This Law Court case is not an appeal of an MLRB decision.
It has been placed on the Board's website because it is a
noteworthy case involving Maine's public sector collective
bargaining laws.
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
Decision: 7078
Docket: CUM-93-781
Argued: September 21, 1994
Decided: December 19, 1994
TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL #340 and RALPH DOBSON
v.
PORTLAND WATER DISTRICT
Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, and RUDMAN, JJ.
WATHEN, C.J.
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Plaintiffs, Teamsters Union Local #340 and Ralph Dobson, appeal from
a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Saufley, J.)
denying their application to compel arbitration of an employment grievance
involving Dobson's employer, the Portland Water District ("District").
Because we conclude as an initial matter that the District has no
obligation to arbitrate this grievance after the expiration of the
collective bargaining agreement, we affirm without reaching the ground
relied on by the Superior Court.[fn]1
The facts may be summarized as follows: In April and May of 1993, a
number of Portland Water District employees, including Dobson, conducted
informational picketing on Douglass Street in front of the District's
headquarters to protest stalled collective bargaining negotiations. The
prior collective bargaining agreement had expired in December of 1992.
When the employees went to work, they put picket signs on their cars and
parked them on Douglass Street in violation of the District's written
parking policy that prohibited parking on Douglass Street during
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1. The Superior Court determined that the decision by the Maine Labor
Relations Board dismissing plaintiffs' prohibited practices complaint
represents a final adjudication in an administrative proceeding and has
res judicata effect in arbitration on the issue of whether Dobson was
terminated for just cause.
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the workday. The District disciplined Dobson pursuant to a progressive
discipline policy that provides for a documented verbal warning, a written
warning, a one day suspension, a five day suspension, a last chance final
written warning, and then discharge. On returning to work after his five
day suspension and last chance final written warning, Dobson again parked
his car on Douglass Street and was subsequently discharged.
In addition to grieving the discipline, plaintiffs Dobson and the
Union filed a prohibited practice complaint with the Maine Labor Relations
Board claiming that the parking policy was selectively enforced to limit
the rights of union members in violation of 26 M.R.S.A. 964.[fn]2 The
Board denied the District's request to defer to arbitration. After a
hearing, the Board issued an oral ruling dismissing the charges of
prohibited practices, followed by a written decision on September 7, 1993.
No appeal was taken from the Board's decision.
Plaintiffs then attempted to proceed to arbitration on the issue of
whether Dobson had been dismissed for just cause. The District refused
to arbitrate and, pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. 5928,[fn]3 plaintiffs filed
an application to compel arbitration in the Superior Court. After
reviewing the Board's decision, and hearing oral argument by the parties,
the court denied plaintiffs' application, finding that "there remains
nothing that an arbitrator could determine without either collaterally
attacking the decision of the Board or simply affirming the Board's
decision." Plaintiffs appeal, contending that the District is obligated
to arbitrate and that the Board's decision does not have res judicata
effect on the issue of Dobson's termination for just cause.[fn]4
Plaintiffs argue that the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement does not extinguish the District's duty to arbitrate disputes
arising under the agreement. They further assert that a dispute arises
under a collective bargaining agreement when it concerns an obligation
created by the expired agreement so that resolution of the dispute hinges
on the interpretation of the contract clause that engendered the claim.
Plaintiffs argue that Dobson's claim hinges on an interpretation of the
phrase "just cause" and thus the District's obligation to arbitrate the
grievance was not extinguished by the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement. We disagree.
As a matter of law, no obligation exists to arbitrate a grievance
that arises after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement
unless that grievance involves rights that vested or accrued, or facts or
occurrences that arose while the collective bargaining agreement was in
effect. Lane v. Bd. of Directors of Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 8,
447 A.2d 806 (Me. 1982).[fn]5 Here we are
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2. 26 M.R.S.A. 964 provides in part: "Public employers, their
representatives and their agents are prohibited from:
A. Interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed in section 963;"
963 enumerates the rights of public employees to join labor
organizations.
3. 14 M.R.S.A. 5928 provides in part: "1. On application of a party
showing an agreement described in section 5927 and the opposing party's
refusal to arbitrate, the court shall order the parties to proceed to
arbitration, but if the opposing party denies the existence of the
agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the
determination of the issue so raised and shall order arbitration if
found for the moving party, otherwise, the application shall be denied."
14 M.R.S.A. 5927 provides in part: "A written agreement to submit
any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written
contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising
between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
4. Plaintiffs also argue that the District's request to defer the dispute
to arbitration operates as an acknowledgment that it has an obligation to
arbitrate the grievance. This argument completely ignores the well
established principle that parties may always agree to arbitrate. The
District's willingness to arbitrate at a specific point in time cannot
reasonably be said to represent an acknowledgment that it has an
obligation to arbitrate.
5. We have traditionally looked to the National Labor Relations Board
and the federal courts' interpretations of the federal labor laws for
guidance in interpreting and enforcing our Municipal Public Employees
Labor Relations Act. See M.S.A.D. No. 43 Teachers Ass'n v. M.S.A.D.
No. 43 Bd. of Directors, 432 A.2d 395, 398, n.6 (Me.1981). A recent
decision of the United State Supreme Court confirms our ruling in Lane.
In Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. N.L.R.B., the Court addressed the question
of whether a dispute over post-expiration layoffs arose "under the
agreement despite its expiration" and was thus subject to arbitration
under the expired agreement. 501 U.S. 190, 115 L. Ed. 2d 177,
111 S. Ct. 2215 (1991). In deciding that there was no obligation to
arbitrate the layoff decisions, the Court held that the right to
arbitration exists "only where a dispute has its real source in the
contract. The object of an arbitration clause is to implement a contract,
not to transcend it." . . . "A post expiration grievance can be said to
arise under the contract only where it involves facts and occurrences
that arose before expiration, where an action taken after expiration
infringes a right that accrued or vested under the agreement, or where,
under normal principles of contract interpretation, the disputed
contractual right survives expiration of the remainder of the agreement."
Id. at 205-06. The Court further stated that "arbitration is a matter of
consent and that it will not be imposed upon parties beyond the scope of
their agreement." Id. at 201. Additionally, the Court noted that, "in
the absence of a binding method for resolution of post expiration
disputes, a party may be relegated to filing an unfair labor practices
charge with the [N.L.R.B.]." Id.
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dealing with neither vested rights nor an occurrence during the term of
the collective bargaining agreement. While an agreement is in effect, the
terms and conditions therein are enforceable as a matter of contract and
may be subject to arbitration. Once the agreement expires, however, the
parties lose their contractual rights and are left with only the statutory
duty to bargain in good faith. Lane, 447 A.2d 810. This duty requires
the parties to maintain the status quo until either a new contract is
ratified, or the negotiations reach a bona fide impasse. The remedy for
a breach of the duty is a prohibited practice complaint before the Board,
rather than grievance arbitration under the expired contract. Id. at
809-810.
Dobson's grievance did not arise until approximately five months
after the agreement had expired and his claim of termination without
"just cause" does not involve rights that either vested or accrued under
the agreement while it was still in effect. Consequently, the District
is under no obligation to arbitrate the grievance and we need go no
further.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
All concurring.
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