Teamsters Local Union No. 48 v. Washington County Commissioners, MLRB 
No. 89-07 (Apr. 4, 1989), rev'd, No. CV-89-163 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., 
Oct. 13, 1989), Decision and Order on Remand, MLRB No. 89-07 (Dec. 12, 1989) 

STATE OF MAINE                           MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
					 Case No. 89-07
					 Issued: April 4, 1989

____________________________________
				    )
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 48,       )
State, County, Municipal and        )
University Employees in the         )
State of Maine,                     )
				    )
		    Complainant,    )       DECISION AND ORDER
				    )
       v.                           )
				    )
WASHINGTON COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,    )
				    )
	Respondents.                )
____________________________________)

     The question presented in this prohibited practice case is
whether the Washington County Commissioners (hereinafter referred to
as "Employer") violated 26 M.R.S.A.  964(1)(E) by unilaterally
changing the day on which bargaining unit employees are paid. We hold
that the Employer's action violated the Municipal Public Employees
Labor Relations Law ("Act"), 26 M.R.S.A. Ch. 9-A (1988). We will,
therefore, fashion a remedy appropriate to redress this violation and
to effectuate the policies of the Act.

     The prohibited practice complaint was filed on September 22, 1988,
pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A.  968(5)(B) by Teamsters Local Union No. 48
("Union"). The Union's complaint charges that the Employer violated
the section of the Act mentioned in the preceding paragraph by unilat-
erally changing the day on which bargaining unit employees are paid,
from Friday of the week in which the wages are earned to Friday of the
following week. The Employer filed its answer on October 14, 1988,
denying that its action transgressed any provision of the Act, alleging
that its action was permitted by the parties' collective bargaining
agreement, suggesting that the dispute is the subject of the bargaining
agreement grievance and arbitration process and that the Maine Labor
Relations Board ("Board") should defer handling of the matter until the
conclusion of the grievance and arbitration process, averring that the
employer's action was, at most, a de minimis violation of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement that did not rise to the level of
violating  964(l)(E) of the Act, alleging that the complaint was moot,

				-1-

and moving to dismiss the Union's complaint.

     In lieu of the usual prehearing conference, counsel for the par-
ties reached a stipulation of relevant facts, decided to submit the
dispute to the Board for decision on the basis of said stipulation and
documentary exhibits, and agreed to present their arguments through
memoranda of law. The parties filed written briefs, the last of which
was received on January 4, 1989, which were considered by the Board in
reaching its decision. The Board, Alternate Chairman Jessie B. Gunther
presiding with Alternate Employer Representative Jim A. McGregor and
Employee Representative George W. Lambertson, met to deliberate on the
case on February 23, 1989.

			   JURISDICTION

     The Complainant Teamsters Local Union No. 48, State, County,
Municipal and University Employees in the State of Maine is the duly
certified bargaining agent, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A.
 962(2), for the Washington County Sheriff's Department and Telecommu-
nications Unit and the Washington County Janitors Unit. The Respondents
Washington County Commissioners are, together, the public employer,
within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A.  962(7), of the employees whose
positions are included in the bargaining units mentioned in the pre-
ceding sentence. The jurisdiction of the Board to hear this case and
to render a decision and order herein lies in 26 M.R.S.A.  968(5).

			FINDINGS OF FACT

     Upon review of the entire record, the Labor Relations Board
finds:

 1.  Complainant, Teamsters Local Union No. 48, State, County,
     Municipal and University Employees in the State of Maine, is
     the duly certified bargaining agent, within the definition
     of 26 M.R.S.A.  962(2), for the Washington County Sheriff's
     Department and Telecommunications Unit and the Washington
     County Janitors Unit.

 2.  Respondents, the Washington County Commissioners, are the
     public employer, within the definition of 26 M.R.S.A. 
     962(7), of the employees whose positions are included in the
     bargaining units mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

				-2-

 3.  A collective bargaining agreement between Complainant and
     Respondents is in effect governing the terms and conditions
     of employment of the Washington County Sheriff's Department
     Patrol, Corrections, Dispatchers and Janitorial Unit. The
     relevant agreement is in effect from January 1, 1986 until
     December 31, 1988.

