and Corrections v.  Bowman.
308 A.2d 586 (Me. 1973), which "shall have the authority to mediate the final
settlement of all grievances and disputes between individual State employees,


both classified and unclassified, and their respective state agencies, except
in matters of classification and compensation."  5 M.R.S.A.  752.  In addition:
"The decision of the [SEAB] shall be final and binding upon the state agency
and state employees involved in the dispute, and shall supersede any prior action
taken by the state agency with reference to the employment and working conditions
of such employees."  Id.
     The grievance involved a new requirement that the employees spend all forty
of their working hours on the grounds at Pineland Center rather than, as before,
only thirty-five of the forty.  The SEAB concluded that it had jurisdiction and
decided that the new requirement was "arbitrary and capricious" regarding the
teachers, but "not unreasonable" regarding the teacher aides.  The Bureau has
appealed to the Superior Court on jurisdictional grounds.
     MSEA's complaint before the MLRB grows out of the same set of facts but is
based upon the claim that the new requirement to perform all work on the grounds
violates 26 M.R.S.A.  979-C(1)(E) because it is a change in working conditions
undertaken without collective bargaining.
     The jurisdiction of the MLRB to decide this case, thus, is clear.  See 26
M.R.S.A.  979-H.  We do not express an opinion whether the SEAB also has juris-
diction.  Rather, as a matter of practicality, we will decide the case since we
have heard it, since the Respondents are objecting to the jurisdiction of the
SEAB, and since both sides agree that the MLRB has jurisdiction.
     Jurisdiction to decide the remainder of the case also lies in 26 M.R.S.A.

                                  FINDINGS OF FACT
     1.  Complainant MSEA was at all relevant times the certified
         bargaining agent for (1) custodial workers at the Pineland
         Center (hereafter "Pineland") who are all members of the
         Operations, Maintenance and Support Services bargaining unit
         (hereafter "OMSS unit"), and (2) teachers and teacher aides
         at Pineland who are all members of the Professional and
         Technical Services bargaining unit (hereafters "PTS unit").
         26 M.R.S.A.  979-A(1).  Respondents State and Bureau operate
         Pineland and are public employers.  26 M.R.S.A.  979-A(5).
     2.  MSEA presented its initial collective bargaining proposals
         to the State on October 21, 1977, covering the PTS unit.
         These proposals were made applicable to the OMSS unit in
         March 1978.  One of the proposals concerned hours and work
         schedules and proposed that work schedules not be changed
         without negotiations and agreement with MSEA.
     3.  On November 7, 1977, Personnel Department officer Frank J.
         Mack, Jr., decided a grievance involving the teaching staff
         at Pineland over a change in work requirements because off-
         grounds preparation time was no longer being considered hours
         worked.  Mack decided "that such activities as 'preparation
         time' shall be considered as hours worked.  The extent to which
         this time  is considered for other activities allowed as hours
         worked will  be at the discretion of Principle Becky Williams."
         The teaching staff immediately returned to the schedule of being


         permitted five hours per week off the grounds as
         preparation time.  Although the letter is somewhat
         ambiguous, the "discretion" for "other activities"
         mentioned referred to permission to allow additional
         off-grounds activities as hours worked.  The testimony
         of teacher Carl Scott and the conduct of the parties
         supports this conclusion.
     4.  This state of affairs continued until Personnel Officer
         Dennis R. Corson issued a memorandum dated May 23, 1978,
         to individual teachers & teachers aides stating:

           "Effective June 19, 1978, the Berman School
            schedule has been changed . . . . The total 40
            hours per week of work (35 classroom and 5
            preparation) will be performed on the grounds
            of Pineland Center . . . . The only change to
            the past schedule is that you will be required
            to be on grounds 40 hours per week."
         The memorandum was not sent to MSEA, and the change
         was not mentioned to any MSEA official.  Corson was
         aware that negotiations were being conducted but
         claimed that he was not informed that work schedules
         were an issue.
     5.  The teachers and teacher aides filed an SEAB grievance
         concerning this change on June 14, 1978.  This is the
         grievance referred to on the "JURISDICTION" section and
         that discussion is incorporated in this finding of fact.

