Caribou School Dept. v. Teachers Assn. & MLRB, 402 A.2d 1279, setting 
aside Superior Court decision C-78-56 and affirming in part and modifying
in part Board decision No. 77-34.

Date Opinion Filed                           Reporter of Decisions
June 19, 1979                                Decision No. 2087
                                             Law Docket No. Ar-78-12
                     CARIBOU SCHOOL DEPARTMENT
                     MAINE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
          Caribou Teachers Association (hereafter "Association")
appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Aroostook County)
vacating a decision of the Maine Labor Relations Board finding a
violation on the part of the Caribou School Department (hereafter
"Department") of the statutory duty to bargain in good faith set
forth in 26 M.R.S.A.  964(1)(E) (1974).[fn]1  The Association main-
tains that the Superior Court erred in deciding that the Board's
decision was without evidentiary support.  We agree with the Asso-
ciation, and accordingly sustain the appeal.  We find it necessary.
however, to modify the relief granted by the Board.
          On January 6, 1976, the Association and the Department
conducted their first collective bargaining session, seeking a
  26 M.R.S.A.  964(1) provides in part:  "Public Employers, their
  representatives and their agents are prohibited from . . . (E)
  Refusing to bargain collectively with the bargaining agent of
  its employees as required by section 965."  26 M.R.S.A.  965
    "(1) Negotiations  It shall be the obligation of the public
     employer and the bargaining agent to bargain collectively.
     'Collective bargaining' means, for the purposes of this chap-
     ter, their mutual obligation . . . (C) To confer and negotiate
     in good faith with respect to wages, hours, working conditions
     and contract grievance arbitration . . .

contract to succeed the 1975-76 contract then in effect, which
would expire on July 31, 1976.  The parties agreed on certain
"ground rules" for the upcoming negotiations, including a ground
rule providing:  "Once the packages for negotiations are exchanged,
no other items may be submitted unless mutually agreed."  The
parties contemplated that if no change in a particular article
of the existing 1975-76 contract was proposed by either side at
the first exchange of contract proposals, then that article would
remain unchanged from the old 1975-76 contract to the successor
contract.[fn]2  The purpose of this ground rule was to insure that
the area of disagreement between the two sides would become pro-
gressively smaller and that new issues would not later be raised
unilaterally, thus upsetting balances and partial bargains already
struck in the negotiating process.
          On January 6, 1976, the parties exchanged their initial
collective bargaining proposals.  Neither side proposed any change
in Article XXIXA of the 1975-76 contract.  That article, entitled
"Duration of Contract," provided in part:
          "This agreement shall be effective as of August 1,
     1975, and shall continue in effect until July 31, 1976
     subject to the Association's right to negotiate over a
     successor agreement . . ..
           "This agreement shall not be extended orally and it
     is expressly understood that it shall expire on the date
  The Department's first item in its initial proposal reflected
  this understanding, stating that "All articles in the current
  contract, except as proposed shall remain in effect, except for
  Articles IVA and XXVI which shall be deleted from the contract."

          The failure to propose any change in this article thus
resulted in the incorporation of a similar article into the suc-
cessor contract, providing for a new contract for a one-year
period starting August 1, 1976.  This one-year contract term
was identical to the one-year terms which had characterized the
three preceding collective bargaining contracts for 1973-74,
1974-75, and 1975-76.  The initial bargaining proposals exchanged
by the Association and the Department were both labeled as con-
tract proposals for the year 1976-77.
          On March 11, 1976, the Association requested, pursuant
to 26 M.R.S.A.  965(3) (1974), that a factfinding panel be
appointed to hear issues in controversy arising from the negoti-
ations.  On March 16, 1976, the Department requested that a medi-
ator be assigned pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A.  965(2) (1974) to at-
tempt to resolve disputed issues.  Neither the Department's medi-
ation request nor the Association's factfinding request listed
the starting date of the successor contract as an issue in dispute.
Mediation was held on April 7, 1976, and no discussion of the term
of the successor contract took place.  A factfinding hearing was
held on June 4, 1976, and the factfinder's report issued on June
29, 1976, made no mention of the term of the successor contract.
          At a negotiation session held on August 9, 1976, over
eight months after the commencement of negotiations and nine
days after the expiration of the preceding contract, the Depart-
ment attempted, for the first time, to introduce the issue of the
effective date of the successor contract.  Citing the ground rule