 4.  During the spring of 1988, an audit of Washington County
     finances was conducted by the State of Maine Department of
     Audit. During the course of that audit, the auditors dis-
     covered that Washington County was paying its employees on
     each Friday for a work week that ended on the following
     Saturday. Because employees were in many instances being
     paid in advance of work performed and before time cards were
     turned in showing actual hours worked, including overtime,
     and any sick leave, jury duty leave, vacation, etc. used,
     adjustments to the payroll continually had to be made in
     subsequent weeks to reflect the difference between what had
     been paid or credited to each employee and what had actually
     been earned or used.

 5.  The Department of Audit determined that paying employees in
     advance did not conform to generally accepted accounting
     principles. During a meeting with the Commissioners to
     review the results of the audit, the Department advised the
     County that proper accounting principles mandated that
     employees be paid after the work period ended.

 6.  The Department of Audit explained the meaning of the recom-
     mendation mentioned in the preceding paragraph through a
     letter to the Washington County Commissioners dated October 20,
     1988, that stated:

	  This recommendation addresses the problem that the
	  county employees are being paid on Friday for the
	  work period that ends on Saturday. In order to
	  improve controls over the payroll function we
	  believe, that proper accounting mandates, the
	  employees should be paid after the work period
	  ends. The recommendation simply requested the
	  commissioners to review this matter.

     Upon review of the above, the Board finds that the
     Department of Audit's recommendation suggested, but did not
     require, that the Employer implement the change discussed
     therein.

 7.  As a result of the audit recommendations of the State of
     Maine Department of Audit, the Commissioners decided, on
     May 25, 1988, that beginning with the first pay period in
     September, 1988, paychecks would be issued with a one week
     delay rather than on the Friday of the work week completed.

 8.  Prior to February 28, 1986, County employees had been paid
     on Mondays following the week in which work was performed.

				-3-

     Effective February 28, 1986, the County decided to change
     payday to Fridays of the week in which the work was per-
     formed. Although the County was unable to find a record
     reflecting when notice was given to county employees, notice
     of the payroll change was given in advance. This change was
     made without prior bargaining with the Union, and the Union
     filed no charge or grievance with respect to the change.

 9.  Article XXXVI of the parties' collective bargaining
     agreement, mentioned in paragraph 3 hereof, entitled "Scope
     of Agreement," states that: "This Agreement represeents
     [sic] the entire agreement between the parties, who agree
     that all matters that were or might have been the subject of
     negotiations have been fully disclosed and resolved as
     expressed herein, and they mutually waive all bargaining
     rights during the term of the Agreement."

10.  Article V of the parties' collective bargaining agreement,
     noted in paragraph 3 above, entitled "Management Rights"
     states:

	       Management of the operations, and the direc-
	  tion of the work force, including but not limited
	  to the establishment and changes of reasonable
	  rules and regulations, including without limita-
	  tion, operational, safety, health and sanitation
	  rules, the right to hire, promote, transfer and
	  assign work, discharge or discipline for just
	  cause, the right to schedule hours and to require
	  such overtime work as is necessary for County
	  operations, the right to relieve employees from
	  duty because of lack of work, the right to
	  increase or decrease the work force and the right
	  to decide the number and location of its opera-
	  tions, quality and quantity of work to be per-
	  formed, the personnel required in supervisory,
	  clerical, and other positions not included in the
	  bargaining unit, the source of an applicant for
	  employment, shall be solely and exclusively vested
	  in the County subject only to limitations as are
	  expressly provided for in this Agreement.

	       The County shall have all such rights as are
	  not specifically granted herein to the Union. The
	  County, by not exercising rights reserved to it
	  under this Management Rights clause or by exer-
	  cising them in a particular way, shall not be
	  deemed to have waived such rights or to have
	  waived the right to exercise them in some other
	  way.

11.  On May 26, 1988, a memorandum was sent to all Washington
     County employees, advising them that the Commissioners had
     accepted the recommendation of the Maine State Audit
      
				-4-

     Department and consequently, beginning in September,
     employees would be paid on the Friday following the week
     during which work was performed. No written notice of the
     payroll change was sent to Complainant.

12.  A "Grievance Report" signed by shop steward Lance Robinson
     on June 3, 1988 protesting the announced payroll change was
     submitted to the Commissioners on June 7, 1988.

13.  On June 3, 1988, employees were notified that, in accordance
     with another recommendation of the Maine State Department of
     Audit, the Commissioners had adopted a new payroll policy
     under which employees would receive paychecks only if they
     had submitted a time sheet by the established deadline.
     This policy came into effect on July 1, 1988.