     6.  On July 14, 1978, the United States District Court for
         the District of Maine Issued a consent decree which
         established in "Appendix 'A' Pineland Center Standards
         certain responsibilities of the living unit personnel
         (which includes the teachers and teacher aides) to provide
         proper care and respect rights of residents.  Minimum staff
         to resident ratios were also established in some fashion.

     7.  MSEA represented the teachers and teacher aids throughout the
         SEAB process but did not formally demand that the specific
         change being grieved be negotiated with MSEA.
     8.  The grievance was denied by the State at Step IV of the
         process on August 25, 1978, and the grievance was appealed
         to the SEAB.  On December 15, 1978, MSEA filed the instant
         prohibited practice complaint.  The SEAB finally decided the
         grievance on July 10, 1979.
     9.  The consent decree also contained a provision pertaining to
         custodial workers, who perform housekeeping chores.
           "2.  Direct care staff shall not perform routine
            housekeeping chores during residents' waking hours.
            Routine housekeeping shall include such chores as
            laundering services; the cleaning of an entire floor,
            wall or window area; the making of beds; the cleaning
            of bathrooms; the cleaning of furniture and the sort-
            ing of linen.  Separate housekeeping staff shall be
            provided from 6:00 a.m. to 1.00 a.m."
    10.  On September 11, 1978, a J. O'Toole sent a memorandum to eight
         custodial workers stating:
           "Please be informed that effective Sept. 26, 1978, you
            will begin working 8 days on, 4 days off, 7 days on,
            2 days off.  To work into this new schedule, you will
            be off Saturday, Sept. 30, Sunday, October 1, and
            Monday, October 2.
            Thank you for your anticipated cooperation."
         These eight custodial workers had been working regular,
         nonrotatinq schedules  before this.
    11.  Due to a relatively high rate of employee turnover in
         these positions only two of the affected employees were
         still in the employ of the Bureau at the time of the
    12.  For some time previous to the September 11, 1978, memo
         the Bureau had been hiring new custodial workers into
         the rotating shift when they were hired as the result of
         employee attrition.  This had resulted in thirty-six out
         of the total of fourty-four custodial workers having been
         assigned to the rotating shift by September 1978.  No
         existing employee's schedule had until this time been
    13.  A custodial worker supervisor had mentioned that changes
         in work schedules of these eight employees might be required
         in the future to an employee who had in the past been active
         in employee grievances but who was not an MSEA steward or
         representative.  Notice of the possibility of a change or
         of the actual change was never given formally to MSEA al-
         though MSEA concedes that it heard about the change at some
         point.  MSEA did not formally demand that the specific
         change which had been made must be negotiated.  MSEA filed
         this prohibited practice complaint on December 15, 1978.
    14.  The State and MSEA executed collective bargaining agreements
         covering the two bargaining units in March 1979.
     Complainant charges that respondents have unilaterally changed the work
schedules of both the custodial workers and the teachers and teachers aides at
Pineland each in violation of 26 M.R.S.A.  979-C(1)(E).  Indeed, it is well
settled that a public employer may not unilaterally change a mandatory subject
of bargaining absent one of four "very limited" exceptions.  M.S.E.A. v. State
of Maine and Bureau of Alcoholic Beverages, MLRB No. 78-23 (July 1, 1978), aff'd
sub. nom State of Maine v. M.L.R.B., CV-78-484, Kennebec Super. Ct. (Aug. 7, 1979)
appeal docketed, Maine Sup. Jud. Ct., L.D. No. Ken-79-30 (October 19, 1979)
(hereafter "Alcoholic Beverages").  It is unchallenged that the changes here in-
volved mandatory subjects of bargaining as "work schedules" or "general working
conditions."  26 M.R.S.A.  979-D(1)(E)(1)(b) and (d).
     Respondents also concede that the changes were made but posit a number of
defenses which would negate the charges, including exceptions to the unilateral
change principle.