that provided that no issue not raised in the initial bargaining
proposals could be raised without the consent of both parties,
the Association refused to negotiate on this issue.
          On October 6, 1976, the parties participated in inter-
est arbitration.  26 M.R.S.A.  965(4) (1974).  The Department
again requested discussion of the term of the successor contract,
and the Association again objected, alleging that it was not a
proper subject for consideration by the arbitration panel.  The
panel requested post-hearing materials on the question of whether
the effective date of the new contract was properly before the
panel.  On December 31, 1976, the panel issued its award, which
included a rejection of the Department's proposal to discuss the
effective date of the new contract.  Neither party sought review
of the arbitration award as provided for by 26 M.R.S.A.  972
          On the ground that the Association had not complied
with the 120-day notice requirement of 26 M.R.S.A.  965(1) (1974),
the Department refused to discuss a wage increase throughout the
negotiations conducted in 1976.  In early 1977, however, the par-
ties agreed for the first time to discuss wages.  Concerned that
almost half of the 1976-77 school year had already elapsed without
the attainment of a collective bargaining contract, the Department
agreed to discuss a wage increase in return for the Association's
consent to enter into a one and one-half year contract instead of
the customary one-year contract.  While willing to agree to extend
the term of the new contract through July 31, 1978, the Association

contended that the effective starting date of the contract had
to remain August 1, 1976.  The Department, however, contended
that the new contract should commence on December 31, 1976,
leaving the parties without any contract for the period between
August 1 and December 31, 1976.[fn]3
          On February 18, 1977, the parties reached agreement on
all issues in dispute save for the issue concerning the effective
date of the new contract.  A new contract was entered into which
contained the following provision:
          "ARTICLE XXXI.  Duration of Agreement.  This Agree-
     ment shall be effective as of December 31, 1976 and shall
     continue in effect until July 31, 1978, subject to the
     Association's right to negotiate over a successor agree-
     ment as provided in Article II.*"  (Asterisk in original)
At the insistence of the Association, the asterisk at the end of
the above-quoted sentence was placed in the contract to refer to
a caveat reading:
          "With regard to the effective date of this con-
     tract, execution of this agreement does not prejudice
     the Association from seeking a determination relative
     to retroactivity."
  Assuming that the Association had failed to provide the notice
  of intent required by section 965(1), and further assuming,
  without deciding, that the Department was authorized to waive
  noncompliance with the statutory notice requirement, the Depart-
  ment was free to negotiate concerning a pay raise which could
  start on any date during the term of the successor contract.
  But instead of insisting simply on a wage increase effective
  date of December 31, 1976, the Department insisted that the
  entire contract not take effect until December 31.  Given the
  negotiation ground rule and the August 1 effective date of the
  preceding one-year contract, the Department was not entitled to
  attempt to renegotiate the starting date of the entire collec-
  tive bargaining contract as long as the Association objected to
  negotiation on this topic.