14.  In a letter dated June 16, 1988, Donald M. Grant, Chairman
     of the Washington County Board of Commissioners, informed
     Mr. Robinson that the June 3, 1988 grievance had been denied
     on procedural and substantive grounds.

15.  A letter dated June 30, 1988, from Union Business Agent
     Paul F. Miragliuolo to Donald M. Grant, Chairman of the
     Washington County Commissioners, stated:

	  Re:  Class Action Grievance--Paycheck Withholding

	  Dear Mr. Grant:

	  Please be advised that the Union is appealing the
	  above-named grievance to the next step in the
	  grievance procedure, namely arbitration.

	  Should you have any questions, please don't hesi-
	  tate to contact my office.
	   
16.  On July 29, 1988, all employees were sent a reminder
     memorandum regarding the payroll restructuring scheduled for
     September. No written notice of the payroll change was sent
     to Complainant.

17.  On August 26, 1988, Paul Miragliuolo, Business Agent for
     Complainant, telephoned Charles S. Einsiedler, Jr., attorney
     for Respondent, to discuss the payroll change scheduled to
     take effect the following week. Mr. Miragliuolo emphasized
     that the Union primarily was concerned that employees would
     go one week without a paycheck. When Mr. Einsiedler attempted
     to explain the Respondent's position, Mr. Miragliuolo became
     upset and hung up. Mr. Einsiedler wrote to Mr. Miragliuolo
     later that day restating the County's position with respect
     to the change in the date of payment and advising
     Mr. Miragliuolo that the County remained "willing to discuss
     both your interpretation of the contract or any proposals
     you might have to solve a potential problem so that we may
     avoid an unnecessary confrontation and litigation."

				 -5-

18.  On August 29, 1988, Mr. Miragliuolo responded in writing to
     Mr. Einsiedler and proposed that the issue be taken care of
     during negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement.

19.  Following receipt of that letter, Mr. Einsiedler was con-
     tacted by Jeffrey Neil Young, attorney for the Union.
     Mr. Einsiedler and Mr. Young had several discussions over a
     period of two days in an effort to resolve the situation.
     An agreement in principle was reached whereby the payroll
     change would be deferred until April 1989 during the week
     that retroactive wage increases (if any) arising out of the
     upcoming negotiations were paid. The agreement in principle
     was reached late Wednesday afternoon on August 31, 1988 but
     was not consummated because the County could not physically
     process the payroll to be ready on Friday, September 2,
     1988, absent assignment of significant overtime, which the
     County was unwilling to do. The County offered to provide
     two paychecks the following Friday, September 9, 1988, but
     this offer was rejected.

20.  Beginning with the first pay period in September, 1988, the
     new payroll practice was implemented.  Employees received no
     paycheck on Friday, September 2, 1988, but received a
     paycheck on September 9, 1988 for work performed during the
     week of August 28 through September 3, 1988.  Employees have
     been paid weekly every Friday thereafter for work performed
     through the preceding Saturday.

21.  On September 19, 1988, Respondents were served with the
     instant prohibited practice complaint.

			      DISCUSSION

     The first issue to be considered is whether the Board should
defer resolution of the instant dispute to the grievance arbitration
process provided by the parties' collective bargaining agreement.
While grievance arbitration is the "desirable" method for resolving
disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements, State of
Maine v. Maine State Employees Association, 499 A.2d 1228, 1231-32
(Me. 1985), the Legislature has explicitly provided that the Board's
prohibited practice jurisdiction "shall not be affected by any other
means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established
by agreement, law, or otherwise." 26 M.R.S.A.  968(5)(A). Deferral
to the grievance arbitration process is a matter reserved to the Board's
discretion and exercise of deferral will turn on the circumstances of
each particular case. Maine State Employees Assocation v. State of
Maine, MLRB No. 86-09, 9 NPER ME-17010, slip op. at 6 (Apr. 23, 1986).

				-6-

     The event charged in the complaint occurred on September 2, 1988.
Despite the fact that the Union purported to invoke the final step of
the bargaining agreement's grievance procedure by letter dated June 30,
1988, the parties' stipulation filed on December 1, 1988 makes no
reference whatsoever to the progress of the dispute through the
grievance arbitration procedure. Over six months have elapsed since
the charged conduct occurred, the parties have gone to significant
expense to fully argue the merits of the case before this Board, the
matter is ripe for decision, and we see nothing to be gained by
deferring to the arbitral process at this juncture.

