STATE OF MAINE MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Case No. 00-UD-04
Issued: April 26, 2000
_______________________________
)
MSAD #16 Support Staff Assoc./ )
MEA/NEA, )
) UNIT DETERMINATION REPORT
and )
)
MSAD #16 Board of Directors )
_______________________________)
On March 8, 2000, the Board received a petition for unit determination and bargaining
agent election from Ms. Joan Morin on behalf of the MSAD #16 Support Staff Association/
MEA/NEA. The petition sought to create a bargaining unit composed of MSAD #16
Educational Technicians I, II and III. On March 17, 2000, the Association filed an amended
petition that expanded the proposed unit to also include Custodians and Food Service Workers.
On March 28, 2000, Mr. Campbell Badger submitted the response to the amended petition on
behalf of MSAD #16. The employer's response included a motion to dismiss pursuant to the
contract bar rule contained in MLRB Rule 7.08. fn1. The employer included with its response a copy
of a document titled "Maine School Administrative District No. 16 Support Staff Wage and
Benefit Agreement School Years 1997-2000." The employer also stated in its response that the
petition should be dismissed "because there is currently an incumbent bargaining agent" and
therefore a decertification petition must precede a unit determination petition. In the alternative,
the employer contended that the description of the proposed unit was ambiguous.
On April 4, 2000, I notified the parties that an evidentiary hearing was not needed on the
contract bar issue because, having reviewed the agreement submitted by the employer, I
concluded that it is clear and unambiguous on its face. I gave the parties the opportunity to
submit written argument on whether the document submitted is a valid collective bargaining
agreement within the meaning of the contract bar rule. Both parties chose to submit written
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1. With respect to the Motion to Dismiss, the March 28th response to the amended petition was
essentially the same as the employer's response to the original petition dated March 8, 2000.
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argument on that point. After reviewing the relevant material I conclude that the contract bar
rule is inapplicable in this case. The employer's motion to dismiss is DENIED.
DISCUSSION
The employer argues that the "Wage and Benefit Agreement" submitted is a valid
collective bargaining agreement within the meaning of MLRB Rule 7.08. The contract bar rule
contained in Rule 7.08 is derived from an express provision of the section of the Municipal
Public Employees Labor Relations Law (MPELRL) governing the determination of the
bargaining agent. 26 M.R.S.A. 967. The relevant portion of 967(2) states:
Where there is a valid collective bargaining agreement in effect, no question
concerning unit or representation may be raised except during the period not more
than 90 nor less than 60 days prior to the expiration date of the agreement.
Rule 7.08 provides a more expansive description of the statutory contract bar provision contained
in not only the Municipal Public Employee Labor Relations Law, but also the statutes governing
collective bargaining for state employees, 26 M.R.S.A. 979-F(2)(D), judicial branch employees,
26 M.R.S.A. 1287(3)(C), and employees covered by the University System Act, 26 M.R.S.A
1025(2)(D). Rule 7.08 in its entirety states:
A valid collective bargaining agreement governing the wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment of employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit shall bar the filing of a petition for unit determination, a petition for
certification or a petition for decertification of a majority representative for such
unit during the term of such agreement, not exceeding in duration the period
permitted by statute; provided, however, that a petition for unit determination, for
certification, or for decertification may be filed during the period not more than
ninety and not less than sixty calendar days before the expiration of any such
agreement. Representation proceedings properly initiated by filings during the
window period may be processed at any time after the filing regardless of the
existence of a collective bargaining agreement.