The caveat reserved to the Association the right to test the
validity of deferring the start of the new contract until Decem-
ber 31, 1976; in other words, to test the validity of leaving
the Caribou teachers and school department without any contract
for the last five months of 1976.[fn]4
          Implementing the reservation of rights contained in
that caveat, on April 11, 1977, the Association filed, pursuant
to 26 M.R.S.A.  968(5)(B) (1974), a prohibited practices com-
plaint with the Maine Labor Relations Board, alleging that the
Department's insistence on a contract starting date different
from August 1, 1976, was a violation of the duty to bargain in
good faith.  26 M.R.S.A.  964(1)(E) (1974).  After a prehearing
conference, two evidentiary hearings, and receipt of briefs from
the parties, the Board issued its decision on February 1, 1978,
holding that the Department had committed a breach of its duty
to bargain in good faith.  Having concluded that the Association
  The asterisked caveat cannot be read to enlarge or limit in any
  way the Maine Labor Relations Board's powers to grant remedial
  relief to a party aggrieved by a violation of 26 M.R.S.A.  964
  (1)(E) (1974).  The terms of the caveat did not purport to set
  forth agreed-upon remedies in the event the Board should later
  determine that the Department had failed to bargain in good faith.
  The caveat simply reserved to the Association the opportunity of
  asserting whatever legal rights it had "with regard to the effec-
  tive date of this contract."  It did not purport to give any sub-
  stantive legal rights to the Association.  As the Board declared
  in its decision, the caveat merely served the purpose of negating
  any implication of waiver by the Association:  "[The caveat]
  clearly reserves to the Association the right to a determination
  of the effective date of the contract without waiving the right
  by executing the agreement, and we conclude that the execution of
  the collective bargaining agreement did not waive the Association's
  right to object under the ground rule."

had not waived its right to object to the contract provision
setting December 31, 1976, as the effective date of the contract,
the Board--"[t]o remedy the violation"--ordered the Department to
"give retroactive effect to the contract executed February 18, 1977
to August 1, 1976" and to "pay any additional wages and benefits
due therefrom with legal interest."
          The Department then filed a complaint in Superior Court
pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A.  968(5)(F) and Rule 80B of the Maine Rules
of Civil Procedure, seeking judicial review of the Board's decision.
On August 3, 1978, the Superior Court entered judgment in favor of
the Department, vacating the decision of the Board.  The Superior
Court stated that the record of the proceedings before the Board
was "totally void of any indication of bad faith bargaining" on
behalf of the Department.  The Board's decision, according to the
Superior Court, "[a]mounted to a finding of a per se violation"
based on the Board's determination that the Department had violated
the ground rule against raising new issues after the initial ex-
change of bargaining proposals without the consent of both parties.
The Association then prosecuted this appeal to the Law Court.
          After a careful review of the record and the Board's
decision, we conclude that the Board did not base its finding
solely on the fact that the negotiation ground rule had been
violated by the Department.  Though there is some language in
the Board's decision that might create the false impression that
the Board applied a per se rule equating any violation of a nego-
tiation ground rule with a violation of the duty to bargain in

good faith, we find that the Board relied on other evidence of
bad faith bargaining as well.[fn]5
          The Board's decision did not rest alone on a technical
violation of the negotiation ground rule.  Instead, the Board
examined that violation in the context of the eight months of
collective bargaining negotiations from January 6, 1976, to
August 9, 1976, and against a background of a history of col-
lective bargaining contracts between the parties which consis-
tently called for contracts of one year's duration starting on
August 1.  The plain inference to be drawn from the ground rules
and the initial proposal submissions in January 1976, as well as
from the subsequent negotiations at least until August 9, is that
both parties understood that the new contract would begin, as had
the existing and prior contracts, on August 1.  Neither party
proposed, nor reasonably could have had in contemplation, nego-
tiating a new contract that would not commence until some months
after the expiration of the existing contract, leaving an hiatus
during which neither party would have any contractual protection.
          Against that factual background the Department's eight-
month delay in raising the issue of the effective date of the new
contract and its failure to raise the issue before the factfinding
panel or the mediator reasonably led the Association to believe
that this issue was settled.  The Department's subsequent injec-

  We need not decide, therefore, whether the Board has the author-
  ity to promulgate such a per se rule concerning the breach of a
  negotiating ground rule.