     The duty to bargain collectively continues throughout the period
when a unit of public employees is represented by a certified
bargaining agent, unless the public employer and the bargaining agent
have reached accord to the contrary in a prior written agreement.
26 M.R.S.A.  965(1)(B). An inherent element of the statutory duty to
bargain is a prohibition against public employers making a unilateral
change in a mandatory subject of bargaining. The Board has discussed
the unilateral change rule as follows:

     Changes in the mandatory subjects of bargaining implemented
     unilaterally by the public employer contravene the duty to
     bargain created by  965(1) of the Act and violate 26
     M.R.S.A.  964(1)(E). The rationale behind this principle of
     labor law is that an employer's unilateral change in a man-
     datory subject of bargaining "is a circumvention of the duty
     to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of [the Act]
     much as does a flat refusal." NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736,
     743, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 1111, 8 L.Ed.2d 230 (1962); Lane v.
     Board of Directors of M.S.A.D. No. 8, 447 A.2d 806, 809-810
     (Me. 1982).

	  In order to constitute a violation of  964(1)(E),
     three elements must be present. The public employer's
     action must: (1) be unilateral, (2) be a change from a
     well-established practice, and (3) involve one or more of
     the mandatory subjects of bargaining. Bangor Fire Fiqhters
     Association v. City of Bangor, MLRB No. 84-15, at 8 (Apr. 4,
     1984). An employer's action is unilateral if it is taken
     without prior notice to the bargaining agent of the employees
     involved in order to afford said representative a reasonable
     opportunity to demand negotiations on the contemplated change.
     City_of Bangor v. A.F.S.C.M.E., Council 74, 449 A.2d 1129,
     1135 (Me. 1982).

Kittery Employees Association v. Strahl, MLRB No. 86-23, 9 NPER
ME-18010, slip op. at 9 (Jan. 27, 1987), citing Teamsters Local Union

				 -7-

No. 48 v. Eastport School Department, MLRB No. 85-18, 8 NPER ME-17003,
slip op. at 4 (Oct. 10, 1985).

     All of the elements necessary to constitute an unlawful unilateral
change are present in this case. The record establishes that, although
the Employer gave advanced notice to the unit employees of its inten-
tion to change the day on which employees are paid, the Employer never
gave such notice to the Union. We have held that the duty to bargain
collectively is a mutual obligation of the public employer and the
bargaining agent and the employer's giving notice to the unit
employees of its intention to implement a change in a mandatory sub-
ject is not tantamount to giving such notice to the bargaining agent
in the unilateral change context. Saco Valley Teachers Association
v. Maine School Administrative District No. 6 Board of Directors, MLRB
Nos. 85-07 & -09, 8 NPER ME-16013, slip op. at 11-12 (Mar. 14, 1985).

     Second, we have held that the topic of pay periods is a mandatory
subject of bargaining and that by unilaterally changing the pay period
of unit employees from weekly to bi-weekly, a public employer violated
the duty to bargaining collectively. Teamsters Local Union No. 48 v.
University of Maine, MLRB Nos. 78-16 & -20, 1 NPER 20-1OO21, slip op.
at 6-7 (June 29, 1979). We have also had a case whose operative facts
were substantially similar to those now before us. In Bath Firefighters
Association v. City of Bath, MLRB No. 80-44, 3 NPER 20-12002 (Oct. 17,
1980), the accounting firm retained by the employer recommended that,
in order to gain better accounting control over personnel expenditures,
the employer should change its payroll system to provide for a one-
week lag in the payment of wages. The employer had been preparing its
payroll and issuing paychecks to its employees prior to the end of the
payroll period. Id. at 2. The employer implemented the recommended
change without negotiating thereon with the bargaining agents of the
employees affected. The Board stated its holding as follows:

	  We find that the City was obligated by 26 M.R.S.A. 
     965(1)(C) to negotiate with the Unions before implementing
     the new payroll system. Section 965(1)(C) requires the City
     to negotiate with respect to "wages, hours and working
     conditions." The proposed system of paying the employees
     one week in arrears had an effect on the employees' wages in
     that the plan would cause the employees to lose the time
     value of a week's wages. Moreover, the manner in which the

			       -8-

     plan might be implemented also would have an effect on wages
     and accordingly is a matter about which the City is required
     to bargain. In short, under Section 965(1)(C) the City has
     the duty to bargain concerning 1) whether the new plan is to
     be implemented, and 2) if so, the way in which the plan will
     be implemented.