In its written argument on the contract-bar issue dated April 12, 2000, the employer
focuses its discussion on the contents of the "Wage and Benefit Agreement" to support its
position that the contract bar rule should apply. The employer's argument starts with the
conclusive statement that the "Wage and Benefit Agreement" is a collective bargaining
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agreement. The employer then argues that the agreement submitted does, in fact, constitute a
valid collective bargaining agreement within the meaning of Rule 7.08 because it contains
"substantial terms and conditions of employment" and it is "'so complete as to substantially
stabilize labor relations between the parties.'" The so-called standards that the employer quotes
are from two leading National Labor Relations Board contract-bar cases that were quoted by the
hearing examiner in the 1984 Scarborough School Department unit determination case:
Appalachian Shale Products Co., 121 NLRB 1160, 1163 (1958) and Stur-Dee Health Products,
Inc., 248 NLRB 1100, 1100 (1980) quoting Spartan Aircraft Company, 98 NLRB 73, 74-75
(1952). Maine Teachers Association and Scarborough School Department, No. 84-UD-16, at 8,
9 (Me.L.R.B., June 13, 1984) (concluding, for a variety of reasons, that a collection of policies
was not a collective bargaining agreement). The employer implies that the application of these
standards is all that is involved in analyzing a contract bar claim. The employer then went on to
distinguish the "Wage and Benefit Agreement" in the present case from the "policies" that the
hearing examiner in Scarborough School Department found did not constitute a bar. The
employer's argument is based on a distortion of Rule 7.08 that would make any sort of agreement
covering "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment" equivalent to a "valid
collective bargaining agreement" that operates as a bar. fn 2.
An explanation of the context of the contract bar requirement, as established by the
NLRB and adopted by the Maine Board, will help demonstrate why the employer's contract bar
claim is inappropriate in this case. The contract bar policy is based on a balancing of competing
objectives at the heart of both the National Labor Relations Act and Maine's collective
bargaining laws: protecting the employees' right to select their own representatives and
protecting the industrial stability maintained through a collective bargaining agreement. See,
e.g., Appalachian Shale, 121 NLRB at 1161.
The first MLRB case interpreting the statutory contract bar provision found in 967(2)
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2. The standards quoted above help the NLRB define what is a "valid collective bargaining
agreement" for the purposes of applying the contract bar rule, an inquiry that is distinct from determining
what is an enforceable collective bargaining agreement in other contexts, see, e.g., Terrace Gardens Plaza
v. NLRB, 91 F.3d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1996), 153 LRRM 2073, 2076, or, for that matter, what is simply an
individual employment contract.
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was the election appeal case Town of Jay and Teamsters Local Union No. 48, No. 78-A-11,
1 NPER 20-10015 (Me.L.R.B. May 15, 1979). In that case, the Board referred to and adopted
many of the principles of the National Labor Relations Board regarding the NLRB's contract-bar
doctrine. Central to this discussion was the Board's explanation of the purpose of Maine's
statutory contract bar:
The rationale underlying the "contract bar" rule found in [Section 967(2)] is that
the rule fosters stability by preserving as much time as possible during the life of
an agreement free from the disruption caused by organizational activities, while
providing a definite guide to employees and outside unions as to the appropriate
time to organize for and seek changes in representatives. See Deluxe Metal
Furniture Co., 121 NLRB 995, 999-1000 (1958).
In referring to the Deluxe Metal case, the Board was turning to one of a whole series of
decisions issued by the NLRB in 1958 that clarified the NLRB's position on the contract bar
doctrine fn. 3, a doctrine that was already well established by 1958. fn 4. Deluxe Metal established the 60-
day insulated period prior to the expiration of the contract; an insulated period expressly
recognized in the contract bar language contained in MPELRL. See Merrymeeting Employees
Assoc./MTA/NEA and AFSCME and M.S.A.D. #75, No. 88-EA-01, 11 NPER ME-20000
(Me.L.R.B. Sept. 19, 1988)(Decision and Order on Objections to Election) at 5. ("[I]t is apparent
that the statutory "window period" found in our Act has the same policy footing as the rule
adopted by the National Board in [Deluxe Metal].")
In Town of Jay, the Board quoted with approval another decision issued by the NLRB in
1958 that provides a more detailed analysis of the balancing of interests at the heart of the
contract bar rule:
We believe that our contract-bar policy should rest on the fundamental premise
that the postponement of employees' opportunity to select representatives can be
justified only if the statutory objective of encouraging and protecting industrial
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3. The National Labor Relations Act does not contain an express contract bar provision. The
NLRB devised the contract bar doctrine administratively in order to help stabilize labor relations.
4. In that year, the NLRB indicated that the contract bar policy had existed for more than 20 years.
Appalachian Shale, 121 NLRB at 1162.
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stability is effectuated thereby. That objective is served where contracting parties
have entered into mutual and binding commitments thereby reasonably insuring
that for the duration of the agreement neither party will disrupt the bargaining
relationship by unilaterally attempting to force changes in the conditions of
employment upon the other. But to grant the protection of our contract-bar policy
to parties which have not so committed themselves - - either party being free at all
times to dissolve the contract and exert economic pressure upon the other in
support of bargaining demands - - would be to abridge the statutory right of
employees to select representatives without concomitant justification.