tion of the issue for the first time is evidence of a lack of
good faith bargaining.  Under the National Labor Relations Act
(29 U.S.C.A.  151 et seq.), which is analogous to the state
act at issue in this case, such a delay in introducing a con-
tract issue while the other party proceeds under the impression
that the issue is settled is evidence of dilatory tactics and
bad faith.  Cf. NLRB v. New England Die Casting Co., 116 N.L.R.B.
1, enforcement granted 242 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1957).
          In NLRB v. Altex Mfg. Co., 307 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1962),
the employer and the union agreed on January 12, 1960, that a
collective bargaining contract which had previously expired on
November 30, 1959, would be renewed and extended through June 30,
1960.  They also agreed that negotiations for a successor con-
tract to take effect on July 1, 1960, would be limited to wages
and monetary issues, and that all other contract provisions in
the preceding contract would remain in force in the successor
contract.  Negotiations for the successor contract commenced on
May 27, 1960, yet it was not until December of 1960 that the
employer took the position that all provisions of the successor
contract were open for renegotiation.  The employer's delay in
raising the nonmonetary issues, coupled with the January 12, 1960,
agreement to limit negotiations to monetary issues only, was held
to constitute sufficient evidence to support a finding that the
employer violated his federal statutory duty to bargain in good
faith.  Id. at 874.
          Similarly, in another federal case the parties bargained

for over seven months for a proposed contract for one year's
duration.  Then, for the first time, the employer stated that
it doubted the union's majority status and suggested that the
proposed contract should cover a period of merely seven weeks.
In affirming a finding of bad faith bargaining, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals opined:
          "This kind of cat and mouse game is not good faith
     bargaining; it is its exact opposite, a negation of the
     employer's duty . . . to enter into discussion with an
     open and fair mind, and a sincere purpose to find a basis
     of agreement . . . ."  NLRB v. Holmes Tuttle Broadway
     Ford, Inc., 465 F.2d 717, 719 (9th Cir. 1972).
          We find the rationale of Altex and Holmes applicable
in the case at bar.  The Board had before it evidence of (1) the 
Department's belated attempt to raise the issue of the effective
date of the contract seven months after the start of collective
bargaining; (2) its proffer of an initial bargaining proposal en-
titled "District Proposal, 1976-77," leading the Association to
believe that the customary one-year contract commencing August 1
was contemplated; and (3) its violation of the ground rule for
negotiations barring one side from unilaterally raising an issue
not raised in the initial bargaining proposal of either party.
Taken together, this evidence provided more than adequate support
for the Board's finding of a failure to bargain in good faith in
violation of 26 M.R.S.A.  964(1)(E) (1974).
          Although we have concluded that the Board was correct
in finding a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith, we
are unable to affirm that part of the Board's decision which

compels the Department to make retroactive payment of wage and
benefit increases.  This portion of the Board's order exceeds
the proper scope of remedial action authorized by 26 M.R.S.A.
 968(5)(C) (1974).
          To begin with, the language of section 968(5)(C),[fn]6
used by the Maine legislature in 1971 to prescribe the Board's
power to remedy violations of the act, is nearly identical to
the comparable provision of the National Labor Relations Act
first adopted by Congress in 1935.  The Maine statute reads as
          "After hearing and argument if, upon a preponder-
     ance of the evidence received, the board shall be of the
     opinion that any party named in the complaint has engaged
     in or is engaging in any such prohibited practice, then
     the board shall in writing state its findings of fact
     and the reasons for its conclusions and shall issue and
     cause to be served upon such party an order requiring such
     party to cease and desist from such prohibited practice
     and to take such affirmative action, including reinstate-
     ment of employees with or without back pay, as will effec-
     tuate the policies of this chapter."  (Emphasis added)
The Maine "policies of this chapter," which the Maine Labor Rela-
tions Board is authorized to take affirmative action to effectuate,
are for present purposes substantially the same as the policies
of the federal labor law.  Compare 26 M.R.S.A.  964(1)(E), 965(1)
(1974) with 29 U.S.C.A.  158(a)(5), 158(d) (1973).
  The Maine statute is identical to 29 U.S.C.A.  160(c) (1973)
  except that it substitutes the word "party" for the word "per-
  son" and the term "prohibited practice" for the term "unfair
  labor practice."