Id. at 2. The change at issue in this case, therefore, involved a
mandatory subject of bargaining.

     Third, the action in contention represented at change from a
well-established practice. The Board has held that, by consistently
paying the bargaining unit employees on a particular day of the week
for a period of over one year, that practice had become well-
established within the context of the unilateral change rule.
Teamsters Local Union No. 48 v. Town of Jay, MLRB No. 80-02, 2 NPER
20-11006, slip op. at 3 (Dec. 26, 1979). In the instant case, the
Employer had been paying the unit employees on Friday of the week in
which the wages were earned for over two and one-half years; there-
fore, such payment practice had become well-established.

     While all of the elements necessary to constitute an unlawful
unilateral change have been established, the Employer denies that its
action violated the duty to bargain collectively because its conduct
was allegedly within the parameters of one of the four limited excep-
tions to the unilateral change rule. These exceptions have been
outlined as follows:

     (1) when a bona fide impasse has been reached between the
     negotiating parties, see, eg., NLRB v. Intercoastal
     Terminal, Inc., 286 F.2d 954, 958 (5th Cir. 1961); (2) when
     important business exigencies require immediate managerial
     decision, see, e.g., Pasco County School Bd. v. Florida
     Public Employees Relations Comm., 96 LRRM 3347, 3358-3359
     (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (1977); (3) when the union has waived
     its right to bargain about the unilateral change, see, e.g.,
     U.S. Lingerie Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 750, 751-752 (1968); and
     (4) when the unilateral change results from a traditional
     practice which existed prior to the commencement of nego-
     tiations, see, e.g., McCulloch Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 201,
     213-214 (1961).

Auburn Firefighters Association v. Valente, MLRB No. 87-19, 10 NPER
ME-l8O17, slip op. at 9 (Sept. 11, 1987), citing Maine State Employees
Association v. State of Maine, MLRB No. 78-23, slip op. at 4 (July 15,
1978), aff'd sub nom. State of Maine v. Maine Labor Relations Board, 413

			       -9-

A.2d 510 (Me. 1980).

     Of the four exceptions listed above, only the waiver exception is
pertinent herein. First, a review of the totality of the circumstances
established that the parties never bargained over the change at issue
and, therefore, did not reach bona fide impasse thereon. Auburn
Firefiqhters Association, supra, at 10-11. Second, the fact that the
altered payroll resulted from a recommendation by the State Department
of Audit provided a valid business reason to implement the change.
Such legitimate business reason does not constitute the sort of
"sudden, out-of-the-ordinary event threatening serious harm and
requiring immediate managerial action" that is required to trigger the
business exigency exception to the unilateral change rule. Teamsters
Local Union No. 48 v. Town of Jay, MLRB No. 80-08, 2 NPER 20-11008,
slip op. at 3 (Jan. 9, 1980). The practice of paying the unit
employees on the Friday of the week during which the wages were earned
had been followed for over two and one-half years. There was no evi-
dence in the record even suggesting that such practice had actually
resulted in harm to the Employer. Third, no traditional practice
warranted changing the pay period for the unit employees.

     The crux of the Employer's defense is that the change at issue is
one that the Employer is authorized to make under the parties' collec-
tive bargaining agreement and that, by the provisions of said
agreement, the Union has waived the right to demand negotiations over
the mandatory subjects of bargaining for the term of the agreement.
A waiver of the statutory right to mid-term negotiations over the man-
datory subjects of bargaining must be "clear and unmistakable" to be
effective. Saco Valley Teachers Association, supra, at 10-11; State
of Maine v. Maine State Employees Association, 499 A.2d 1228, 1232-
1233 (Me. 1985). In examining whether the management rights and dura-
tion of agreement articles of a collective bargaining agreement
effected a waiver of the statutory right to mid-term bargaining, the
Board stated:

	  All contract provisions must be given due weight as the
     written memorialization of the understandings of the parties
     arrived at through the give and take of negotiations. The
     parties and their representatives are responsible for being
     fully aware of the ramifications of language incorporated in

			      -10-

     their agreements; therefore, when the parties incorporate
     "boilerplate" language in their contracts they are account-
     able for understanding the application of such language,
     including the generally accepted meaning accorded labor
     relations terms of art, to their own circumstances.
     However, the right to bargain proposed changes in working
     conditions is a statutory and not a contractual right, the
     contractual waiver of which must be established by evidence
     of clear relinquishment, whether by express contract term or
     necessary implication.