Town of Jay, 78-A-11, at 6, quoting Pacific Coast Association of Pulp and Paper Manufacturers,
121 NLRB 990, 994 (1958). The Board applied this rationale to the facts in Town of Jay and
held that the extension of the agreement during negotiations did not bar the filing of a
decertification petition by a rival union because, following the extension of the agreement, the
parties were free to terminate the agreement at all times. Town of Jay, 78-A-11, at 6. There was
no justification for denying the petitioning employees the right to an election because the
employer and the recognized union had not made "mutual and binding commitments" serving to
protect industrial stability. Thus, it is very clear that the Board, like the NLRB, views the
contract bar provision to be based on the need to balance the statutory objective of stabilizing the
bargaining relationship with the statutory right of employees to select their representatives.
In looking closely at the Board's consideration and adoption of the rationale supporting
the NLRB's contract bar doctrine, we see the corollary administrative concern of handling
representation matters expeditiously. The Board noted that the contract bar rule should provide a
"definite guide" that is "easily understood and applied" by the parties and which does not require
complex litigation. These were just the concerns that led the NLRB to revisit its contract bar
doctrine in 1958: The NLRB wanted to simplify the application of the doctrine and reduce the
amount of litigation over the nuances and exceptions that had developed which had only made
the doctrine unnecessarily complex. In Appalachian Shale, the fifth of the key contract bar cases
issued in 1958, the NLRB noted that:
The [NLRB] has been reexamining its contract bar rules with a view toward
simplifying and clarifying their application wherever feasible in the interest of
more expeditious disposition of representation cases and of achieving a finer
balance between the statutory policies of stability in labor relations and the
exercise of free choice in the selection or change of bargaining representatives.
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121 NLRB at 1161. The NLRB proceeded to simplify the application of the doctrine by
removing various exceptions that had developed over the years, explaining, with respect to one
exception addressed, that:
[T]he Board's view [is] that every effort should be made to eliminate the litigation
of factual issues such as these in representation cases and to give greater weight to
the language of the contract itself.
Appalachian Shale, 121 NLRB at 1162. Thus, we can see that both the Maine Labor Relations
Board and the National Labor Relations Board support a contract bar rule that is easy for the
parties to understand and apply on the basis of the contract itself.
In the present case, I conclude that the contract bar rule is inapplicable because there is no
collective bargaining agreement nor is there any collective bargaining relationship to protect. As
noted in Scarborough School Department, a case also involving the application of the contract
bar rule, "collective bargaining agreement" is not explicitly defined in the Act. The Act is quite
clear, however, in imposing a duty to bargain on both parties. Section 965(1) states, "It shall be
the obligation of the public employer and the bargaining agent to bargain collectively" and
defines that to include a mutual obligation to put any agreements arrived at in writing. Thus, to
be a collective bargaining agreement within the context of the Act, there must be a bargaining
agent, a public employer, and an agreement. See Scarborough School Dept., 84-UD-16, at 10 ("It
is quite clear . . . that a collective bargaining agreement, within the context of the Act, is an
accord reached between a public employer and a bargaining agent for a definite unit of public
employees."). While the document submitted may be some sort of agreement between the
signatories, it is not a collective bargaining agreement. Put simply, there can be no collective
bargaining agreement when there is no certified or recognized bargaining agent.
Section 962(2) defines "bargaining agent" as:
"Bargaining agent" means any lawful organization, association or individual
representative of such organization or association which has as its primary
purpose the representation of employees in their employment relations with
employers, and which has been determined by the public employer or by the
executive director of the board to be the choice of the majority of the unit as their
representative. (emphasis added.)
