STATE OF MAINE                                     MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
                                                   MLRB No. 76-IR-01

______________________________________
                                      )
M.S.A.D. #54 EDUCATION ASSOCIATION    )
                                      )
AND                                   )               INTERPRETATIVE RULING
                                      )                 (Joint Request)
M.S.A.D. #54 BOARD OF DIRECTORS       )
______________________________________)
                                       
     The Maine Labor Relations Board having received a "Request to Withdraw
Complaint" in a prohibited practice complaint involving the above-captioned
parties, signed by Donald F. Fontaine, Esquire, Counsel for the Complainants, and
Hugh MacMahon, Counsel for the Respondents, unanimously granted that request on
November 25, 1975.  Subsequent thereto, the Maine Labor Relations Board received
correspondence from Mr. Fontaine, dated December 5, 1975, and Mr. MacMahon, dated
December 8, 1975, requesting an interpretative ruling in the matter pursuant to
the authority granted to the Board under  968, [Par.] 3, of the Public Employees Labor
Relations Act.

     Accordingly, we have addressed ourselves to the following question:

          What uses are contemplated for the ten day notice requirement
          provided in  965, Sub- 1, [Par.] B, of the Public Employees Labor
          Relations Act, and may such notice be used for more than the
          initial bargaining session between the parties?

     Our reading of  965, [Par.] 1, of the Public Employees Labor Relations Act leads us
to believe that there are five separate obligations contained in that section of the
Act.  They are:

          A.  To meet at reasonable times;

          B.  To meet within 10 days after receipt of written notice from
              the other party requesting a meeting for collective bargaining
              purposes provided the parties have not otherwise agreed in a
              prior written contract; (emphasis added)

          C.  To confer and negotiate in good faith with respect to wages,
              hours, working conditions and contract grievance arbitration . . .

          D.  To execute in writing any agreements arrived at, the term of
              any such agreement to be subject to negotiation but shall not
              exceed 3 years; and

          E.  To participate in good faith in the mediation, fact finding, and
              arbitration procedures required by this section.

     Items A and B of this section appear to set standards under which the parties
must operate in determining when they will meet for purposes of collective bargaining.
First, it is apparent that under the provisions of  965, Sub- 1, [Par.] A, the parties
are obligated "to meet at reasonable times."  If they are not able to effectuate
meetings at reasonable times or to agree to a bargaining schedule, then the parties
are obligated to meet within 10 days [pursuant to  965, Sub- 1, [Par.] B, of the Act]
after receipt of written notice from the other party, requesting a meeting for collec-
tive bargaining purposes if the parties have not otherwise agreed in a prior
written contract.

     Pursuant to the foregoing standards we believe that the 10 day notice rule
contained in  965 Sub- 1, [Par.] B, in the Act can be used to start negotiations proce-
dures and must be followed by both parties if either serves on the other a notice to
commence negotiations within a 10 day period.

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     If, after the first meeting for collective bargaining purposes, the parties are
able to agree upon a reasonable schedule to conduct the successive collective bargain-
ing sessions, we believe that the so-called 10 day requirement is no longer operative;
however, such agreement must either be contained in a written contract between the
parties or in a negotiation procedures agreement.  To amplify, we believe that the
parties may agree to a meeting schedule for the purposes of collective bargaining
either in a prior collective bargaining agreement or in a negotiation procedures agree-
ment.  We believe that either of these two types of documents satisfies the requirements
of reaching such an agreement "in a prior written contract" as contemplated in  965,
Sub- 1, [Par.] B, of the Act.

     On the other hand, if, in engaging in a negotiations process, the parties have
failed to reach an agreement either in their collective bargaining agreement or in
a negotiations procedures agreement as to the method and dates for collective bargain-
ing sessions, then either party may rely upon the 10 day notice provision of  965,
Sub- 1, [Par.] B, of the Act in order to institute successive meetings for the purposes
of collective bargaining and to facilitate the bargaining process contemplated under
the Public Employees Labor Relations Act.  We believe that 10 days between collective
bargaining sessions is a reasonable standard and, absent the ability of the parties to
negotiate and jointly agree upon an equivalent standard of reasonableness, we believe
that it is the intent of the Public Employees Labor Relations Act that the 10 day
notice provision may be used in order to enable one party to require the other party
to proceed with collective bargaining without procrastination.

     Further, if an impasse exists and if either of the parties seeks the impasse
resolution procedures of mediation, fact finding, or arbitration, the obligation to
bargain continues unabated.  A different view would enable a party to employ those
procedures as a technique to delay a meeting for bargaining purposes beyond reason.
Consequently, we do not believe that the invoking of impasse resolution procedures
should sidetrack the statutory obligation to bargain in good faith - either by meeting
at reasonable times or, absent an agreement to do otherwise, to meet within a 10 day
period after receipt of written notice from the other party to the negotiations.  In
all instances, we believe the statutory reference to ten days refers to calendar days,
as it has not been annotated otherwise.  This opinion is advisory only, since binding
determinations by the Board are restricted by statute to actual cases presented to it.

Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 11th day of February, 1976.

                                        MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

                                        /s/_____________________________________ 
                                        Walter E. Corey, Chairman

                                        /s/______________________________________
                                        Robert D. Curley, Employer Representative

                                        /s/______________________________________
                                        Eldon L. Hebert, Employee Representative

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