COUNT I:  custodial workers.
     The State argues that the change:  (1) was a decision affecting delivery of
public services, programs, coverage and direction of the work force and as such
is a decision excluded from collective bargaining as a matter of management pre-
rogative; (2) was a business necessity or government exigency exception to the
general rule; (3) was required by the federal court consent decree which super-
sedes any conflicting state law or regulation; (4) cannot now be raised by MSEA
since it has waived its right to object because it did not demand negotiations
when it became aware of the change; and (5) was done when the negotiations
were at impasse.
               1.  Managerial prerogative or governmental policy.
     Initially the State's argument invokes the spectre of an ad hoc board of
arbitrators determining what the State's program of treatment of institutional
residents will be - the result, it hypothesizes, if it were required to negotiate
this change with the bargaining agent of its employees.  Then, building on the
false premise that the change at issue is a decision to change its program of
treatment of residents - rather than the simple change of work schedules of
employees that it actually is - the State constructs a legal argument for a
governmental policy exception to the duty to bargain this change.  This legal
argument is based, however, on misleading analogies and relies on decisions of the
MLRB under a parallel but wholly different provision of the Municipal Public
Employees Labor Relations Act, 26 M.R.S.A.  961 et seq.  The argument also does
not acknowledge or address the rationale behind the decisions by both the MLRB
and the Superior Court which recently totally rejected this exact argument.
     To begin with, a "public policy" decision to change a State service is
simply not at issue here.  The State has already made this decision and it is
not questioned by MSEA.  Rather, the further change in the work schedule of these
eight custodial workers without bargaining is the issue.  Thus the necessary pre-
mise to the governmental policy exception is absent.
     In any event, the argument itself does not hold water.  The State argues
that there should be a governmental policy exception to the duty to "confer
and negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, working conditions
and contract grievance arbitration."  26 M.R.S.A.  979-D(1)(E)(1).  The State
points to the decision in City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Association,
304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973), which held that a number of bargaining subjects such
as the length of the school day were not mandatory subjects of bargaining
because, the State would have us believe, the subjects were matters which trans-
cend teacher interests and embrace important public interests.[fn]1  What the State
glosses over in its claim that identical phrases of the two acts are involved
is that the Municipal Act has a unique statutory exception to the subjects of
bargaining:  "educational policies.' 26 M.R.S.A.  965(1)(C).[fn]2  It is abundantly
1. Three of six Justices concurred in this reasoning in City of Biddeford v.
Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973) (Wernick, J., concurrinq).
Three other Justices reached the same result without reaching this line of reason-
2.   The Municipal Act declares the mutual obligation:
"C.  To confer and negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, working
conditions and contract grievance arbitration except that by such obligation neither
party shall be compelled to agree to a proposal or be required to make a concession
and except that public employers of teachers shall meet and consult but not negotiate
with respect to educational policies for the purpose of this paragraph, educational
policies shall not include wages, hours, working conditions or contract grievance
arbitration."  26 M.R.S.A.  965(1)(C).


clear that the City of Biddeford decision in this area was based upon the appli-
cation of the statutory exclusion for educational policies to the subjects of
bargaining.  304 A.2d at 418-420.
     The State Act, in contradistinction, has no such "educational policy,"
governmental policy, management rights, or managerial prerogative phrase.[fn]3  Thus,
City of Biddeford undermines the State's argument by highlighting the failure of
the alleged analogy.
     Moreover, each of the six decisions of the M.L.R.B. that the State relies
on is also based on the statutory exception for educational policies unique to the
Municipal Act.
     Thus there is no basis for the M.L.R.B. to read a broad governmental policy
exception into the State Act.  In fact, the Superior Court specifically rejected
this same argument when the State advanced it in the Alcoholic Beverages case:
          "No such exception is included in State Employees Relations
           Act and there is no authority to suggest that such a limi-
           tation should be implied.  Although the Legislature enacted
           an "educational policy" exception in MPELRA, it is quite
           limited.  The exclusion applies only to teachers covered by
           the Act.  No broad exception for "managerial decisions," which
           would affect all municipal employees, is included in MPELRA.
           further, under MPELRA, public employers of teachers are still
           required to "meet and consult" with the teachers relative to
           educational policies.  Such restrictive language suggests to
           this Court that the limitation is to be applied only to public
           employers of teachers and the teachers' bargaining agents, and
           no implication of such a policy should be transplanted to the
           State Public Employees Labor Relations Act."