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There are two parts to this definition, neither of which is satisfied in this case. Not only is there
no identifiable organization or association involved, there is no indication that any person or
entity has been certified by the Board or recognized by the employer as "the choice of the
majority of the unit as their representative." fn 5
Recognition or certification of a bargaining agent is the cornerstone of the collective
bargaining process. Without a recognized or certified bargaining agent, "collective bargaining" is
by definition impossible because the "collective" part is missing. With respect to Board
certification, the Board files indicate that there once was a certified bargaining agent for some of
the positions at issue. A unit of the MSAD #16 Teacher Aides, Teacher Assistants, and Teacher
Associates was created by a Unit Determination Report dated March 17, 1982. The last activity
of any sort in that unit file is the Election Report and Decertification of the Maine Teachers
Association, dated December 7, 1984. The Board files contain no subsequent certification nor
any documents suggesting a new unit was created. fn 6
Likewise, the Board files do not include any voluntary recognition of a bargaining agent
by the employer nor any evidence that such recognition has been granted. Board Rule 3.01(A)
requires that the parties submit a voluntary recognition form to the Board offices "[w]hen the
parties agree that a prospective bargaining agent represents the majority of employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit." While we certainly prefer to have voluntary recognition forms filed
with our office, it would be inconsistent with our mandate to improve labor-management
relations to disrupt an established bona fide collective bargaining relationship simply because the
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5. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not use the term "bargaining agent." The
NLRA defines "labor organization" as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
respresentation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C.152(5). The NLRA does not include the
express requirement present in Maine's statutes that a bargaining agent be certified or recognized by the
employer as the majority representative.
6. In general, the following information is contained in bargaining unit files maintained at the
Board: petitions to create or modify bargaining units, election petitions and reports, unit determination
or clarification reports, all correspondence regarding a unit, and requests for assignment of mediators,
fact finders and some arbitration services. The files on prohibited practice complaints are kept
separately.
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parties failed to supply us with the proper form.fn 7 Other than through a voluntary recognition
form, the most common mechanism for voluntarily recognizing a bargaining agent as "the choice
of the majority of the unit as their representative" (and one that is often, but not always,
sufficient) is through the recognition clause of a collective bargaining agreement. Typically, a
collective bargaining agreement will contain a recognition clause in which the employer
recognizes the particular bargaining agent as the exclusive representative of all of the employees
in the specified bargaining unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.
In this case, the MSAD #16 "Support Staff Wage and Benefit Agreement" submitted by
the employer includes a provision that, although entitled "Recognition," actually does nothing of
the sort. The Agreement's "Recognition" clause provides in full:
RECOGNITION
A. This Agreement has been established by the M.S.A.D. #16 Board of Directors
and representatives from the M.S.A.D. #16 support staff for the school years
1997-2000. The Board of Directors, or its representatives, will meet during the
1999-2000 year with support staff representatives to review the new items and
conditions of this Agreement.
This is clearly not sufficient to serve as voluntary recognition of a bargaining agent for the
purposes of collective bargaining. This provision does not contain even a hint of any of the
elements that make up valid recognition: there is no recognition nor any acknowledgment that
the "representatives" are the choice of the majority of the employees, there is no reference to any
bargaining unit of employees, fn 8 there is no reference to the collective bargaining process, to the
application of the MPELRL to the relationship, to negotiations with the "representatives" or to
__________________
7. The primary purpose of requiring the submission of a voluntary recognition form is to enable the
Board to publish a "Notice of Voluntary Recognition" for the benefit of employees and others. The
parties benefit because that notice triggers a one-year bar to challenges to the voluntary recognition. See
MLRB Rule 3.01(A) and (B).
8.In the provision of the agreement immediately following the "Recognition" clause, where one
might expect to find a definition of the bargaining unit affected, the employer simply defines "Support
Staff" to include a list of specified positions. The fact that the employer does so without making use of
the term "bargaining unit" or even "unit" is noteworthy.
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any sort of bargaining relationship. It seems to be merely recognition that an agreement was
"established" (first sentence) and a statement that in the final year of the agreement, the School
Board will meet with "support staff representatives" to "review the new items and conditions of
the agreement" (second sentence). It is telling that the word "established" was used in the first
sentence and the word "review" was used in the second sentence, rather than words based on
"negotiate" or "bargain."