M.S.A.D. No. 54 Education Association v. M.S.A.D. No. 54, MLRB No.
86-12, 9 NPER ME-18004, slip op. at 12 (Oct. 8, 1986). In considering
the waiver issue in the instant controvery, we must examine both the
management rights and scope of agreement articles of the relevant
collective bargaining agreement.

     The scope of agreement article of the parties' collective
bargaining agreement is set forth in full in paragraph 9 of our find-
ings of fact. Consistent with the decision of the Law Court in State
of Maine v. Maine State Employees Association, 499 A.2d at 1232-1233,
we conclude that the broad language of this article clearly and
unmistakably waived both parties' right to demand negotiations during
the term of the collective bargaining agreement. This holding does
not end our inquiry, since we must also determine whether the Employer
was permitted to change the day on which the unit employees were paid
under the parties' collective bargaining agreement.

     During the term of a collective bargaining agreement, the
employer may only lawfully implement such changes in the mandatory
subjects of bargaining as are permitted under the terms of the
agreement or which are otherwise consistent with the unilateral change
rule. In the instant case, the Employer avers that its authority to
change the day on which the unit employees are paid is based on the
management rights article of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement. The relevant management rights article is quoted in its
entirety in paragraph 10 of the foregoing findings of fact. The spe-
cific authorizations contained in the first paragraph of the article
do not include the right of the Employer to implement the change at
issue. The second paragraph of the relevant management rights article
purports to reserve to the Employer all rights not specifically

				-11-

granted to the Union by the agreement. Both the Law Court and this
Board have held that there are no inherent management rights, other

than the educational policy exception, in public sector labor
relations in Maine.Bath Firefighters Association, supra, at 3;
citing State of Maine v. Maine Labor Relations Board, 413 A.2d 510,
514 (Me. 1980). The attempt to reserve inherent management rights
does not constitute a clear and unmistakable grant of prerogative to
make the change at issue in derogation of the duty to negotiate
thereon.

     The Employer has also argued that, by failing to object to the
change of payday effected on February 28, 1986, the Union has waived
the right to object to the change at issue. We reject this contention
for two reasons. First, the 1986 change involved changing the day on
which the unit employees were paid, from Monday of the following week
to Friday of the week during which the wages being paid were earned.
Since this change resulted in the unit employees receiving their
earned wages earlier than they previously had, the employees probably
perceived the change as favorable and did not want their bargaining
agent to object thereto. Second, this Board has held that a single
instance of failure to object to a prior unilateral change does not,
absent extraordinary circumstances, constitute a clear and unmistakable
waiver of the right to object to subsequent unilateral changes in the
mandatory subjects of bargaining. Maine Teachers Association/National
Education Association v. State Board of Education, MLRB No. 86-14,
9 NPER ME-18005, slip op. at 12 (Nov. 18, 1986). Since the Employer
was not authorized by the collective bargaining agreement to change
the day on which the unit employees are paid and since the Union did
not otherwise waive its right to object to the Employer's action, we
hold that the Employer's unilateral implementation of this change
violated 26 M.R.S.A.  964(1)(E).

     The Employer's final defenses are that the violation established
in the record is de minimis or that the instant controversy is moot.
We cannot accept either of these arguments. We held, in Teamsters
Local Union No. 48 v. Town of Jay, MLRB No. 80-02, supra, at 3-4, that
changing the unit employees' payday, from Tuesdays to Wednesdays of
the same week, constituted a violation of the duty to negotiate in

			       -12-

good faith. The withholding of one week's wages, as was the case here,
is a far more serious matter. Second, the unlawful unilateral change
resulted in the unit employees losing the time value of one week's
wages, Bath Firefighters Association, supra, at 2, and since this harm
continues, the instant controversy is not moot.