State of Maine v. M.L.R.B., Kennebec Super. Ct., CV 78-484 (Aug. 7, 1979), appeal
docketed, Maine Sup. Jud. Ct., L.D. No. Ken-79-30 (Oct. 19, 1979).
     This decision is amply supported by the legislative history of the State Act
which shows that the Legislature rejected an amendment which would have limited
the scope of bargaining by including a broad management rights provision in the
statute.  See [1974] Me. Leg. Rec. 1835.
     Decisions in other states are not particularly helpful since each state has
a unique statute in this area and is distinguishable for that reason.
                               2.  Business exigency.
     One of the four exceptions to the rule against unilateral changes is "when
important business exigencies require immediate managerial decision."  Alcoholic
Beverages, supra, MLRB No. 78-23 at 4.  The M.L.R.B. explained:
          "Mere business 'reasons' for the unilateral change are not
           sufficient to immunize the change.  We envision an 'exigency'
3.  The State Act does provide an exception for matters prescribed or controlled
by public law.  "All matters relating to the relationship between the employer
and employees shall be the subject of collective bargaining, except those matters
which are prescribed or controlled by public law."  26 M.R.S.A.  979-D(1)(E)(1).
This exception is not claimed in this case.                

           as a sudden, out-of-the-ordinary event threatening serious
           harm and requiring immediate managerial action.  Only in
           such unusual circumstances can an exception to the rule
           against unilateral changes be justified, for, as previously
           indicated, the cost of a unilateral change to the collective
           bargaining process may be substantial.  Requiring any less
           of a justification for unilateral changes could, we believe,
           result in subverting the State's public policy concerning
           collective bargaining for State employees, as declared in
           26 M.R.S.A.  979."
     The State's argument that the need to change the work schedule of the custodial
workers was a matter of business necessity is frivolous.  The consent decree that
it claims to be responding to was dated July 14, 1978.  Yet it was not until nearly
two months later that the change was made, and then based on fifteen days notice.
There was neither a sudden event nor one which threatened serious harm.  Indeed,
there was not even an event.  Moreover, there was ample opportunity to discuss
these changes for many months before they were made.  There also were available al-
                      3.  The federal court consent decree.

