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Home > Maine Hazards > Energy Shortage, Power or Utility Failure

Energy Shortage, Power or Utility Failure *

Description:

Energy Shortage: A significant shortage of any energy resource or the inability to pay for high priced energy resources, which results in a loss of fuel supplies for space heating, emergency and health care service; thereby endangering both life and property.

Power/Utility Failure: Interruption or loss of services for an extended period of time. (Gas, oil, electricity, fiber optics, telephone, microwave towers, water, and sewage sites, etc.)

Situation:

General—

An energy event can be the result of:

  • a short-term crisis when unplanned and unexpected events dramatically impact the supply and availability of resources; or
  • can develop over a longer time period where it is the culmination of an unfolding sequence; or
  • can be a chronic condition or exacerbated by chronic conditions such as over-reliance on a particular type of energy resource, inadequate energy infrastructure, or inefficient use of available energy resources.

Sharp price fluctuations can also be indicators of supply disruptions. An unexpected or dramatic increase in the price of energy resources, therefore, is capable of triggering an energy emergency.

Factors which could singly or in combination result in energy events include weather, world events, and industry conditions, for example:

  • Severe winter cold creates an increased demand for heating fuels at the same time as iced-in ports delay terminal deliveries.

  • A natural disaster such as a hurricane or ice storm destroys energy delivery infrastructure or hinders its use.
  • High summer gasoline demand results in continued refinery production of gasoline and delayed production of home heating oil; cold weather creates demand for home heating oil before inventories are built.
  • Political events result in actions against the U.S., such as the oil embargo that was imposed in the 1970s.
  • Terrorist acts or acts of war destroy energy infrastructure or supply, or slow deliveries to key ports due to safety concerns.
  • Unexpected refinery outages delay just-in-time production and /or delivery of fuels at a time when storage levels are already low.
  • Increased demand for winter fuels displaces refinery production of gasoline.

The potential seriousness of an energy supply or price disruption can vary greatly, and in some cases will depend on exogenous circumstances. Seriousness may depend on such factors as:

  • Situation duration and magnitude;

  • Available storage levels, if applicable, and replenishment options;
  • Availability of energy alternatives;
  • Prevailing weather;
  • Economic conditions; and
  • Financial impact.

Energy resources are interrelated, and disruptions in one type of energy may result in disruptions or issues in other energy markets. For example,

  • Disruptions in natural gas supply may cause electric generation plants or large industrial customers to fuel switch to #2 oil; #2 oil is also used for residential home heating.
  • The percentage of the region’s electric generation fueled by natural gas is increasing; a disruption in natural gas supply could result in electricity shortages.

  • High natural gas prices may make it more profitable to delay production of the gasoline oxygenate MTBE which is made from natural gas and on which much of the region still depends; shortages of MTBE could result in delayed gasoline deliveries to the region.
  • High gasoline demand could result in delayed refinery production of home heating oil; delayed production could mean lower inventory levels, which would make Maine and the region more vulnerable to weather-related supply disruptions.
  • Drought may result in reduced hydroelectric production, stressing fossil fuel supplies.

Product Specific—

Fuel Oil: Fuel oil is used by more than 80% of Maine households for space and water heating, making the state highly dependent on fuel oil supply.

Propane: Propane is the primary heating fuel for about 26,000 Maine households, or about 5.5% of the population. Propane is basically crude oil with natural gas additives, so propane prices generally follow crude oil and natural gas prices.

Kerosene: According to 1995 data, about 39,600 Maine households or about 8.3% of the population heats with kerosene. Kerosene is often the fuel of choice for mobile homes because kerosene when stored outside does not congeal at temperatures below freezing, unlike heating oil.

Natural Gas: While relatively few residential households use natural gas in Maine, numbers are increasing. Maine consumers could be considerably impacted by natural gas supply issues, however, because natural gas is relied on by several of the region’s power plants to generate electricity as well as key industrial users for their energy needs.

Electricity: Electricity is used throughout the state for residential, commercial and industrial purposes. Electric power keeps security and communication systems operating, life-support systems functioning, and computers operating. Any interruption in electricity will have immediate impact on these vital services.

Transportation Fuels: With little public transportation infrastructure, the rural citizens and businesses of Maine depend on transportation fuel for travel as well as to move goods throughout the region. Maine reserves for transportation fuels would probably last about a week if outside supply were interrupted.