     Since we have concluded that the Employer's action violated 26
M.R.S.A.  964(1)(E), we will provide appropriate remedies to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act. 26 M.R.S.A.  968(5)(C). In exer-
cising our remedial authority, we seek "a restoration of the
situation, as nearly as possible, to that which would have obtained"
but for the commission of the prohibited practice. Sanford Highway
Unit v. Town of Sanford, 411 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Me. 1980); Coulombe v.
City of South Portland, MLRB No. 86-11, 9 NPER ME-18008, slip op. at
25 (Dec. 29, 1986). To restore the status quo ante, we will order the
Employer to reinstate the practice of paying the unit employees on
Friday of the same week during which the wages being paid were earned.
We will also order that the Employer, on a payday within 30 days of
the date of this order, pay to each unit employee the wages that that
individual earns during that week plus the one week's wages being
withheld for that employee. We have fashioned this remedial order to
make the employees whole, while according the Employer a reasonable
period of time in which to carry out the payroll change required.

			      ORDER

     On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and discussion and
by virtue of and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor
Relations Board by the provisions of 26 M.R.S.A.  968(5), it is
hereby ORDERED:

     That the Respondents, Washington County Commissioners, and their
representatives and agents, shall:

     (1)  Cease and desist from making unlawful unilateral
	  changes in the day on which the employees that
	  constitute the Washington County Sheriff's
	  Department and Telecommunications Unit and the
	  Washington County Janitors Unit are paid;

     (2)  Within thirty (30) days of the date of this order,
	  reinstate the policy of paying the employees that
		     
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	  constitute the bargaining units mentioned in number
	  1 hereof on Friday of the week during which the
	  wages being paid are earned; and

     (3)  On a payday occurring within thirty (30) days of the
	  date of this order, pay to each employee in the
	  aforementioned bargaining units the wages that that
	  individual earned during that week plus the one
	  week's wages that are being withheld for that
	  employee.


Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 4th day of April, 1989.


					MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD




					/s/__________________________
The parties are advised of              Jessie B. Gunther
their right pursuant to 26              Alternate Chairman
M.R.S.A.  968(5)(F) (1988)
to seek review of this
decision and order by the
Superior Court by filing a              /s/__________________________
complaint in accordance with            Jimmy A. McGregor
Rule 80B of the Rules of Civil          Alternate Employer Representative
Procedure within 15 days of
the date of this decision.

					/s/__________________________
					George W. Lambertson
					Employee Representative


-------------------------------------------------------------




   

    
STATE OF MAINE                          MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
					Case No. 89-07
					Issued: December 12, 1989

___________________________________
				   )
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 48,      )
State, County, Municipal and       )
University Employees in the        )
State of Maine,                    )
				   )
		Complainant,       )
				   )    DECISION AND ORDER ON REMAND
	      v.                   )
				   )
WASHINGTON COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,   )
				   )
		Respondents.       )
___________________________________)
						 

     This is a prohibited practice case, remanded to the Maine Labor
Relations Board ("Board") on October 13, 1989, by Order of the Superior
Court in Washington County Commissioners v. Teamsters Local Union No. 48,
No. CV-89-163 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., Oct. 13, 1989). The Court's
Order mandated as follows:

	  "Appeal GRANTED. April 4, 1989 Order of the Maine
	  Labor Relations Board VACATED. Case remanded to
	  the Maine Labor Relations Board for entry or an
	  order dismissing defendant union's prohibited
	  practice complaint."

     The Board's jurisdiction to render this decision and order lies in 26
M.R.S.A.  968(5)(C) (1988). The findings of fact reported on pages 2-6 of
our April 4, 1989 order were not challenged on appeal and are incorporated
herein by reference. The Superior Court concluded that the Law Court
decision in State v. Maine State Employees Association, 499 A.2d 1228
(Me. 1985), is controlling.

				ORDER

     On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and discussion, and by
virtue of and pursuant to the powers granted to the Maine Labor Relations
Board by the provisions of 26 M.R.S.A.  968(5), it is ORDERED:

				-1-

	  That the prohibited practice complaint brought by
	  Teamsters Local Union No. 48 against the Washington
	  County Commissioners, filed on September 22, 1988,
	  in Case No. 89-07, is hereby dismissed.

Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 12th day of December, 1989.

					MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD


					/s/__________________________
The parties are advised                 Jessie B. Gunther
of their right pursuant                 Alternate Chair
to 26 M.R.S.A.  968(5)(F)
(1988) to seek review of
this decision and order by
the Superior Court by                   /s/__________________________
filing a complaint in                   Jimmy A. McGregor
accordance with Rule 80B                Alternate Employer Representative
of the Rules of Civil
Procedure within 15 days
of the date of this
decision.                               /s/__________________________
					George W. Lambertson
					Employee Representative








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