     The State argues that its hands were tied; its options foreclosed. It was
"under the gun" of the federal court consent decree.  However, it is plain that
this is a false dilemma:  the consent decree does not require that the State
change the work schedules of these eight custodial workers and there are many
     If the court order mandated the change in work schedule, it is doubtful that
MSEA would even object.  But the order leaves the choice of how to provide custo-
dial services at the dinner meal wide open.  There is thus no issue of supremacy
     There are also many alternatives to the course of action the Bureau decided to
undertake.  For example, it could have utilized overtime opportunities or additional
employees.  Perhaps MSEA representatives familiar with the needs of the employees
involved would have had numerous alternative accommodations to suggest.  The Bureau
apparently never considered the latter option.
     We obviously reject the notion that the Bureau was incapable of pursuing the
possibilities of overtime or additional employees.  First, the argument was not
lucidly presented.  In any event, at the bottom line, collective bargaining would
be a sham if the State could refuse to negotiate a change in working conditions of
its employees on the claim that it has no money.
     For all we know now, MSEA may very well have agreed to the change had it been
consulted in advance.  But now, even though only one employee remains who is still
affected, and even if none remained, MSEA is entitled to its right to be accorded
its proper role as the law requires, and to be protected from future disregard by
the Bureau.
                              4.  Waiver.
     A similar claim of waiver was made by the State in the Alcoholic Beverages
case.  The MLRB held:
          "We do not believe, however, that MSEA, after submitting a proposal
           to negotiate over holiday work at the commencement of negotiations,,
           was required to reiterate its desire to negotiate holiday work each
           and every time it learned of a possible change in the holiday work
           schedule.  To rule to the contrary would be to risk transforming
           collective bargaining sessions into a nightmarish exercises in which
           bargaining proposals are monotonously repeated ad infinitum.  Such
           a ruling would be a grave disservice both to the parties who parti-
           cipate in collective bargaining and to the collective bargaining
           process itself.  Consequently, we believe that once MSEA submitted
           its proposal to negotiate over holiday work, Respondents were
           placed on adequate notice that holiday work was an area in which no
           unilateral changes should occur without prior negotiation and settle-
Alcoholic Beverages, supra, MLRB No. 78-23 at 4-5 (emphasis added).  That principle
holds equally well in this case.  It comports with the general rule that a waiver of                                               4
collective bargaining rights must be clear and unmistakable.[fn]4   See Tide Water Asso-
ciated Oil Co., 85 NLRB 1096, 1098 (1949).
                                   5.  Impasse.
     The State argues that since the parties were at an impasse in negotiations
in September 1978 when it issued the change in work schedule memo, the obligation
to negotiate was suspended.  This is  however, not quite correct in two respects:
the parties were not at impasse over this change in work schedule, and even if the
parties were, the State has not established that its action was consistent with its
impasse position.  See Easton Teachers Association v. Easton School Committee, MLRB
No. 79-14 (March 13, 1979).
     Simply stated, an impasse is "a state of facts in which the parties, despite
the best of faith, are simply deadlocked."  NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472,
482 (5th Cir. 1963).  Among the relevant factors to be considered in determining
whether an impasse existed are "[t]he bargaining history, the good faith of the
parties in negotiations, the length of the negotiations, the importance of the
issue or issues as to which there is disagreement, [and] the contemporaneous under-
standing of the parties as to the state of the negotiations .  . . ." Taft Broad-
casting Co., 163 NLRB 475, 478 (1967), enf'd sub nom., A.F.T.R.A. v. N.L.R.B., 395
F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
4.  We note that the memoranda implementing these changes reflect essentially a
fait accompli.  This mitigates against a claim of waiver.
     We conclude that there was no impasse in negotiations over this change.
It was never discussed at the bargaining table or anywhere else, indeed Bureau
officials did not really know what the status of the negotiations were.  More-
over, a general impasse does not totally suspend the obligation to negotiate.
Any request to negotiate a new proposal, or any change in circumstances calls
for further investigation of possibilities.  In these circumstances there was
a duty on the part of the Bureau to offer to negotiate the schedule change with
     In addition, this change was not even a matter for specific coverage in a
collective bargaining agreement, rather it was a one-time event which could
easily have been dealt with aside from the formal bargaining process underway
concerning the comprehensive collective bargaining agreements.
    In any event, the burden to establish an exception to the rule for action
consistent with an impasse position is on the State.  It simply has not established
such.  See Easton Teachers Association, supra.
COUNT II:  Teachers and teacher aides.
     Regarding this count the State argues that this change:  (1) is also a question
of managerial prerogative; (2) was a business necessity; (3) was required by the
consent decree; (4) was waived by MSEA; and (5) transpired greater than six months
prior to the complaint and thus is barred by the statute of limitations.  The
first four of these arguments have been discussed under Count I, and are therefore
only briefly considered below.
                           1.  Managerial prerogative.
     The State again misconceives the change at issue in this count.  The decision
of the State to increase the teaching staff-to-resident ratio is not questioned by
MSEA.  Rather, it is the change in work schedule which requires these employees
to spend 5 extra hours on the premises - hours which these employees have by long-
standing practice have in the past spent at home or other places preparing for their
regular duties.  This change is a subsidiary decision which merely implements but
does not alter the decision to increase the staff-resident ratio.  Thus, there
simply is no fundamental public policy decision implicated in the actual change
disputed in this case.
             The remainder of the discussion rejecting the managerial prerogative theory
          itself in the discussion of Count I is equally applicable here.[fn]5
5.  The State belatedly and unconvincingly argued that the Corson memo of May 23,
1978, was merely an exercise of the discretion vested in Principal Williams by
the letter of November 7, 1977, from Mr. Mack.  See Finding #3.  We do not read
this ambiguous letter as creating such discretion.  Rather, in light of the sur-
rounding circumstances and testimony we conclude that the discretion applied only
to time other than the five hours of preparation time.