This is not to say that, in the absence of a certification or voluntary recognition of a
bargaining agent, the contract must include a precisely worded recognition clause in order for the
contract bar rule to apply. It is conceivable that the Board could find that a bona fide bargaining
relationship exists even though a contract includes an imperfectly-worded recognition clause or
no recognition clause at all. If, for example, a contract is entered into by the "President/Chief
Negotiator" of an association of employees and the contract itself says it was entered into
"pursuant to the provisions of the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law," there is a
strong suggestion that the employer has voluntarily recognized the bargaining agent and that the
contract was the product of legitimate collective bargaining. If the collective bargaining
agreement in question also contained a grievance procedure for resolving disputes regarding the
interpretation of the contract with the final step going to an outside arbitrator, that indicates that
the collective bargaining agreement serves to maintain industrial stability, something that the
contract bar rule is intended to protect. See, Scarborough School Dept., 84-UD-16, at 10;
Appalachian Shale, 121 NLRB at 1163. If the evidence in the Board's files also shows that those
same parties had utilized the interest arbitration procedure set forth in the statute to resolve a
prior negotiations dispute, that is further evidence of the existence of a bargaining relationship
that preceded the current contract. Obviously, the stronger and more consistent the evidence, the
greater the inference of recognition.
In the present case, the "Wage and Benefit Agreement" is clear and unambiguous. There
is no recognition of a bargaining agent nor is there any direct or indirect acknowledgment of a
collective bargaining relationship. On the contrary, there are many examples of artful wording in
the agreement that suggest that the employer was intentionally avoiding language that is normally
associated with collective bargaining. While none of these items carry much weight alone, they
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do illustrate a consistent and rather thorough effort on the part of the drafter to avoid any
language that might be viewed as indicative of a bona fide collective bargaining agreement and
establishing an on-going duty to negotiate.
For example, the agreement is titled "Maine School Administrative District No. 16
Support Staff Wage and Benefit Agreement School Years 1997-2000." There is nothing in the
title of the agreement to suggest that it is the product of collective bargaining. There is nothing
in the contents suggesting even indirectly the existence of a bargaining agent, of a formal or
informal organization or association of employees, or any role for "representatives from the
support staff" other than attending an annual meeting on job descriptions and reclassification
requests. fn9 There is no process for raising issues regarding terms and conditions of employment
with the employer other than a procedure for appealing discipline or discharge decisions to the
Superintendent, whose decision is final. That procedure does not mention any role for a
representative. Significantly, because there is no grievance procedure to resolve differences
regarding the interpretation of the agreement, it is hard to see how the Wage and Benefit
Agreement can serve to maintain industrial stability. See, e.g., Scarborough School Dept., 84-
UD-16, at 10; Appalachian Shale, 121 NLRB at 1163 ("[T]o serve as a bar, a contract must
contain substantial terms and conditions of employment deemed sufficient to stabilize the
bargaining relationship."). Just as there is nothing to suggest that a bargaining relationship exists
or continues during the term of the agreement, there is nothing in the contents of the agreement
to suggest that prior to signing the document there was any bargaining, negotiations, or even
discussions regarding the substance of the document.
Consistent with the pointed failure of the employer to recognize any bargaining agent is
the absence of any reference in the agreement to the actual status of the "support staff
representatives." There is, not surprisingly, no mention of any sort of support staff "association,"
"organization," or "union." The employer never even uses the definite article before
"representatives" --that is, it is not "the representatives" of the support staff but always a more
____________________
9. The employer's claim that this is a mechanism "to address important concerns regarding . . .
working conditions" is an overstatement. Individual contracts of employment do this are are,
nevertheless, not collective bargaining agreements within the meaning of the Act.
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indefinite reference to "representatives from the support staff" or "support staff representatives."
When combined with the absence of certification or recognition of a bargaining agent, this
omission brings into question whether the "representatives" of the support staff have any
authority to bind the other employees in the first place, let alone to maintain industrial stability
through enforcement of the agreement. See, e.g., J.P. Sand and Gravel Co., 222 NLRB 83
(1976), and Scarborough, 84-UD-16, at 11. An agreement is not enforceable as a collective
bargaining agreement when there is no bargaining agent and no bargaining relationship.
Even the wording of the employer's response claiming that "there is currently an
incumbent bargaining agent," rather than a reference to a "recognized bargaining agent" that
would be expected where there is true recognition, appears to be a disingenuous attempt to claim
the existence of a bargaining agent without saying anything that might be considered to be actual
recognition. In addition, the employer studiously avoids the use of the term "collective
bargaining" or "negotiations" in its written submissions to the Board, other than referring to the
document as a collective bargaining agreement, which obviously would be hard to avoid when
claiming a contract bar.