          Since the Maine legislature, in defining the Maine
Labor Relations Board's powers to grant relief, chose to employ
the same statutory language as that employed by Congress, the
legislature must be understood to have intended the Maine Board
to have the same powers, and only the same powers, as those given
the National Labor Relations Board by the federal act as con-
strued by the federal courts.
          The N.L.R.B. is authorized to issue remedial orders
once it has found a statutory violation.  However, "the power to
command affirmative action is remedial, not punitive."  Republic
Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 12 (1940).  See Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235 (1938).  "[T]he purpose
of Board remedies is to rectify the harm done the injured workers,
not to provide punitive measures against errant employers."  Local
57, International Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295,
303 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 387 U.S. 942 (1967).  A properly
designed remedial order seeks "a restoration of the situation, as
nearly as possible, to that which would have obtained" but for the
unfair labor practice.  Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177,
194 (1941).  In enacting section 968(5)(C) the Maine legislature,
by taking over the federal statute without any significant change
in language, could not have meant to work any change in statutory
intendment.  Thus our law, like the federal law, contemplates reme-
dial Board orders only and does not authorize punitive orders seek-
ing to deter future violations of the act.
          The Maine Labor Relations Board, having found the viola-

tion of the Department's duty to bargain in good faith, had then
the task of fashioning remedial relief.  The Department's viola-
tion arose out of its insistence that the whole contract should
not go into effect until December 31, 1976, leaving a gap of near-
ly five months with no operative contract between the parties.  The
scope of the permissible wage negotiations extended to both the
amount and the effective period of any wage increase.  The Depart-
ment was within its rights in limiting the period of time for which
it would agree to pay the negotiated wage increase.  By signing the
February 18, 1977, contract, it agreed to a wage increase of a cer-
tain amount contingent upon all other terms of that contract, includ-
ing a starting date of December 31, 1976.  It agreed to nothing more.
          In fashioning a remedy, the Maine Labor Relations Board
is authorized "to take such affirmative action . . . as will effec-
tuate the policies of this chapter."  26 M.R.S.A.  968(5)(C), su-
pra.  One of those policies is set forth in 26 M.R.S.A.  965(1)(C),
which provides in part that "neither party shall be compelled to
agree to a proposal or be required to make a concession  . . .."  In
nearly identical language the National Labor Relations Board is in-
structed "to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate
the policies of this subchapter."  29 U.S.C.A.  160(c) (1973).
Similarly, the obligation to bargain in good faith, under federal
law, "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or re-
quire the making of a concession."  29 U.S.C.A.  158(d) (1973).
          The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the
National Labor Relations Board's remedial powers under 29 U.S.C.A.

 160(c) (1973) are limited by the effect of 29 U.S.C.A.  158(d)
(1973).  The interplay between 26 M.R.S.A.  968(5)(C) and 965
(1)(C) (1976) must be construed in a similar manner.  As the
United States Supreme Court observed in H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,
397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970):
     "One of [the] fundamental policies [of the National
      Labor Relations Act] is freedom of contract. . . .
      [A]llowing the Board to compel agreement when the
      parties themselves are unable to agree would violate
      the fundamental premise on which the Act is based--
      private bargaining under governmental supervision
      of the procedure alone, without any official compul-
      sion over the actual terms of the contract."
      (Emphasis added)
          In Porter the National Labor Relations Board found the
employer had violated its duty to bargain in good faith by refus-
ing to discuss the union's request that the contract include an
automatic union dues check-off provision.  In fashioning a remedy
for this violation, the Board ordered the employer to include a
union dues check-off clause in the contract.  The Supreme Court,
however, while approving the finding of a failure to bargain in
good faith, set aside that portion of the Board's order directing
the employer to include the check-off clause in the collective
bargaining contract.  The Court noted that the National Labor
Relations Act requires the employer to negotiate with respect
to such a clause, but it does not require the employer to agree
to such a contract provision.
          Similarly, in Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d
1343, 1351 (5th Cir. 1978), the Court stated:

     "Even though the company did violate its duty to bargain
      by refusing to discuss the possibility of [including the
      employees in] the company's profit-sharing/retirement
      plan, we are unable to enforce that part of the Board's
      order which requires the company to create [profit-sharing]
      accounts for those employees . . ..  The Board justifies
      this remedy as an effort to recreate the status quo ante
      existing before the adoption of the [successor] contract.
      It obviously does not. . . .  The Board order creates a
      status novus which would exist only if the employees had
      succeeded in getting . . . coverage under . . . the com-
      pany's profit-sharing/retirement plan . . ..
           "Even though the company violated the Act, there is
      no way to evaluate, or even to identify, the harm flowing
      to the employees as a result of that violation. . . .
           "Of course, the Board cannot fashion remedies on the
      basis of an assumption as to what the parties would have
      agreed to absent an employer's failure to bargain in
      good faith."  (Emphasis added)
Accord Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), enf'd as modified
sub nom. International Union, U.A.,A.& A.I. Workers v. NLRB, 449
F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
          Applying this clearly applicable law to the circumstances
of the present case, we find no difficulty in concluding that the
Maine Labor Relations Board exceeded its powers in imposing upon
the Caribou School Department against its will the duty of paying
a wage increase during the last five months of 1976.  The Depart-
ment had never, directly or indirectly, agreed to any change in
wages to become effective at any date earlier than December 31,
1976.  Even though the Board correctly found that the Department
violated the Act by failing to bargain in good faith, there is,
in the above-quoted words of the Fifth Circuit in the Winn-Dixie
case, supra, "no way to evaluate, or even to identify, the harm
flowing to the employees as a result of that violation."  Neither

the Board nor this court can speculate "as to what the parties
would have agreed to [relative to a wage increase] absent [the]
employer's failure to bargain in good faith."  Id.
          The Department and the Association had, prior to their
February 18, 1977, contract, arrived at a partial agreement to
the effect (1) that the new contract would start on August 1, 1976,
and (2) that undisputed contract terms would be taken over unchanged
into the new contract.  That is as far as the parties had agreed
prior to February 18, 1977.  That partial agreement arose out of
their negotiation ground rule adopted in January 1976 and their
exchange of negotiating proposals pursuant to the ground rule.  In
subject matter that partial agreement was strictly limited to the
starting date and duration of the new contract and the carry-over
of the unchanged provisions of the old contract.7[fn]  Any changed
provisions of the new contract, including any increase in wages
and the date any increase should go into effect, was left to be
negotiated.  They remained contingent upon either a meeting of

  We reject any notion that the Department in January 1976 bound
  itself to pay any negotiated wage increase from August 1, 1976,
  regardless of the fact that the Department contracted to pay
  the increase in February 1977 only as part of a total package
  providing, inter alia, for extension of the new contract for
  an additional year and start of the wage increase and other
  changes on December 31, 1976.  The Board did not find that any
  such broader agreement arose from the January 1976 transactions
  between the parties, but rather--after finding the Department
  by introducing a new subject on August 9, 1976, had violated
  section 964(1)(E)--ordered the Department to pay the wage in-
  crease retroactively, in order "[t]o remedy the violation."
  The record, in our judgment, would not support any broader
  construction of the parties' January 1976 agreement than that
  found by the Board.

minds between the negotiating parties or a binding decision in
interest arbitration.[fn]8  There simply never was any meeting of
minds on any wage increase to go into effect prior to December
31, 1976; and the wage increase could never be the subject of
binding arbitration.  The Board ordered the Department involun-
tarily to pay the increased wages for a period during which the
Department never agreed to pay.
          Thus, even though we affirm the Maine Labor Relations
Board's decision that the Department violated section 964(1)(E),
we find it necessary to modify the Board's order.  The operation
of the ground rules for negotiation, together with the parties'
initial bargaining proposals exchanged on January 6, 1976, re-
sulted in a partial agreement binding the parties to incorporate