                           2.  Business exigency.
     There was simply no sudden, extraordinary event which threatened serious
harm or which required immediate action.  The memo simply anticipated a require-
ment incorporated into the consent decree which was signed two months later.
Again, there was ample opportunity to discuss this change with MSEA before it
was made.

                            3. The consent decree.
     The consent decree was issued nearly two months after this change was insti-
tuted, thus it cannot be said to have required the change.  In any event, the
decree did not require that this schedule change be made.  There are many other
alternatives:  overtime, extra employees, and perhaps other possibilities which
could have been created in appropriate negotiations.
     The consent decree required that the staff-resident ratio be increased.  It
did not direct how it must be done.  The Respondents' hands are not tied.
                            4.  Waiver.
     The discussion of Count I is also directly applicable here because the same
facts are involved.  Moreover, there is an additional reason why there is no
waiver of Count II.  Here the employees, with MSEA's assistance, filed a grievance
immediately, even before the effective date of the change.  In effect MSEA was
very specifically objecting to the change.  The Respondents had an adequate oppor-
tunity to avert the entire SEAB process if at any time it had agreed to or proposed
to negotiate the change.  It did not do so; MSEA did not waive its right to file
this complaint.
                            5.  The statute of limitations.
     The State Act provides that:  "no hearing shall be held based upon any alleged
prohibited practice occurring more than 6 months prior to the filing of the com-
plaint with the [MLRB] executive director."  26 M.R.S.A.  979-H(2).   If the imple-
mentation of the change on June  9, 1978, is a prohibited practice, then the com-
plaint is timely.  If it is not, and rather only the memorandum notice dated May
23, 1978, of the impending change is a prohibited practice then the complaint is
not timely.
     The answer is clear:  the complaint is timely.  The threatened change is not
necessarily a violation of 26 M.R.S.A.  979-C(1)(E) until it takes place.  We
conclude that the basis of the charge here is the actual charge.  The statute for
this violation did not begin to run until June 19, 1978, and thus the complaint is
timely.  See NLRB v. Anchor Rome Mills, 228 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1956).
     We have concluded that Respondents have violated 26 M.R.S.A. . 979-C(1)(E)

in both counts.  We will thus issue a cease and desist order against making
future unilateral changes in matters subject to collective bargaining.  Further-
more, the Respondents will be directed to bargain collectively with MSEA on
demand with respect to the work schedule of any custodial workers who remain
affected by the change of September 26, 1978, or with respect to the hours on
the grounds of the teachers and teachers aides.  It is not our intention to
override or undercut any ruling of the SEAB which may prove more beneficial to
the affected employees.  Rather we intend that the State must at a minimum nego-
tiate on demand with MSEA regarding the change in on-grounds requirement.
     Respondents State of Maine and Bureau of Mental Retardation of the Department
of Mental Health and Corrections, its agents and representatives:

     (1)  Shall cease and desist from making changes in wages, hours,
          working conditions and contract grievance arbitration without
          collective bargaining; and
     (2)  Shall meet with the Maine State employees Association if re-
          quested to collectively bargain the work schedule of any cus-
          todial worker whose work schedule was changed by the memo of
          September 26, 1978, and, if requested,to collectively bargain the
          number of hours per week that teachers and teachers aides are
          required to be on the grounds of the Pineland facility.
Dated this  6th   day of December, 1979

                                       MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
                                       Edward H. Keith
                                       Wallace J. Legge
                                       Employee Representative
                                       Don R. Ziegenbein
                                       Employer Representative