Secondary/Cascading Effects:

Although there is not necessarily a connection between an energy emergency and specific other emergency conditions (as, for example, in an earthquake causing a gas line breach or an ice storm causing an electrical outage), there may be more subtle connections, such as:

  • A prolonged period of energy shortage could result in increased crime (e.g. looting during prolonged electric outages).
  • High heating fuel prices or shortages may result in increased reliance on firewood; shortages of dry firewood may result in increased burning of green wood, increasing the risk of chimney fires.
  • Electric outages may result in increased reliance on in-home generators; generators used without proper ventilation can pose safety risks.
  • Energy disruptions may affect other utility sectors; the electricity and telecommunications sectors are increasingly inter-dependent.

Vulnerability:

General—

Maine’s energy vulnerabilities depend not only on the security of Maine-specific resources, but also on the security of resources for the region. Maine is part of larger, regional markets for petroleum products, natural gas, and electricity.

There are increasing interdependencies among utility sectors. Electric generation is increasingly dependent on the availability and deliverability of natural gas. Telecommunications systems rely on electricity to run. Electric industry communications rely on telecommunications infrastructure.

Energy infrastructure is potentially vulnerable not only to natural disasters but also to cyber and physical attack. Increasing dependence on the internet for energy industry communications and dispatch increases vulnerability to cyber-attack. Energy infrastructure is also prone to physical attack, given numerous sources of public information on its location and importance and the accessibility of energy facilities to the public.

Energy security has traditionally been a utility and energy industry responsibility, and access to information (even by energy regulators and emergency personnel) is limited. The security of the regional electric generation on which Maine depends, and all of the electric generation in Maine, is an industry responsibility and unregulated by State government.

Security of interstate facilities such as gas pipelines is also an industry responsibility, with some federal oversight.

Factors Affecting Maine’s Vulnerability, by Product:

Fuel Oil:

  • Maine is at the end of a long supply-distribution system, heavily dependent on ship or barge delivery that is subject to a variety of economic and weather conditions.
  • Just-in-time inventory practices, coupled with limited in system storage, further exacerbate vulnerabilities to supply disruptions.
  • The regional heating oil reserve can, under certain conditions, be used to relieve regional demand and as such may affect price. But because the reserve is located in Linden, New Jersey and New Haven, Connecticut, the oil is unlikely to be deliverable to Maine under emergency conditions.

Propane:

  • A limited number of suppliers and the majority of product delivered to a single facility greatly increase the vulnerability of propane supplies to disruptions.

Kerosene:

  • Homes heated with kerosene often have no alternative-heating source.
  • Many kerosene users are lower income households with less capacity to withstand price shocks.

Natural Gas:

  • The regional supply of gas is augmented by the infusion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) delivered by ship to a Boston area terminal where it is introduced into the pipeline system. This single point of delivery of large amounts of volatile fuel is a significant point of vulnerability.
  • Electric generation plants generally have “nonfirm” contracts for natural gas. Currently, at the regional level, there is insufficient deliverability on a peak winter day for such contracts.

  • There is limited access to, and knowledge of, interstate pipeline vulnerabilities and security plans.

Electricity:

  • Regional electric generating capacity is increasingly dependent on the availability of natural gas. Most new generating plants are gas-fired. While many of these plants are dual fuel in theory, they do not have dual fuel capability in practice. In the event of a major natural gas supply disruption, there would likely be a significant cascading effect for electricity.
  • Security plans for electric generation plants are a private sector responsibility and are generally proprietary and confidential. They are generally not made available to emergency managers.
  • Utility system security is also a private sector responsibility, with input from the MPUC. Utility plans are filed with the MPUC and MEMA but are not regulated per se.
  • Northern Maine’s electricity supply (and associated price) depends in large part on New Brunswick Power’s policies and supply situation.

Transportation Fuels:

  • Industry reliance on just-in-time inventory, limited storage capacity, and the expense and regulatory hurdles associated with increased storage capacity leave Maine vulnerable to supply disruptions.
  • Performance-based gasoline standards allow more than one type of gasoline blend to meet Maine’s air quality requirements. Resistance to fuel specifications unique to Maine and continued support for efforts to develop regional fuel standards will reduce Maine’s vulnerability to supply disruptions.