In summary, the application of the contract bar rule contained in 967(2) and MLRB Rule
7.08 requires the existence of a "valid collective bargaining agreement." For there to be a
"collective bargaining agreement," there must first be a bargaining agent. Under 962(2), a
"bargaining agent" is an organization or association that has been certified by the Board or
recognized by the employer as the choice of the majority of the employees in the unit. Here,
there is no Board certification nor is there any voluntary recognition by the employer.
Consequently, the "Wage and Benefit Agreement" at issue is not a collective bargaining
agreement and the contract bar rule does not apply. The employer's motion to dismiss is hereby
DENIED.
With the contract bar issue dispensed with, there remains only one matter regarding the
positions included in the bargaining unit proposed by the Association. As previously mentioned,
the original petition filed on March 8, 2000, sought to create a bargaining unit composed of
Educational Technicians I, II and III. The amended petition sought a unit composed of
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Custodians, Food Service Workers, and Educational Technicians I, II and III.
In the employer's response to the amended petition, there is no claim that the proposed
bargaining unit is not an appropriate bargaining unit. Nor does the employer contend that any of
the positions in the proposed unit should be excluded from the bargaining unit on the basis of any
of the statutory exclusions in section 962(6). The employer simply claims that the unit described
"is ambiguous because it could conceivably include positions (library, media and library/media
technicians) which have traditionally been treated as separate classifications from the education
technicians, although such positions do require educational technician authorization." The
employer submits that those classifications should be excluded from the unit.
I disagree with the employer's contention that the Library, Media and Library/Media
Technicians should not be included in the unit. First of all, the employer recognizes that these
positions require educational technician authorization and that they share a community of interest
with the other employees. fn10 Second, the employer's statement that the unit description "could
conceivably include" the library and media technicians is at odds with the employer's previous
position in its response to the original petition, in which it stated that those positions were
included in a unit made up of Educational Technicians I, II and III. The employer initially
considered them to be included and claimed no ambiguity at that point. Finally, in the unit
determination proceeding that ultimately created the bargaining unit of Teacher Assistants,
Teacher Aides, and Teacher Associates in 1982, the union (not the employer) argued that the two
Teacher Aides working in the school libraries should be in a separate unit. The hearing examiner
agreed with the employer's argument that a unit of all Teacher Assistants, Aides and Associates
was appropriate. Thus, a unit composed of the three predecessor positions to what are now
Educational Technicians I, II and III very clearly included the aides working in the libraries.
Accordingly, I conclude that the employer's claim that the proposed unit of Food Service
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10. In the employer's response to the original petition, which sought a unit of Educational
Technicians I, II and III, the employer claimed that the library, media and library/media technicians did
not share a community of interest with the other Educational Technicians, in addition to the arguments
supporting its motion to dismiss. This contention that there was not community of interest was not
included in the employer's response to the amended petition, which sought a broader unit. Given that the
substance of the employer's arguments for its motion to dismiss are restated in full in its response to the
amended petition, I conclude that the community of interest argument was intentionally dropped.
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Workers, Custodians, and Educational Technicians I, II and III does not include those
Educational Technicians employed as library, media or library/media technicians is unfounded.
Although it is not absolutely necessary, for the sake of clarity I will restate the
uncontested description of the unit incorporating my conclusions above. This bargaining unit
description will be the basis for the bargaining agent election to be conducted by the Board
within the coming weeks. The unit is composed of:
Included: Employees who have been employed for more than six (6) months in positions as
Food Service Workers, Custodians, Educational Technicians I, II and III which
includes library technicians, media technicians and library/media technicians.
Excluded: All other employees of MSAD #16.
If the parties agree that a different description of the bargaining unit is called for, they
may submit an agreement on appropriate unit (MLRB Form 1) at any time to the Board. If the
parties desire that the change in the bargaining unit be effective prior to the upcoming bargaining
agent election, the Form 1 Agreement must be received prior to the distribution of the Election
Notice, which is currently scheduled for May 12, 2000.
Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 26th day of April, 2000.
MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
_________________________________
Lisa Copenhaver
Board Counsel
The parties are hereby advised of their right, pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. 968(4), to appeal this
report to the Maine Labor Relations Board. To initiate such an appeal, the party seeking
appellate review must file a notice of appeal with the Board within fifteen (15) days of the date of
issuance of this report. See Board Rules 1.12 and 7.03 for requirements.
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