  Where the parties fail to reach an agreement on subjects of
  negotiation, the legislature has provided a statutory mechanism
  for resolving disagreement by submitting disputes to binding
  or advisory interest arbitration.  26 M.R.S.A.  965(4) (1974)
  states that:  "With respect to a controversy over salaries, pen-
  sions and insurance, the arbitrators will recommend terms of
  settlement and may make findings of fact; such recommendations
  and findings will be advisory only . . .; with respect to a
  controversy over subjects other than salaries, pensions and in-
  surance, the arbitrators shall make determinations with respect
  thereto . . . and if made by a majority of the arbitrators, such
  determinations will be binding on both parties and the parties
  will enter an agreement or take whatever other action that may
  be appropriate to carry out and effectuate such binding deter-
  minations . . .."  (Emphasis added)  Thus, except for disputes
  over salaries, pensions, and insurance, a decision of the major-
  ity of a panel of arbitrators may be substituted for a meeting
  of the minds between the negotiating parties.  In the case at
  bar, however, the interest arbitrators were powerless to mandate
  a wage increase.  The Board's order requiring a wage increase
  for a period prior to December 31, 1976 (the date agreed upon
  by the Department), cannot be predicated upon a decision of the
  interest arbitration panel.

several terms of the preceding 1975-76 contract into the succes-
sor contract, which took effect on August 1, 1976.[fn]9  Also, both
parties, were bound by all those terms involving matters other
than "salaries, pensions and insurance" that the interest arbi-
trators had mandated to be effective starting August 1, 1976.
All those terms binding upon the parties either by the January
1976 partial agreement or by the interest arbitration might be
enforced by a remedial order of the Maine Labor Relations Board.
Cf. Taft Broadcasting Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1971).[fn]10
The Board, by going beyond that point and ordering a wage increase
retroactively to August 1, 1976, was making a contract for the
parties and was mandating a contract term that even the interest
arbitrators were forbidden to impose upon the parties.  Such an
order was not "remedial" relief within the authority of the Board.
          We therefore remand and direct the Superior Court to
enter an order of the following tenor:
   Although we cannot affirm that portion of the Board's order which
   grants the Association a retroactive wage increase as of August 1,
   1976, we are nonetheless granting the Association and its members
   substantial relief by recognizing the continued effectiveness
   after August 1 of all those provisions of the 1975-76 contract
   which both parties under the ground rules had agreed to carry
   forward without change.  As is illustrated by the companion case
   of Caribou Board of Education v. Caribou Teachers Association,
   Me., ___ A.2d ___ (June 19, 1979), also decided today, the exis-
   tence of contractual provisions, such as those governing griev-
   ance arbitration, during the last five months of 1976 are of
   considerable importance to the teachers.
   A complete discussion of Taft may be found in the companion de-
   cision in Caribou Board of Education v. Caribou Teachers Associ-
   ation, Me., ___ A.2d ___ (June 19, 1979), also decided today.

     "It is hereby ordered that:
          (1) that portion of the Maine Labor Relations
      Board's decision finding a violation of the duty to
      bargain in good faith by Caribou School Department
      is affirmed;
          (2) that portion of the Board's order requiring
      Caribou School Department to pay retroactive wage and
      benefit increases for the period from August 1, 1976,
      to December 31, 1976, is reversed and vacated;
          (3) the Board's decision is modified to declare
      that the parties from August 1, 1976, to December 31,
      1976, were bound by all those provisions of their
      1975-76 contract that were not put in issue by either
      party in its collective bargaining proposal of Janu-
      ary 6, 1976; and
          (4) the parties were bound for the same period
      by all determinations made by a majority of the in-
      terest arbitrators, except for determinations made
      concerning teachers' salaries, pensions or insurance."
          The entry must be:
                                 Appeal sustained.
                                 Judgment of the Superior Court
                                 set aside.
                                 Case remanded to the Superior
                                 Court for entry of an order as
                                 directed in this opinion.
                                 Costs on appeal allowed to
                                 neither party.
Wernick, J., did not sit.

Dufresne, A.R.J., sat by assignment.
Pomeroy, Archibald, Delahanty, Godfrey, Nichols, JJ.,
and Dufresne, Jr., A.R.J., concurring.