Emergency Phases:

Mitigation: Proactive mitigation for an energy emergency may include policies, programs, and educational initiatives to encourage increased energy efficiency, energy resource diversity, fuel price risk management (e.g. through pre-buy arrangements), and reducing the vulnerability of at risk populations.

Most utilities have an emergency restoration plan in effect, with priorities given to essential services, emergency responders, and densely populated areas before rural and isolated areas are restored. Many utilities have received mutual aid from utilities not severely impacted when widespread damages occurred.

Routine maintenance and inspections of utility distribution systems minimize the adverse effects in many instances. A periodic review, testing, and revision of emergency response plans is required. Personnel need to be trained to conduct emergency functions which may differ from routine duties.

The Public Utilities Commission oversees utility policy regarding the restoration of services. Critical needs for temporary use of emergency generators are routed through MEMA to the National Guard when an emergency exists.

Preparedness: Preparedness activities center on situation assessment, inter-governmental communication and coordination, and proactive public information. The interagency energy task force provides an effective vehicle for assessing and addressing unfolding energy events.

Response: Potential response to an actual or perceived energy emergency can range from no action, to fuel rationing and/or direct assistance in extreme situations. Where an energy event results from other types of disaster, it is generally addressed as part of that disaster response, as appropriate. But if an energy event occurs in isolation, governmental response must necessarily be situation-specific.

Energy events differ from other types of disasters in fundamental ways. Energy emergencies may develop over time and may impact some groups more than others:

  • An energy supply or price event may develop slowly; effects may seem to be scattered but they accumulate over time.
  • Energy events may not be regarded as emergencies per se, but as economic or personal problems; therefore, there is less likely to be a sense of urgency about preparing for a possible crisis.
  • Petroleum price increases may disproportionately affect the most vulnerable segments of society.

Many agencies and organizations are involved in response, with no single responsible agency:

  • Energy emergency response is decentralized; in many cases, no one state entity is responsible for all potentially relevant assistance or information. Effective response will require cooperation and coordination of resources from multiple entities.
  • Response to an energy event may not fall under the traditional mission of many volunteer organizations; these groups may have no procedures for responding, or criteria for evaluating resulting requests for assistance (this applies to Recovery, also).

An energy event may stress certain resources which are already stressed (e.g., public assistance programs, shelters) or resources that are not available in all areas (e.g., outreach to elderly and folks with special needs.); redirection of other community resources may be necessary. Community centers may be more effective providers of heat, a hot meal, and camaraderie to a reluctant general public than traditional emergency shelters, for example. Outreach to isolated individuals and organizing transportation to and from their homes may also be effective.

Recovery: Recovery programs for energy emergencies are the exception rather than the rule.

Victims may not seek assistance nor be automatically granted assistance as with other disasters:

  • Unlike other types of emergencies, energy events are unlikely to result in disaster relief; victims may need to rely on existing assistance programs and insurance coverage, if applicable.
  • Victims of energy events may be unwilling or embarrassed to ask for public assistance if they do not do so normally; family and neighbors let alone town officials may not know where problems exist. Victims may also not know where to go for help if they want it.
  • Criteria for assistance may be applied differently in different jurisdictions.

Resources Available:

Hazard-specific reference materials will be made available in the EOC for use during response.

Maps:

The Maine Public Utilities Commission (MPUC) and Maine Office of Geological Information Services (MEGIS) maintain GIS coverages of utility-related information. Some critical facility data relating to fuels has been digitized by MEGIS in conjunction with homeland security planning. All MEGIS data is available in the EOC. More data layers may need to be developed.

Inventory Lists:

The MPUC maintains inventory data on regulated utilities (electricity, natural gas). The State Planning Office (SPO) maintains inventory data on fuel oil, transportation fuels, kerosene, and propane.

History:

The MPUC maintains records relating to regulated utilities. The defunct Office of Energy Resources maintained data relating to the petroleum products shortages in the 1970s. Anecdotal reports indicate that historical data was lost when the Office of Energy Resources was disbanded in the early ‘90s. Some data may be in the possession of SPO and the Department of Economic and Community Development. Earlier Energy Emergency Plans are in the possession of SPO and MEMA.


* An occurrence of this hazard could possibly be initiated by a deliberate act.